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AN OPTIMUM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR A 
LARGE EARTH-ORBITING MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
SPACE BASE 
James M. Ragusa 
NASA, John F. Kennedy Space Center 
INTRODUCTION 
This study was concerned with the determination of an 
optimum hypothetical organizational structure for a large 
earth-orbiting multidIsädplinary research and applications 
Space Base manned by a mixed crew of 50 to 100 domestic and 
foreign technologists. Designed for a useful ten-year 
pperating life, Space Base would be assembled and supplied 
with equipment, personnel, and food by a reusable Space 
Shuttle. This facility would serve to greatly expand 
advancements in the sciences, exploration, public and 
private services, and foreign relations. For discussion 
and analysis purposes, organizational structure was defined 
to be the established pattern or deliberate grouping of 
relationships among the components or parts of a formal 
organization to achieve specific goals. It was character-
ized by planned division of activities, leadership, and 
communications responsibilities. Another salient feature 
was the presence of a hierarchy of authority needed to 
plan, control, and direct, and coordinate the concerted 
efforts of the organization toward its goal in an orderly 
manner.
viii
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AN OPTIMUM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR A 
LARGE EARTH-ORBITING MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
SPACE BASE 
James M. Ragusa 
NASA, John F. Kennedy Space Center 
I. BACKGROUND 
Space Base Background and
Program Objectives 
This study was concerned with the determination 
of an optimum hypothetical organizational structure for 
a large earth-orbiting multidisciplinary research and 
applications (R&A) Space Base. The facility would support 
a heterogeneous crew of 50 to 100 male and female scien-
tists, engineers, and technicians working for extended 
periods on a variety of R&A experiments and projects. 
While this space community does not presently exist, it 
is planned to be operational within the next two decades. 
Several photographs of artist's concepts of a Space Base 
and a modular laboratory mockup are contained in Appendix 
A.
National interest in this type of facility began 
on February 13, 1969, with the appointment of a Space 
Task Group by President Richard M. Nixon. The purpose of 
this ad hoc group was to study the direction and pace of 
post-Apollo manned space flight programs. Significant 
recommendations presented to the President in September, 
1969, relating to future space programs included 
1
2 
1. Development of a modular12-man Space Station 
laboratory by 1975, to be followed in-1985 by a 
much larger permanent Space Base. This latter 
laboratory would be created by modular additions 
to the Space Station, and would accommodate a 
crew of 50 to 100 people, including large numbers 
of scientists and engineers of various skills. 
2. Development of a reusable Space Shuttle which can 
be flown over and over, perhaps 100 times, to pro-
vide logistics in the form of supplies, crew rota-
tibn, and exchange of scientific instruments and 
data--to support Space Station and Space Base 
activities. 
To delineate Space Base program objectives, NASA 
identified the following activity categories and examples: 
1. Technology Forcing Function--This program is 
intrinsic in the development, use, growth, and 
continual updating of a major space facility and 
its equipment. 
2. Sciences--The combined environment, facilities, 
and crew of the Space Base will provide excellent 
research opportunities in many disciplines (e.g., 
astronomy, life sciences, physics, and chemistry). 
3. ExDloration--This Space Base Program will provide 
essential data acquisition, equipment development 
and qualification, and operational concept demon-
stration and training for future manned missions 
to the moon and planets. 
4. Public Services--Global surveys in Earth resources 
and meteorological disciplines will be conducted 
primarily for the development of better equipment 
and techniques, but also for the collection of 
user-oriented data. 
5. Foreign Relations--The Space Base Program provides 
a focal point for productive international coopera-
tion and joint ventures, including the use of 
foreign nationals as members of the onboard tech-
nical team. 
1William J. Normyle, "Future Goals of NASA 
Described," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 13, 
1969, pp. 39-42.(Emphasis added].
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6. Private Sector Support--Unique materials and 
manufacturing research will come out of the pro-
gram, as might production services thatexploit 
the zero-g and hard-vacuum environment. 
7. Orbital Operations--The Space Base will provide 
a servicing and maintenance platform for both 
unmanned spacecraft in Earth orbit and in transit 
to and from the moon and deep space.1 
Space Base is intended to be a large facility in 
earth orbit supporting highly flexible multidisciplinary 
R&A activities similar to advanced, existing facilities on 
earth. There will be some differences, however, since 
the Space Base will utilize and exploit the unique features 
provided by low-earth orbit (270 nautical miles), such as 
weightlessness, unlimited vacuum, and rapid earth and 
unobstructed celestial viewing. The flexibility of design 
for this facility would allow support of R&A. activities, 
and interplanetary missions which are not presently defined 
in detail. 2 
Space Base will be a semipermanent facility with a 
minimum operational life of ten years with resupply. 3 The 
facility will allow large numbers of international and 
domestic technologists the opportunity to carry out varied 
R&A activities as well as female scientists and engineers 
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Space Base Concept Data, Volume 1, June, 1970 (Huntington 
Beach, Calif.: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, 
1970), p. 9. 
2lbid., p. s.	 3lbid., p. 57.
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who will be allowed to participate as crew members.' These 
technologists, as well as the Space Base, will be relatively 
autonomous from earth control, thus reducing the requirement 
for round-the-clock mission control activities on the 
ground. 2
 The highly skilled specialists will be afforded an 
opportunity to conduct experiments, develop new technologies, 
materials, and processes that cannot be accomplished on 
earth. In time, other government agencies will be given the 
opportunity to use the facility for work in their own areas 
of responsibilities in much the same way that government-
owned ground-based laboratories are used today. The facility 
will provide an opportunity to implement cooperative inter-
national programs in the sciences and beneficial earth 
applications. 3 
It is envisioned that a portion of the total in-
orbit crew will be devoted to Space Base operations. This 
group will be responsible for system operation and status, 
safety of the entire crew, onboard procedures, coordination 
with group personnel, scheduling of facilities use, and 
information management. Another group assigned to medical 
1Nieson S. Himmel, "Advanced Space Station Concepts," 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 22, 1969, p. 
100.
2National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Statement of Work: Space Station Program Definition (Phase 
'1, April14, 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 196), p. 1-6. 
31bid., pp. 4-30-4-31.
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operations will cater to the general health of the drew. 
Needed physiological and psychological services would be 
provided by a multidisciplined medical team. Yet another 
in-orbit group assigned to Space Base maintenance will 
repair and maintain subsystems and experiment equipment, will 
perform assembly and modifications, and will provide house-
keeping and food services as necessary. Engineers and 
technicians will be required for specialized skills in 
instrumentation, system operation, and repair. 1 This 
group may be responsi ble for the various logistics 
activities required. 
Purpose of the Study. 
The broad purpose in conducting this study was to 
add to the body of knowledge regarding the role of organi-
zational structure in human endeavor. The current research 
effort was designed to identify an optimum hypothetical 
organizational structure for a Space Base. The primary. 
question answered by this research was what is the 
preferred organizational structure for optimizing the 
mission accomplishments of the various technologists who 
will work and live in a large multidisciplinary earth-
orbiting Space Base? 
To answer the primary question of the study, the 
following elemental questions were considered: 
1 lbid., p. A-8.
1. What known Space Base program requirements are 
important to organizational structure selection, 
and what assumptions must be made? 
2. What related studies provide insight into Space 
Base organizational structure selection? 
3. What variables are important to the selection 
of an organizational structure for a Space 
Base? 
4. 'What type of organi tIônál"t±ucth±e bêst" 
serves the needs of technical professionals? 
5. How appropriate to Space Base are the multitude 
of social systems and environmental situations 
involving isolation, confinement, and situa-
tional danger; and what can be learned from the 
most applicable analogs with regard to Space 
Base organizational structural selection? 
6. What evaluation criteria should be used to 
select the preferred Space Base organizational 
structure? 
7. What variations to basic classical and modern 
organizational structural models should be 
considered for Space Base use and why? 
8. What analyses can be used to assess feasible 
classical and modern organizational structures 
and select the preferred one? 
For discussion and analysis purposes, Space Base 
organizational structure was defined as the established 
pattern or deliberate grouping of relationships among the 
components or parts of a formal organization to achieve 
specific goals. It was characterized by planned division 
of activities, leadership, and communications responsi-
bilities; and the presence of a hierarchy of authority 
needed to plan, control, direct, and coordinate the con-
certed efforts of the organization towards its goals. 
Other definitions are specified in the study when required,
7 
and are listed in Appendix B. 
While the next section discusses the need for 
Qrganizational structure in professional organizations, it 
should be realized that the right structure will do much 
to ensure Space Base program success. Properly selected, 
organizational structure will enable on-board NASA managers 
to accomplish objectives and plans through various activi-
ties. A few of themore significant ones include 	 (1) 
establishing and maintaining the organization's character-
istic and processes in good functioning order, (2) coordi-
nating activities, (3) managing resources, (4) maintaining 
crew morale, health, and safety, and (5) providing training 
and indoctrination.' While these activities are diversified, 
they have one thing in common -they all require resource 
management, especially human activity. 
Need for the Study 
High Program Costs 
The high costs anticipated for future programs such 
as Space Base, dictate that program objectives be maximized 
through effective and efficient operations. While a dollar 
cost has not been estimated for a full-duration Space Base 
program, part of the cost will be associated with crew 
'National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Crew 
9prations StudSr of Command Structure, by Samuel C. Campbell, 
Perry L. Gardner, and Robert H. Schaefer (Bethpage, New York: 
Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 1971), p. 8.
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operations of the facility and selection, training, and 
transportation of personnel. These costs will probably be 
in the millions of dollars. 
The American taxpayers, their congressional representatives, 
and the President's Office of Management and Budget have 
recently put pressure on NASA to provide more benefits from 
space activities at a reduced cost. These desires have 
caused NASA's Deputy Administrator to note that because budgets 
are imposed by external forces NASA has little control over 
budgetary constraints, but NASA can and must do something 
about the high cost of doing business in space. He, therefore, 
concluded that NASA's biggest challenge was achieving that 
1 goal.
The Need for a Productive Crew 
While an optimum organizational structure will not 
guarantee that Space Base will be a low cost program, it 
will greatly aid that goal through productive crew perfor-
mance. One justification used to identify an optimum 
organizational structure for a twelve-man Space Station by 
Campbell, Gardner, and Schaefer of the Grumman Corporation 
was that since the crew was probably the most important 
component of the total system, it must be used as productively 
1George M. Low, "NASA's Attack on the Cost Problem," 
Address given at the National Security Industrial Associa-
tion and Armed Forces Management Association Symposium, 
Washington, D.C., August 16,. 1972.
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as other resources. 1 This need supports the view of 
Likert, who strongly believes that, "of all the tasks of 
management, managing the human component is the central and 
most important task because all else depends upon how well 
it is done."2 
Campbell, et al. went on to say that while it is 
difficult to predict crew productivity, evidence derived 
from similar earthbased analogs indicated that crew perfor-
mance will most likely degrade with time. They concluded as 
a result of their studies that organizational structure was 
an important means of achieving and insuring long-term crew 
productivity. 3 In the opinion of the researcher, the concern 
for crew productivity over extended periods of time for the 
much larger Space Base crew makes the problem even more 
serious.
Unique Crew Composition
and Environment 
It was envisioned in this study that the technol-
ogists required for Space Base R&A activities and operations 
will have qualifications different from those of the astronauts 
who will command Space Shuttle vehicles and participate in other 
'NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure, 
P. 1.
2Rensis Likert, The Human Organization: Its Manage-
ment and Value (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1967), 
P. 1.
3NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure, 
P. iii.
10 
manned programs. The Space Base crew will include people 
with a variety of skills and cultural backgrounds which 
must be recognized. These people must be organized to function 
productively through harmonious interpersonal relationships. 
In addition, problems can arise because technologists have 
certain distinct characteristics, attitudes, and needs 
which must be satisfied if optimum mission results are to 
be achieved. 
In addition to a varied crew composition, the Space 
Base program will place in-orbit NASA managers in the unique 
situation of managing groups of highly skilled, non-astro-
naut trained or non-space disciplined personnel in a space 
environment. In spite of limited training and exposure to 
space, these technologists will be expected to live and work 
in an autonomous environment under conditions of semiconfine-
ment, isolation, and zero gravity. They will work and live 
with the world and their ground-based colleagues, to a 
certain extent, looking on. 
The need to consider unique crew composition and 
environment of space crews was recognized by Campbell, et al. 
who acknowledged that a properly designed organizational 
structure provided the mechanism and a link between socio-
logical-psychological considerations and the human engineer-
ing aspects of physical configuration. When an organizational 
structure provides clear avenues of communications, responsi-
bility, and authority while being responsive to the crew's
11 
human needs, energies can be better directed toward the 
mission and its goals. 1 But clearly, the problem and main 
challenge for those who develop organizations, according 
to Etzioni, is to construct human groupings that are as 
rational as possible, which at the same time produce a 
minimum of undesirable side effects and a maximum of 
satisfaction 
Research on research within the planned Space Base 
was, therefore, justified to identify an organizational 
structure which makes orderly, effective, and efficient 
R&A activities and operations possible.. If an optimum 
Space Base organizational structure can be identified at 
an early date, facility design considerations, personnel 
selection criteria, and training plans can be developed 
and implemented in the intermediate future. In the longer 
run, organizational structure testing in analogous 
environments and other useful management studies will do 
much to ensure the ultimate success of the total program. 
If these actions are taken, the United States can probably 
enhance its prestige and preeminence in major fields of 
science and technology for the benefit of ailmankind: 
through a program the nation can afford. 
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space 
Station Crew Operations Study: _Technical Proposal, by Samuel 
C. Campbell, Perry L. Gardner and Robert H. Schaefer (Beth-
page, New York: Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 1970), p. 1. 
2Ainitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. 3.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 2.
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Meod1 - 
This section prese erview of the sequential, 
analytical, and systematic methodology used in the study to 
obtain and analyze data and reach conclusions. The use of 
this methodology provided an answer to the primary study 
question through the development of answers, from various 
sources, to the elemental questions. 
Henry Tosi discusses the, contention of Lykken that 
replication is required for corroboration of theories 
within the domain of the social sciences. Tosi also lists 
and defines the degree of replication identified. 
Lykken briefly outlines three replication strategies: 
(1) literal replication is exact duplication of the 
first research; (2) operational replication is dupli-
cation of the sampling and experimental procedures; 
and (3) constructive replication occurs when an 
independent researcher begins with the findings of a 
study and uses other constructs of t  concepts in 
the first to examine.the hypothesis. 
The methodology used for this study was, to a 
certain extent, an opera9naJ '$...'cation of a NASA funded, 
Grumman Corporation ana1y dntify a preferred Space 
Station command structure-. 2 The methodology of the present study 
served as an extension, with cerain . modifications, of the 
Grumman effort with the applicatidn being Space Base instead 
of Space Station Data	 and analysis activities, 
'Henry Tosi, "Organizational Stress As a Moderator 
of the Relationship Between Influence and Role Response," 
Academy of Management Journal, XIV (March, 1971), 12. 
2NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure.
ibraries. These documents 
NASA developed 
reviewed. This litera
-	 - 
the following phases: like those of the Grumi
(1) data research, (2) de f organizational 
structural evaluation critef	 t4:a set of feasible models, 
and (3) evaluation of feasible models and selection of the 
optimum one ,. In general, these phases are contained in 
Sections II, III, and IV, respectively. 
Data Research 
Sources of data 
Data were obtained from a number of sources for a 
variety of reasons. More specifically, these sources 
included	 (1) reviews of primary and secondary literature, 
(2) visitation and examination of certain Space Base 
analogs where appropriate and practical, and (3) interviews 
with knowledgeable persons. 
Primary and secondary literature was obtained from 
NASA and various univer 
consisted essentially of 
and/or sponsored püblica
	 rious other publications 
relating to the subject Th..bIiography contains a listing 
of appropriate books,
	
lès, and miscellaneous materials 
two general categories: 
organization/management t1 1oral science, and ana-
logs/space activities The .ategory contained a 
copious quantity of information€hé second was more 
restricted.
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A large portion of this literature was identified 
by the use of NASA's RECON (reconnaissance by REmote CON-
trol) system. A remote terminal located at the John F. 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida, was used to electronically 
search the literature stored in NASA's Scientific and 
Technical Information Facility in College Park, Maryland. 
Both the NASA RECON system and University Microfilms of 
Ann Arbor, Michigan indicated, however, that limited appli-
cable information exists for Space Bases, and that no 
dissertations or theses have been written on the topic 
under analysis. The primary and secondary data which was 
found was essential to section II and subsequent chapters, 
as was information obtained from the visitations/examina-
tion and interview activities discussed next. 
A number of Space Base analogs were visited and 
examined by the researcher during the study. These included 
Space Station mockups, a nuclear powered submarine, and the 
Ben Franklin research submersible. The Space Station mockups 
visited were located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama. Tours through fourteen feet 
and thirty-three foot diameter facilities were accomplished 
on November 16, 1971. These full-scale Space Station 
versions with their supporting documentation provided in-
sight into the physical environment and constraints in 
which crew personnel would have to work and live. 
A nuclear powered Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)
15 
submarine was visited on December - 10, 1971. The submarine 
was the USS Nathanael Greene (SSBN 636), normally on opera-
tional patrol. The vessel was on a training mission at 
the time, operating at a maximum depth of 200 feet in 
preparation for a training launch of one of its Poseidon. 
missiles. The last visit was to the Grumman/Ben Franklin 
research submersible on December 28, 1971. On that day 
the submarine was in dry dock at its berth in Riveria 
Beach, Florida. It was from this port that this vessel 
began its training/certification dives and its historic 
thirty day Gulf Stream drift mission-on July 14, 1969. 
There are several reasons why visitations were made 
to only these analogs. The first was that analysis 
accomplished by the researcher, discussed later, indicated 
that the analogs visited (and several others) had the most 
similarity to Space Base. The second reason was that while 
it would have been ideal to visit and examine first hand a 
number of analogous Space Base environments, this was 
impossible. The reasons were that some are no longer 
operating programs, others are not even in existence, and 
some situations because of their diversity or location were 
not feasible to visit for economic reasons. Fortunately, 
a large body of literature exists for these analogs;-there-
fore, visitation is desirable but not mandatory. 
Personnel interviews with knowledgeable individuals
16 
provided additional primary data. NASA, military, and 
contractor management, and operating and planning personnel 
at various levels were interviewed to ensure thorough 
coverage. This multilevel approach permitted cross-checks 
to assure accuracy of reporting. Unstructured questions 
with follow-on questions were asked with continual refine-
ment of questions as the interviews proceeded. The purpose 
of using interviews was to identify and/or verify significant 
factors and considerations which affect organizational 
structure. Results of these interviews are presented in 
subsequent sections when appropriate and significant. 
Specific topics investigated 
Topics relating to Space Base organizational 
structural considerations which were investigated during 
this study were (1) program requirements and assumptions, 
(2) related studies, (3) general and specific organizational 
structural variables, (4) the nature of professional organ-
izations and technical professionals, and (5) applicable 
analogs.
The identification of program requirements and 
assumptions was necessary to answer the first elemental 
question: What known Space Base program requirements are 
important to organizational structure selection, and what 
assumptions must be made? The requirements identified in 
several NASA and contractor sources were considered by NASA 
to be mandatory and essential to ensure program success. In
17 
addition to these requirements, certain reasonable assump-
tions were made by the researcher to simplify, clarify, 
and restrict operational and other related considerations. 
These requirements and assumptions, although part of data 
research, are contained in the last section of this chapter. 
A number of NASA and contractor related studies were 
investigated to answer the second elemental question: What 
related studies provide insight into Space Base organizational 
structure selection? The results of this review are con-
tamed in section II, as are the discussions of the remaining 
specific topics. 
An in-house NASA study concerned with both Space 
Station and Space Base was used to develop a Statement of 
Work to be used for follow-on contractor efforts. Inaddi-
tion to the identification of program requirements, general 
functions	 s for Space Base crew activitie were proposed.1

As a result of the Statement of Work, two contractors - 
investigated Space Base programmatic and physical design 
considerations. Little attention, however, was paid to 
organizational structure in these studies except to 
identify, in general terms, major groups of personnel 
which would be required.2 
1NASA, Statement of Work, pp. A-2-A-18. 
2NASA, Space Base Concept Data, and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space Base Definition: 
Volume 1, July 24, 1970 (Downey, Calif.: North American 
Rockwell Corp., 1970).
	 -
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Two concurrent and independent studies by two 
NASA employees at different centers took a slightly 
different approach to investigating the Space Base than 
did the contractor efforts. These studies established a 
hypothetical line organizational structure, and then investi-
gated the effect of this structure on physical facility 
design and crew skills. Little consideration was given to 
other types of structures.' 
Two other pertinent studies were useful to the 
present study. The first, the Grumman study, was invaluable 
because of the methodology developed and used. This method-
ology led Campbell, et al. to the selection of an optimum 
line functional organizational structure for a twelve-man 
Space Station. 2
 While the results of the Grumman study 
were not considered to be applicable to Space Base because 
of the differences in program crew size and other major 
factors, the methodology used was of immense value to the 
present study. 
The second and final related study was performed by 
Sells, and was an analysis of a hypothetical 500-day mission 
to Mars and back by a crew of six. This study was important 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Fifty-Man Space Base Population Organization, by Georg von 
ieseihausen (Marshall Space Flight Center, Ala.: NASA, 
1970), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Earth-Orbiting Space Base Crew Skills Assessment, by Robert 
T. Gundersen (Manned Spacecraft Center, Tex-.--.--NASA, 1970). 
2NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure.
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because of its development and use of a comparison method 
for determining the appropriateness of various social 
systems. 1 This technique was used in the present study to 
identify the environmental situations most analogous to 
the one envisioned for Space Base. The results of this 
analysis are contained in Appendix C and in subsequent 
discussion of relevant data from applicable analogs. 
A study of general and specific organizational 
structural variables was made to provide an answer to the 
third elemental question: What variables are important to 
the selection of an organizational structure for a Space 
Base? The variables sought were those which were generally 
considered to be important for organizational structural 
selection. 
A survey of management literature was made which 
indicated that the most applicable set of general variables 
were those identified by Koontz and O'Donnell. These 
variables were objectives and plans, capability of 
personnel, environment, and authority. 2 After review and 
evaluation by the researcher, the more specific variables 
.3 
used in the Grumman Space Station analysis and others 
15 B. Sells, "A Model for the Social System for the 
Multiman Extended Duration Space Ship," Aerospace Medicine, 
ocxvii (November, 1966), 1105-135. 
2Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of 
Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 
26-37.
3NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure, 
pp. 3-5.
NEI 
determined to be significant were included. These 
specific variables were then placed under appropriate 
general variable categories, and are discussed in sèctin 
II.
The nature of professional organizations and 
technical professionals was the next specific topic 
studied. The ultimate purpose of this investigation was to 
answer the fourth elemental question: What type of organi-
zational structure best serves the needs of technical 
professionals? A review of the literature on this topic 
revealed that a formidable number of references existed. 
To restrict the review of this literature and to answer 
the elemental question, only the following sub-topics were, 
therefore, considered: professional organizations, the 
characteristics of technical Professionals, and technical 
professionals and the organization. 
The remaining specific topic was concerned with 
Space Base applicable analogs. The purpose of this 
investigation was to provide answers to the broad two-
part fifth elemental question. This question was how 
appropriate to Space Base are the multitude of social 
systems and environmental situations involving isolation, 
confinement, and situational danger; and what can be 
learned from the most applicable analogs with regard to 
Space Base organizational structural selection? 
To answer the first part of this question, the Sells
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methodology was used by the researcher as the basis for 
the analysis of Appendix C. Twenty-two social systems were 
compared to the Space Base social system and ranked. An 
analysis of system similarities by descriptive categories 
was also performed. To answer the second part of the ques-
tion, an in-depth analysis by the researcher identified the 
correlation between the most applicable analogs and the 
general and specific organizational structural variables. 
This fruitful effort greatly reduced and directed the 
follow-on analog data research (review of literature, 
visitations, and interviews'). 
Development of Organizational Structure 
Evaluation Criteria and a 
Set of Feasible Models 
The next phase of the study methodology was con-
cerned with the use of the data collected and analyses 
performed during the first phase. Results thereby ob-
tained were used to provide a rationale for evaluation 
criteria identification, and to develop a number of 
feasible organizational structural models which should be 
evaluated. The ultimate purpose was to use the results.of 
this second phas.e to evaluate and select the preferred 
organizational structure for Space Base from the alternates 
contained in section III; this phase provided answers to 
the sixth and seventh elemental questions. 
The sixth question was what evaluation criteria 
should be used to select the preferred Space Base
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organizational structure? To answer this question, data 
obtained from the specific topics investigated were used. 
These data were grouped into the following categories: 
program requirements and assumptions, management concepts 
and practices, and applicable analog data. The second 
category included those data from the Space Base related 
studies, general and specific variables, and professional 
organization and professional topics. The result of this 
extensive effort by the researcher was a comprehensive list 
of criteria with sources and rationale, identified by general 
and specific variable categories. The listing was an essen-
tial requirement for subsequent evaluation efforts. 
The seventh question was what variations to basic 
classical and modern organizational structural models should 
be considered for Space Base use and why? To provide in-
sight and an ultimate answer to this question, a four level 
Grumman "level-of-authority model" used for Space Station 
feasible model development was used. These organizational 
levels were command, discipline, function, and task. 1As 
a result, a number of hypothetical Space Base organiza-
tional structural models were identified. Unlike the 
Grumman and all other related studies, however, modern 
project; as well as classical model variations were 
considered. 
p. D-2. 
1NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure,
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This screening was accomplished by the researcher 
to determine if the models should be considered further. 
Screening criteria developed by Grumman were used to 
determine if each model was rea-listic. .and practical, had 
sufficient differences, provided for a decision making 
capability, and satisfied Space Base program requirements 
(and assumptions). 1 This initial screening allowed reduc-
tion of models identified to a more manageable and feasible 
set.
Evaluation of Feasible Models and

Selection of the Optimum One 
The final phase of the study methodology used the 
results of the other two phases to evaluate and select 
the optimum hypothetical Space Base organizational structure 
from the feasible set. This evaluation and selection, con-
tained in section IV, answered the eighth elemental question 
and the primary study question. 
The eighth question was.whàt analyses can be 
used to assess feasible classical and modern organizational 
structures and select the preferred one? Essentially a 
continuation of the Grumman developed methodology, the 
final study analysis was partially accomplished by three 
-	 aluation teams and partially by the researcher working 
alone.
1lbid., pp. D-5-D-7.
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The function of two pilot evaluation teams was to 
verify the practicality of a team* evaluation process in 
this application and the appropriateness of the criteria 
and model variations. The final, primary evaluation team 
consisted of five knowledgeable NASA, contractor, and 
academic representatives who were familiar with one or 
more of the following areas: program requirements and 
study assumptions, management concepts and practices, and 
applicable analog data. This team's purpose was to objec-. 
tively and individually score each of the organizational 
structural models in the feasible set depending on how well 
each of the evaluation 	 teria were satisfied. 
The concluding	 this final phase of the 
methodology was ac	 by the researcher. 
Using evaluation data which	 d from the primary 
team's assessment, quantitative	 qualitative analyses 
were performed. The q	 .a.tye analysis was concerned
with how well the ev 
relation to each o	 :ative analysis consisted 
of an evaluation and reasses	 differences between

the highest scoring models with respect to howwell 
weighted "discriminating" criteria were satisfied. 
These criteria discriminated because of their wide 
variation in scoring between models. The rationale for 
using these criteria was tht while all criteria ,
 consiëed 
have some importance for Space Base organizational structure
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consideration, those which discriminate between models are 
of higher importance for evaluation purposes. In summary, 
the quantitative and qualitative analyses, and the sequential 
methodology which provided data led to a rational approach 
to the selection of an optimum model. 
While this study's methodology has been identified 
as an operational replication of the Grumman study, there 
are some significant differences contained in the present 
study. First, the Sells methodology for identifying simi-
larities between social systems was used. Second, a broader 
range of variables were evaluated. Third, consideration 
wa given to modern organizational structures as well as 
classical varieties. Thes,jnces were not intended to 
be a criticism of the 
members. However, th 
required due to diffe
logy or the study team 
the methodology was 
Base requirements and 
assumptions, and because the app.icable analogs were less 
obvious to the researcher 
It must be re that the methodology used and 
the study subject have limitations. First, the methodology 
was not of the rigid quantitative type strongly desired for 
social science studies. This study does not seek empirical 
validity or rigorous proof
.becausethe subject, by its very 
futuristic nature, does not lend itself to such analyses. 
The study does, however, attempt to quantify the subjective,
26 
as will be shown in sections III and IV; and relevant 
experimental findings of laboratory research are used when 
appropriate. 
The second limitation was that some feel that when 
studying organizations it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
study structure by itself. Kast and Rosenzweig respond by 
indicating that two separate phenomena are involved. They 
suggest that structure and functioning (processes) can be 
viewed as the static and dynamic features of the organiza-
tion,respectively, and that for some social systems, the 
static aspects (the structure) are most important, while 
in others the dynamic aspects (the processes) are more 
important. 1
 For the purposes of the present study, organi-
zational structure was the area of concentration, while 
processes are of secondary but related importance. 
The third limitation was that Space Base is a 
social system which will not be operational for two more 
decades. It could be argued that the present study was 
premature and has limited value. The problem was further 
complicated by the fact that the majority of R&A mission 
activities are not only undefined, but have not even been 
conceived yet. 
There are several responses to this last apparent 
'Fremont Kast and James Rosenzweig, Organization 
and Management: A ystems Approach (New York: NcGraw-
Hi].]. Book Co., 1970), p. 171.
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limitation. The first was that any study on the subject of 
Space Base organizational structure will have some value 
for long-range planning purposes, as previously discussed. 
The second was that while the organizational structure 
selected by the present study may not be the one finally 
used, what was considered important by the researcher was 
the methodology used to select that structure. The appli-
cation of the three-part methodology to the stated Space 
Base problem may become the most significant long-run con-
tribution this study makes. Finally, since there are 
several unknown aspects to Space Base activities, assumptions 
can-be made which will suffice for this study's purpose and 
can be updated as more information becomes known, thus 
utilizing the methodology's flexibility. 
ace Base Program Requirements 
and Assumptions 
The introductory portion of this chapter identified 
Space Base background and program objectives. Contained in 
that discussion are program requirements considered by NASA 
to be necessary to ensure program success. These require-
ments, as well as assumptions the researcher considered as 
program requirements not yet formally identified in existing 
Space Base documentation, are listed because of their 
importance to subsequent sections: 
1. The Space Base will be operational by 1985.1 
1Normyle, p. 39.
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2. The Space Base crew size is expected to be 
maintained between 1 50to 100 technologists 
of various skills. 
3. The Space Shuttle will be used to provide 
Space Base logistics in the form of supplies, 
crew rotation, and exchange of scientific 
instruments and data.2 
4. A variety of multidisciplinary R&& activities 
will be accomplished concurrently within the 
Space Base.3 
5. International as well as domestic technolo-
gists will participate as Space Base R&Pt 
crew members..4 
6. The Space Base will support R&A. activities 
and interplanetary missions which are not 
defined in detail at present.5 
7. The Space Base will be a semipermanent 
facility with a minimum operational life of 
ten years with resupply.6 
8. Female, as well as male, technologists will 
comprise the Space Base crew.7 
9. The Space Base will be as autonomous from 
earth control and support as possible.8 
10. Support operations personnel will function 
to satisfy the needs of the R&?t technologists 
who use but do not operate the Space Base.9 
'Ibid.	 2lbid., P. 40. 
3NASA,	 ace Base Concept Data, p. 9. 
4lbid.
ce Base Concept Data, p. 5. 
6lbid., p. 57.	 7Himmel, p. 100. 
8NASA, Space Station Program Definition, p. 1-6. 
9 Ibid., p. A-8.
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11. Initial crew size will be 50 members. As the 
Space Base facility grows in size, the crew 
will increase to 100 technologists.1 
12. The vast majority of crew members, especially 
those involved with R&A activities, will be 
non-astronaut trained and will have been 
selected using criteria without overly restric-
tive physical or mental requirements. 
Assumptions are made for this study to simplify, 
clarify, and restrict variables. They included the 
following:
1. The great majority of Space Base personnel 
will be technical professionals, i.e., scien-
tists and engineers, while a much smaller 
group will be technicians and semiskilled 
personnel. The technicians of the Space Base 
era will, however, be as capable as today's 
technical professional because of rapid 
advances in the state-of-technology and 
knowledge requirements. 
2. Some in-orbit training and indoctrination 
will be required because some R&A technolo-
gists will participate for extended periods 
and new crew member indoctrination will be a 
recurring requirement. 
3. R&A technologists and support operations 
personnel will participate in Space Base duty 
for varying (yet unspecified) lengths of time. 
4. Nonroutine and around-the-clock activities 
and support operations will be accomplished 
within the Space Base when required. This 
will allow R&A technologists the flexibility 
to perform activities during "nonstandard" 
hours for various technical reasons. Support 
operations.personnel,in addition to supporting 
nonroutine activities,will be required to 
'Ibid., p. 3-6. 
2National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
ines and Constraints Document: Space Station Program 
B), March 20, 1970 (Manned Spacecraft Center, Tex.: 
'p.
operate and maintain the Space Base on an 
around-the-clock basis. 
5. Personnel changes will be made within the 
Space Base as required to replace technolo-
gists because their work is complete, or to 
reassign them to higher priority work. 
6. The Space Base will either be of a modular 
design as envisioned by the Space Task Group 
with major components sized to fit into the 
Space Shuttle cargo bay, or it will be a more 
centralized design placed in orbit by another 
vehicle--with the former being more likely. 
7. In-orbit Space Base managers will be techni-
cally trained in either a scientific or 
engineering discipline and will be NASA 
employees. This assumption, therefore, 
restricts discussion of whether nontechnical 
personnel can manage technologists--especially 
within the Space Base. 
8. Permanent party and transient technologists 
will comprise the Space Base crew at any 
point in its operational life. The permanent 
members will be NASA employees assigned to 
the program on a full time basis. The tran-
sient members would be international and 
domestic technologists usually involved in one 
time only R&A. activities. 
9. Crew members will be approximately divided 
between R&A. and support operations. This 
ensures that adequate supporting personnel 
are available to assist those involved in 
accomplishing Space Base objectives. 
Summary 
This section has provided an introduction into the 
nature and scope of the present study. It was seen that 
this study was concerned with the identification of an in-
orbit hypothetical organizational structure which would 
optimize the activities of a large, mixed crew of 50 to 100 
technologists participating in futuristic Space Base
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activities. These technologists were identified as scien-
tists, engineers, and some technicians performing R&A 
activities and support operations generally autonomous from 
earth.
Organization structure was defined as the established 
pattern or deliberate grouping of relationships among the 
components or parts of formal organizations to achieve 
specific goals. The study problem pinpointed was to identify 
an optimum structure at this point in time, based on what is 
known about the program and others like it. The need for 
the present study was justified for several reasons, the 
primary one being that information will be needed by NASA 
to ensure that an orderly, effective, and efficient Space 
Base program results. 
The three-part methodology used was essentially 
an operational replication with modification of a previous 
study of Space Station organizational structural determina-
tion. Data collection and analysis consisted of 	 (1) 
data research, (2) development of organizational structural 
criteria and a set of feasible models, and (3) evaluation 
of feasible models and selection of the optimum one. This 
methodology was not rigorous in its approach or design, 
since the nature of the subject does not lend itself readily 
to empirical testing. Finally, Space Base program require-
ments were abstracted from background and program objective 
information, and assumptions were made to further simplify,
II. REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND WRITINGS 
This section provides insight into the volume and 
type of literature relevant to the subject or organizational 
structural determination for a Space Base. The review of 
research and writings discussed here represents the first 
part of the study methodology, data research. 
An initial literature search was confined to 
published writings from NASA sources with the belief by 
the researcher that previous work had been conducted in 
the area of Space Base organizational structural analysis. 
After an extensive review of this literature, it became 
apparent that only limited research had been accomplished. 
With this knowledge, the inquiry was broadened to include 
general management literature relevant to organizational 
structure. What was revealed was a relatively large amount 
of information, such as organizational structural variables, 
structural forms and functions, professional organizations, 
and technical professionals. 
The literature investigation was further expanded 
to include data for the analogous situations identified in 
Appendix C and briefly described in Appendix D. Although a 
number of analog research projects had been conducted 
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requiring the use of organizational structures in analogous 
situations, none concerned themselves with structural 
analysis per se. The objective of this survey, then, became 
an eclectic review of these analogs, to identify the best of 
the appropriate data available relevant to the study subject. 
A number of interviews and visits to applicable 
analogs and mockups were accomplished at various locationé. 
The purpose of these activities was to determine if any 
studies useful to this research would be supportive of 
published literature. The findings revealed that only 
limited interest has been given to organizational structure 
as a separate study consideration. 
Because of the variety of research and writings 
which are relevant to this study, this section was organized 
into four parts.. The first deals .- with a survey of Space 
Base related studies, some of which had attention given to 
organizational structural considerations. The second identi-
fies general and specific organizational structural variables 
which are important to structure selection for various 
organizations, including a Space Base. The third concerns 
the nature of professional organizations and technical. 
professionals. Finally, the fourth section discusses data 
from applicable analogs which are relevant to Space Base 
organizational structural considerations. 
A Survey of Space Base

Related Studies 
Concurrent with the President's Space Task Group
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Sta
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activities, NASA initiated an in-house effort to develop a 
Space Station/Base Program Definition Statement of Work in 
early 1969. Contracts were to be awarded for in-depth 
eleven-month contractor studies.' Contained within the 
Space Base portion of the Statement of Work were guidelines 
for the program concept, crew considerations, and a number 
of possible centralized configurations.2 
Of significance to the present study was the 
specific but limited guidance provided within the crew 
considerations section. Three general functions were 
envisioned for Space Base crew activities. First, an 
operations group would be charged with command and control 
of the entire Space Base system. Within their responsi-
bilities would be system operation and status, resupply, 
safety of the entire crew, onboard procedures, coordination 
with group personnel, scheduling of activities and facility 
use, and information management. The capabilities and 
training of these personnel was envisioned as being similar 
to that required for a nuclear submarine.3 
A second group, Space Base maintenance, would be 
responsible for maintenance repair of subsystems and experi-
mental equipment when needed; performance and assembly and 
2	 3 Ibid., pp. A-2-A.-l8. 	 ibid., p. A-B.
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modifications; accomplishment of housekeeping tasks; pro-
viding food service; unloading, storing, inventorying of 
cargo; and providing technical support to the experimentation 
program as required. Various engineers and technicians with 
specialized backgrounds would be needed to perform this 
function. A third group, experiment operations, would employ 
the latest techniques to conduct useful R&A activities. 
Special apparatus would be brought up with particular investi
-
gators. These technical professionals would not be encum-
bered with base operations or maintenance tasks, and would 
represent the majority of Space Base inhabitants at any one 
time.
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, One of 
two study contractors, investigated programmatic and design 
considerations for the centralized Space Base. The approach 
used in the Space Base portion of the study was to review 
program objectives; requirements in terms of user and other 
mission support, and Space Base support personnel needs; 
and mission analysis. Two important assumptions were made 
to ensure that the return of results of R&A user personnel 
were maximized. First, R&A operations should be separated 
(in time) from support operations activities, with two 
shifts of work probably required to satisfactorily accomplish 
R&. activities. Second, the crew should work approximately 
fifty-six hours per week, with length of a given work day 
1lbid., pp. A-8-L9.
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varying with the experiment, operation, and individual 
capabilities and motivation.1 
As a result of this analysis, it was determined 
that all Space Base crew members could be assigned to two 
organizational groups, namely! R&A User (and . other mission 
support) Activities and Operations. A commander was 
included in the latter group. Based on this basic organi-
zational composition, further analyses considered vehicle 
design requirements, operational considerations, and sub- 
system functional requirements. 2 . No other analyses affect-
ing Space Base organizational considerations were performed. 
North American Rockwell Corporation, the other study 
contractor, took a slightly different approach to the Space 
Base segment of the Statement of Work, but ended up with 
similar conclusions. A centralized design was identified 
through a systematic approach that included establishing 
capabilities and requirements to satisfy mission objectives, 
selection of a preferred configuration including subsystems 
which satisfied identified requirements from various ca ndi-
dates, and a description of a growth sequence for the pre- 
ferred configuration.3 
1National  Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space 
Base Concept Data (Phase A Definition): Volume 1, June 1970 
(Huntington Beach, Calif.: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics 
Company, 1970), pp. 6-48. 
2 lbid., pp. 53-71. 
3Nationai Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space 
Base Definition: Volume 1, July 24. 1970 (Downey, Calif.: 
North American Rockwell Corporation, 1970).
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In establishing capabilities and requirements to 
satisfy mission objectives, a conclusion important to 
organizational structural considerations was reached. The 
contractor study team recommended that the three groups of 
personnel identified in the NASA Statement of Work be 
placed in two organizational elements. They were Space 
Operations and Scientific Investigation, and Vehicle Opera-
tions. The maintenance personnel were to be shared between 
these elements on an as-needed basis.' 
In early 1970, von Tiesenhausen, of NASA's Marshall 
Space Flight Center, established a hypothetical, baseline 
social and functional organization for a fifty-man Space 
Base, and showed how the requirements and activities of the 
personnel affect Space Base layout. 2
 The rationale used to 
design the oganizationa1 structure was that "no similarities 
(to the Space Base) have been found with either strictly 
military discipline-oriented crew operations or with civilian 
science administration-oriented situations." The author, 
therefore, concluded that a mix of military-type discipline 
and a free and scientifically-oriented organization should 
be used for a Space Base. Because of this conclusion, it 
was proposed that the total fifty-man population be divided 
into three groups: Base Command and Management, Base 
1lbid., pp. 1-166-167. 
2National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Fifty-
Man Space Base Population Organization, by Georg von 
TiesenhausenNarsha11 Space Flight Center, Ala.: NASA, 1970).
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Operations, and Scientific Faculty. Seven, eighteen, and 
twenty-five people were planned for each group, 
respectively. 1 
In another exploratory Space Base study published 
in 1970, Gundersen of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center pro-
posed a possible organizational structure, and then per-
formed a crew skills assessment and discussed problems 
associated with facility design aspects. The methodology 
used to identify the suggested organizational structure 
was to consider general Space Base objectives, the activities 
and organizational structure of a nuclear submarine, and the 
staffing and physical configuration of off-shore drilling 
2 
rigs.
The Space Base organizational structure proposed 
was that of a military line organization similar to that of 
a nuclear submarine. Using a crew size of sixty-nine, the 
author suggested that there be two major functional groups 
as follows: the Operations Department and the Technical 
Projects Department--thirty-four and thirty-five people, 
respectively. A Space Base commander and his deputy, 
located at a higher hierarchical level than the Operations 
and Technical Projects functional managers, were considered 
1 lbid., p.,3. 
2National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Earth-Orbiting Space Base Crew Skills Assessment, by Robert 
T. Gundersen (Manned Spacecraft Center, Tex.: NASA, 1970).
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as part of the Operations Department.1 
After the line organization was proposed and func-
tions identified and staffed; crew skills, weekly schedules, 
compartmentation, and distribution were determined. A few 
of the more significant conclusions important to the present 
study identified were that a line organization consisting 
of Operations and Technical Project Departments with a 
nominal crew size of sixty-nine should be adopted, and 
cross skills are important in crew selection.2 
The most significant related study was concluded 
in May 1971 by the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation. 
Its purpose was to identify an organizational structure 
which would effectively organize the resources of a twelve-
man Space Station. Identification of factors in the Space 
Station work/living environment, which correlated with crew 
performance, allowed the selection of an organizational 
structure from various candidates which deliberately main- 
tain crew performance at a high level. 3
 The methodology 
used to select the optimum organizational structure in the 
Grumman study was used extensively in the present study, 
and is, therefore, described in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
Basically, the study utilized an evaluation team of 
11.bid., pp. 11-14.	 2lbid., pp. 22-23. 
• 3NA5A, Crew Orations Study of Command Structure, 
pp . u-iii.
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five people to score how well six organizational..models 
satisfied fifty-eight criteria. Scores were summed and the 
models were ranked. After analysis, a "line item" model 
was selected as the optimum Space Station model. Charac-
teristic of the model was its subdivision of all Space 
Station operations into small manageable units (or line 
items). Each had an individual (task leader) formally 
assigned responsibility for task accomplishment, and 
coordination of team activities. These task leaders were 
viewed as a valuable link to the next higher organizational 
tier, but were considered part of the command team. Task 
activities were performed by technologists in life science 
and engineering team units.' 
The final study was performed by Sells in 1966 to 
identify analogous situations to a hypothetical 500-day 
manned mission to Mars and return by a crew of six. The 
comparative methodology developed and used consisted of 
a subjective assessment by the author of the relative 
degree of similarity between eleven comparison social 
systems and the Mars mission social system under study. 
Each of eleven systems received similarity scores using a 
three-point scale, for fifty-six system characteristics 
under seven descriptive categories. These categories were: 
objectives and goals, value systems, personnel composition, 
1lbid., pp. 10-12.
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organization, technology, physical environment, and temporal 
characteristics. 1
 The systems were then ranked by the 
of scores received. The highest scoring systems were con-
sidered most similar to the system under analysis. In 
terms of closeness of fit, Sells identified the following 
systems by descending order of similarity to the extended-
duration Mars manned space ship: 
1. Submarines 
2. Exploration parties 
3. Naval ships 
4. Bomber crews 
5. Remote duty stations 
6. POW situations 
7. Professional athletic teams 
8. Mental hospital wards 
9. Prison society 
10. Industrial work groups 
11. Shipwrecks and disasters 
The methodology also provided a means of investi-
gating similarity by descriptive categories on a percentage 
basis. This technique clearly indicated categorical areas 
of similarity (and dissimilarity) for the most similar 
systems 2
Variables Important for 0rtiona1

Structure Selection 
General Considerations from

Management Literature 
The problem of selecting an organizational structure 
for any group of people who use coordinated activities, 
S. B. Sells, "A Model for the Social System for the 
Multiman Extended Duration Space Ship," Aerosp ace Medicine, 
XXXVIII (November, 1966), 1105-135. 
2lbid., p. 1135.
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authority, and leadership to achieve goals is that important 
variables must be identified. This was.no
 simple task since 
there was no totally acceptable set of variables identified 
in the literature, nor was there agreement as to how 
organizational structure determination was to be accomplished. 
Litterer acknowledges that there is no final organizational 
form universal for all organizations even though there are 
regular aspects and components for some. Further,- the 
problem of organizational selection was complicated by the 
need for a variety of structures appropriate to the various 
types of organizations which can exist. 
Numerous writers have acknowledged that situation 
is important to organizational structural selection. 
Galbraith concludes that current organization theory 
research in the area of organization structure is directed 
toward ways to define situations that distinguish when 
alternate organizations forms are more or less effective.2 
Litterer feels that it is important that organizational 
structure be formed in response to conditions, rather than 
the way that it conforms to a universal ideal, and that 
there are a multitude of ways that structural components 
1Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 330. 
2Jay Galbraith, "Organizational Design: An Informa-
tion Processing View," in Organizational Behavior and Design: 
Perspectives and Perceptions, ed. Victor F. Phillips, Jr. 
(Arlington, Va. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 
1969), p. 29.
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can be arranged, depending on the particular situation that 
the organization faces.' With the importance of situation 
recognized, a search of relevant literature was accomplished 
to identify a set of variables sensitive to the Space Base 
environment.	 . 
Koontz and O'Donnell indicate that several fundamental 
inputs must be considered in the formulation of activity 
groupings and authority relationships.. The input variables 
that these writers identify are objectives and- p1ns, 
capability of personnel, environment,-and authority. 2 The 
first variable is concerned with objectives and plans and 
is considered of key importance because all enterprise 
actiVities naturally arise from these. The goalsthat the 
organization hopes to achieve are identified by objectives 
and accomplished through plans. In addition, objectives 
serve as standards to measure organizational performance. 
The second variable, that of capability of personnel, 
is significant because organizations must be manned by 
trained people. Activity grouping and authority provisions 
of an organization must take into account human capabilities, 
limitations, and customs. This consideration does not 
indicate that structure should be designed around individuals 
instead of around goals. However, frequently the capabilities 
'Litterer, p. 318.	 . 
2Harold Koontz andCyril O'DOnnell, Principles of' 
Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968)7 pp. 
236-37.
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of people are the constraining factor for the organization 
architect. Just as the strength and.weakness of materials 
are considered by an engineer, so must the organization. 
designer consider his materi.al-.people. 
The third variable, environment, is synonymous with 
situation aridconditions. Structure, like any plan, must 
reflect the: environment in which organizational members are 
..exp.ected to accomplish work. The structure must permit 
contributions by members of the group and must help them 
gain objectives, efficiently, in .
 a changing future. , The 
workable organizational structure can never be simply 
mechanistic.,  
The fourth variable, authority, is essential to any 
organization because , authority relationships must be 
acknowledged and used by management. Authority depends on 
such socil. institutions ,
 a private property, representa-
tive,,government, and the host of customs, codes, and laws 
that both restrict and sanction individuals in operating a 
business, a , church, a university, or any group venture. 
Speific Variables from the

Grumman Study 
The Grumman study of Space Station organization 
structure,' .was,,found,to be significant ,
 to the present study 
primarily because of the methodology used.' Another reason. 
p. '
 222. 'NASA, Crew Operations _Study of Command Structure,
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important to this section was that the study identified 
and considered variables important for a hypothetical 
Space Station--an analog found in the analysis of Appendix 
C as having the highest ranking similarity to Space Base. 
From an analysis of many possibilities, the Grumman study 
team concluded that seven specific situational variables 
significantly affected the selection of organizational 
structure. These specific variables were identified as: 
1. Multidisciplinary scientific operations 
2. Crew size 
3. Space Station with users on board 
4. Mission duration 
5. Duty cycle 
6. Arrangement of space 
7. Space Station autonomy-
Since these specific variables are important to the 
present study, they are discussed in some detail. "Multi-
disciplinary scientific operations" were a requirement of 
the Space Station program, and the Grumman study team 
recognized that heterogeneous mixes of crew personnel and 
activities would present a more demanding situation than 
would homogeneous ones. "Crew size" was considered important 
because increased crew size affects the number of authority 
tiers in the structural hierarchy. In addition, size pro-
vides the potential for the formation of numbers of sub-
groups. As groups become large (greater than twenty 
members), more limited opportunity for personal contact and 
more formal organization is required. 
1Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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The "Space Station with users on board" variable 
considered that a crew consisting of various technologists 
poses a different situation than one where the entire crew 
will be composed of trained astronauts. It was felt that 
with users on board, greater benefits would accrue if 
training were devoted to R&A activities and the interface 
of these activities with the Space Station. The alternative 
was to try achieving marginal efficiency by requiring users 
involvement in operations. 
The "mission duration" variable was emphasized 
because, in spite of exceptionally high motivation levels 
anticipated in crew members, the planned three to six month 
Space Station mission duration in a fairly confined area 
was expected to cause deterioration of performance. The 
relatively high cost of transportation of crewmen justified 
placing a premium on the most effective performance possible. 
The "duty cycle" variable was included in the list by the 
Grumman study team because around-the-clock manned opera-
tions required an organizational structure which would 
accommodate multiple shift crews. In addition, it was 
believed that the extent of automation of physical systems 
played a significant role in duty assignments. 
"Arrangement of space" as a variable accommodated 
the fact that crew unity and performance are affected by 
the physical configuration of working and living areas. 
The segregation or-integration of crew member activity
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affects environmental stresses if not properly considered. 
"Space Station autonomy" was felt to be important because 
the extent to which the organization is autonomous 
from ground command and control strongly affects structure. 
Day-to-day decision making on board requires a structure 
which was independent and relatively self-sufficient. 
Variables Used for the Present Study 
Since this chapter is concerned in part with 
organizational structural considerations from management 
concepts and practices and applicable analogs, it is 
necessary to introduce the structural variables ' which are 
used in the present study at this point. Without this 
identification it would be virtually impossible to classify 
the multitude of data which are available. Table 1 repre-
sents a composite of general and specific variables of 
organizational structure which have been discussed, and 
two specific variables which have not been yet. This. 
classification scheme was used throughout the remainder of 
the present 'study. 
The general variables of Table 1 are of course the 
Koontz and O'Donnell variables discussed earlier. 1
 The 
specific variables are closely related to those identified 
and used in the Grumman study. The correlation between 
1'Koontz and O'Donnell, pp. 236-37.
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the seven factors used by Grumman' and the nine used in the 
present study is shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 1 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
USED FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
Objectives and Plans 
Multidisciplinary R&A Activities 
Crew Size 
Capability of Personnel 
Crew Composition 
Crew Selection and Training 
Environment 
Mission Duration 
Environmental Factors 
Autonomy of Operations 
Authority 
Authority and Responsibility 
Communications, Coordination, and Integration 
In most cases, as Table 2 shows, the specific 
variable titles are either identical or have been modified 
only slightly. The "multidisciplinary R&A activities" 
variable is identical to "multidisciplinary scientific 
operations." The former, however, better describes the 
mission of Space Base. The "crew composition" and "crew 
selection and training" variables are merely an expansion 
1NASA, CrewOperations Study of Command Structure, 
pp. 3-6.
50 
of "Space Station with users on board." The Grumman "duty 
cycle" heading was deleted for Space Base consideration 
because it is not felt by the writer to be an important 
specific structural variable. Certain aspects of this 
variable, however, such as multishift and nonroutine work, 
are considered in subsequent analysis. 
TABLE 2 
CORRELATION BETWEEN SPACE BASE AND

SPACE STATION ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
Space Base 
Objectives and Plans 
Multidisciplinary R&A 
Activities 
Crew Size 
Capability of Personnel 
Crew Composition 
Crew Selection and 
Training 
Environment 
Mission Duration 
Environmental Factors 
Autonomy of Operations 
Authority
Space Station 
Multidisciplinary Scientific 
Operations 
Crew Size 
Space Station with Users on 
Board 
Mission Duration 
Duty Cycle 
The Arrangement of Space 
Space Station Autonomy 
Authority and Responsibility 
Communications, Coordination, 
and Integration
51 
The "environmental factors" variable directly relates 
to the "arrangement of space" category identified in the 
Grumman study. The reason for the change in heading was 
that less emphasis was placed on the physical arrangement 
of space and equipment for the present study, and more on 
the "environmental factors" themselves. Finally, "autonomy 
of operations" was more appropriate to Space Base than was 
the "Space Station autonomy" heading for obvious reasons. 
The Space Base authority subcategories of "authority 
and responsibility" and "communications, coordination, and 
integration" were added for several reasons. The first was 
that authority and responsibility relationships are of 
significant importance to the present study, as will be 
seen later. Second, these relationships are an essential 
part of the definition of organizational structure used as 
the basis of the study. The processes of "communications, 
coordination, and integration" are felt to be essential to 
any analysis of Space Base structure, and especially for 
the modern organizational structures which are discussed 
later.
Professional Organizations and 
- Technical Professionals 
The previous section of this study discussed 
variables important for organizational structure selection. 
No specific references were made to professional organiza-
tions or to those professionals who are essential to their
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success. For that reason, discussion in this section 
concerns these organizations and people in relation to 
a study elemental question introduced in section I, 
namely, what type of organizational structure best serves 
the needs of technical professionals? Topics are, there-
fore, restricted to the following: (1) professional 
organizations, (2) the characteristics of technical profes-
sionals, and (3) technical professionals and the 
organization.
Professional Organizations 
Professional organizations, as described by 
Etzjonj, are those where knowledge is produced, applied, 
preserved, or communicated. Included in this category 
are research organizations, universities, colleges, other 
schools, large general hospitals, and therapeutic mental 
hospitals) For the purposes of this study, discussion 
was limited to research (and development) organizations. 
The rationale for this restriction is due primarily to 
the analog analysis contained in Appendix C which showed' 
that various earthbound R&D labs were found to be an 
appropriate analog for Space Base, while mental hospital 
wards were not. Universities, colleges, other schools, 
and large general hospitals were not considered in the 
Appendix C analysis because they lacked sufficient 
1Etzjoni, pp. 77-78.
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environmental similarity to Space Base, and were, there-
fore, excluded for the purpose of this study. 
Characteristics 
According to Etzioni, professional organizations 
certain situational 
and the high proportion 
1 St fifty percent).	 In 
identified, structure 
are characterized by their goals, 
factors, authority relationships, 
of professionals employed (at lea 
addition to the variables Etzioni 
was also considered. 
Goals
The goals of R&D organizations may be many and 
varied, but the National Science Foundation reports that 
generally these goals are concerned with research--
investigation or inquiry which is either of the basic or 
applied variety-development--the systematic use of 
scientific knowledge directed toward the production of 
useful materials, devices, systems, or methods including 
design and origination of prototypes and processes.2 
Situational factors 
According to Etzioni, several situational factors 
describe the parameters of professional organizations. 
1lbid., pp. 77-78 and pp. 91-93. 
2National Science Foundation, Reviews of Data on 
Research and Development, Report NSF 62-9 tashthgton, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 8.
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They are externalization and internalization, single and 
multiple professions, and private and public organizations. 
The first factor relates to the division between internal 
and external professionals and administrative activities. 
Etzioni states that ideal professional organizations are 
identified by internalized professional functions and 
externalized administrative functions. The example given 
was that of schools which have few administrative problems 
because of their narrow scope and reliance on many others 
to administer to the nonprofessional needs of clients. 
The second factor concerns the administrative responsibility 
to serve as an arbitrator among different professional 
groups. And finally, the third factor relates to how the 
professional organizations are owned and financed, and who 
pays the professionals. 1
 Using Etzioni's framework, the 
Space Base organization would be considered to be an 
internalized, multiprofession, public professional 
organization. 
Johnson, et al. conclude that professional organi-
zations frequently have conflicting situational require-
ments. They must provide for nonuniform events and inno-
vation and, at the same time, must utilize the traditional 
bureaucratic mechanisms for routine activities., 2
 Classical 
models are not usually adequate to satisfy these 
'Etzioni, pp. 91-93.	 2Johnson, et al., p. 61. 
Ii
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requirements. Research by Delbecq indicates that the 
bureaucratic organization model is not an appropriate 
solution strategy for creative decisions, even though it 
is for programmed or computational decisions. 1 
Authority relationships 
Etzioni indicates that authority relationships 
between professionals and nonprofessionals in professional 
organizations are such that professionals usually have 
superior authority over the major objectives of the organi-
zation. In addition, it is pointed out that with these 
types of organizations, there are differences in authority 
relationships when contrasted with classical beliefs. In 
the bureaucratic organizational model, according to Etzioni, 
the line serves as the structure of authority having a 
single center of authority for decision making and control. 
Conversely, in professional organizations there is no line 
in this sense, and authority is usually shared between 
professionals and administrators. As an example of this 
sharing, Etzioni identifies "service organizations" in 
which instruments, facilities, and an auxiliary staff are 
provided to professionals to accomplish their work. These 
professionals usually are not subordinated to administrators 
nor are they necessarily employed by the organization.2 
lAndre L. Delbecq, "Managerial Leadership Styles 
in Problem-Solving Conferences," in Academy of Management 
Journal, VII (December, 1964), 225-68. 
2Etzioni, pp. 77-86.
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tzioni further clarifies authority and structural 
relationships by identifying three areas of activity in 
professional organizations: 
1. Major objective activities carried out by 
professionals almost completely under the 
authority of the professionals who perform 
the activities or direct the semiprofessionals 
(technicians) and nonprofessionals who perform 
it..	 .. 
2. Secondary activities performed by administra- 
tors and nonprofessional personnel under 
their control.-. . 
3. Secondary activities performed by professionals 
such as allocating resources, preparing sta-
tistics, and participating in public relati.ons 
activities •1 
There is no established hierarchy in the first 
category, and much individual autonomy. Johnson, et al. 
report that control for this group is exerted through 
professional norms and colleague interactions rather than 
2	 . 
structure. A hierarchy does exist in the second category, 
but it does not involve professionals. The third.category 
has a clear hierarchy and administrative-predominance. 
It is-in this last category-:that misunderstanding
 
of. the natue of professional organizations exists because 
it appears that professionals are- part of the administrative 
line structure. In reality, only secorriary functions are 
performed, unlike the first category where.major activities 
occur and professional authority and autonomy exist. 3
 From 
1 lbid., pp. 86-87. 
3Etzioni, p. 87.
2Johnson, et al., p. 61.
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these considerations it is easy to understand why in 
many professional organizations, major conflicts can exist 
between professional knowledge, individual autonomy, and 
administrative authority. 
In summary, Etzioni indicates that one way to solve 
the dilemma Of combining professional and administrative 
authority is by dividing responsibilities. This is 
accomplished, by allowing professionals to control goal 
activities while administrators control the means to 
Accomplish those goals. The whole structure is then super-
vised by talented middlemen who possess greater administra-
tive skills and authority than the average professional, 
and more professional authority and competence than the 
average administrator. These supervisory talents are ob-
tained by professionally-oriented administrative training 
and experience) 
Structure 
Many observers of modern society, and specifically 
Bennis, have noted that the accelerated growth of science? 
R&D activities, and intellectual technology have caused a 
need for change in organization and structures. Bennis 
believes that a need exists to develop adaptive, temporary 
systems of diverse specialists, solving problems,'linked. 
together by coordinating and task evaluative specialists, 
1lbid.	 .	 . .
/ 
,,	 .:
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in organic flux. For lack of a better phrase, he calls 
these "organic-adaptive" structures. 1 
Bennis, like Miles  and Toffler, 3
 feels that the 
key word in these types of structure is "temporary." The 
need for adaptive, rapidly changing temporary systems 
requires organization around problems to be solved by 
groups of relative strangers who may represent diverse 
professional skills. This need will create organic rather 
than mechanistic (bureaucratic) models. Kast and Rosenzweig 
also observe that there has been a movement away from rigid 
bureaucratic form toward more dynamic, flexible structures. 
They conclude that the permanent, structured positions of 
mechanistic systems are being replaced by an adaptive-
organic system with less structuring, more frequent change 
of positions and roles, and more dynamic interplay among 
various functions. 
Dale describes the organic method of structuring 
organization as being a system under which jobs are very 
loosely defined to produce a flexible organization in which 
1Warren G. Bennis, "The Decline of Bureaucracy and 
Organizations of the Future," in Changing Organizations: 
Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human Organiza-
tion, ed. by Warren G. Bennis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1966), pp. 9-12. 
B. Miles, "On Temporary Systems," in Innovation 
in Education, ed. by M. B. Miles (New York: Bureau of 
blication, Columbia University, 1964), pp. 437-90. 
3A.ivin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1970). 
41ast and Rosenzweig, p. 205.
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each person performs tasks which he does best. He notes 
that it is occasionally suggested that the organization 
becomes "autonomous" in that the members themselves divide 
the work up according to ability. 1 Shepard sees organic-
adaptive structures allowing for shifts to cooperative 
group effort rather than that of individuals, to shared 
responsibility from that which is delegated, to confidence 
from obedience, and to problem solving rather than antago-
nistic arbitration.2 
The shift in organizational structure is obviously 
from the mechanistic or bureaucratic structures developed 
by the classicists to more modern flexible, even temporary, 
organic-adaptive structures. Kast and Rosenzweig caution, 
however, that these modern structural arrangements may not 
be ideal for all types of organizations since they repre-
sent polar points on a continuum. They indicate that for. 
some elements of an organization, such as R&D, organic 
structures would be best; while for others, like produc-
tion, mechanistic structures are better. 3 Table 3 contrasts 
the differences, identified by Hower and Lorsch, in organi-
zational characteristics between organic and mechanistic 
1Ernest Dale, Planning and Devel22ing the Company 
Organization Structure Research Report No. 20 (New York: 
American Management Association, 1950), p. 137. 
2Herbert A. Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and 
Intergroup Relationships in Organizations," in Handbook of 
Organization, ed by James G. March (Chicago, Ill.: Rand 
McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 1115-143. 
3Kast and Rosenzweig, p. 206.
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organizational structures. 1 
TABLE 3 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF

ORGANIC AND MECHANISTIC 
STRUCTURES 
Organizational Characteristics 
Index
Types of Organization 
Structure 
Organic Mechanistic 
Span of control Wide Narrow. 
Number of levels of authority Few Many 
Ratio of administrative to 
production personnel High Low 
Range of time span over which 
an employee can commit 
resàurces Long Short 
Degree of centralization in 
decision making Low High 
Proportion of persons in one 
unit having opportunity to 
interact with persons in 
other units High Low Quantity of formal rules Low High 
Specificity of job goals Low High 
Specificity of required 
activities Low High 
Content of communications advice and Instructions 
information and decisions 
Range of compensation Narrow Wide 
Range of skill levels Narrow Wide 
Knowledge-based authority High Low 
Position-based authority Low High
In recent-years, there have been several organ iza 
tional designs which reflect the new organic-adaptive 
1Ralph M. Hower and Jay W. Lorsch, "Organizational 
Inputs," in Systems Analysis in Organizational Behavior, 
ed. by John A. Seller (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., and The Dorsey Press, .1967), p. 168. 
LI 
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approach to modern organization theory. The most signifi-
cant one is project management. 
Project management 
Baumgartner in tracing the developing of project 
management, indicates that this concept was developed in 
the early 1950 1 s when the Air Force and large segments of 
industry were faced with the problem of developing an ICBM 
system in half the time usually required. He relates that 
the solution was found in "projectizing"--organizing and 
managing the effort primarily on the basis of technical, 
cost, and, schedule objectives, rather than on the basis of 
existing structures and procedures. The success of the 
concept led to wide spread application in industry and the 
government.1 
Kast and Rosenzweig believe that the project manage- 
ment approach is one of the most important developments in 
the structure of organizations. They indicate that the 
approach was geared to the changing managerial requirements 
in R&D, procurement, and the utilization of large-scale 
military, space, and civilian projects. The pressure of 
accelerated technology and shOrt lead times in these areas 
made it essential to establish a' structure and system which 
would provide for the overall integration of many diverse 
1John Baumgartner, "Project Management," in Handbook 
of Business Administration, ed. by H. B. Maynard (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 5-70.
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functional activities. These requirements made it necessary
 
for organizational structure to be dynamic rather than 
static with emphasis placed on flexibility rather than 
permanent relationships. 1 
The need for integration in organic-adaptive, pro-
ject management organizations is closely related to 
systems theory as well since this approach requires that 
the parts or subsystems be brought together to accomplish 
the objectives established. Both applications are con-
sistent-with the definition of Lawrence and Lorsch who 
indicate that integration is the process of achieving unity 
of effort among the various subsystems in the accomplish-
ment of the organization's task.2 
According to Kast and Rosenzweig, approaches to 
project management can be placed on a continuum. They 
believe that on one end is the "staff" form where a 
project manager with little authority serves in an advisory 
capacity to the chief executive. On the other end, the 
project manager has complete authority over all activities 
of the project or program. This latter approach is commonly 
used for major space program and military activities. 
Between these extremes is an approach more commonly known as 
1 Kast and Rosenzweig, pp. 194-98. 
2Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, "Differentiation 
and Integration in Complex Organizations," in Administrative.
 
Science Quarterly, June, 1967, p. 4.
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matrix project management.1 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical model of a matrix 
project management organizational structure. 2 As is 
shown, the project manager reports directly to the 
president or general manager on a line basis, but he has 
personnel assigned to his project from the various func-
tional areas. The functional managers serving in a line 
capacity such as engineering, manufacturing, and marketing 
are responsible to a general manager only for their 
specialized activities. Two flows of authority and responsi-
bility thus exist under the matrix project management form. 
The first is the vertical flow of functional manager authority 
and responsibility. The second is the horizontal flow of 
project manager authority and responsibility which crosses 
the vertical superior-subordinate relationships which exist 
within the functional organization. 
The functions of a project manager are varied, 
but the main ones are organizing and controlling all neces-
sary activities to achieve project goals. Since his activi-
ties are superimposed upon the functional organization, 
new and complex relationships are created requiring integra-
tion of activities, and the development of effective 
'Kast and Rosenzweig, pp. 195-96. 
1'2 David I. Cleland and William R. King, Systems 
Analysis and Project Management (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1968), p. 177.
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information networks) According to Cleland, the project 
manager must concentrate his attention on the major 
problems of the project and serve as a focal point. This 
concentration is significant because it places the respon-
sibility for resolution of problems on an individual who 
has the proper perspective to integrate the important 
matters of cost, time, technology, and project compatibility 
in total. 2 
While project management strives to eliminate many 
of the problems of older structural arrangements, it is not 
without problems of its own. Kast and Rosenzweig report 
two problems. The first is that project activities are 
finite, since projects have an anticipated end. Once 
complete, reassignments of personnel must be made so that 
new activities can be accomplished. The inherent tempo-
rary nature of this type of structure requires people to 
learn that change is inevitable. Second, since project 
management is interfunctional, conflicts are created 
within the normal or functional organizational structure. 
These conflicts result because project management does 
not operate in a classical manner with a well defined 
hierarchical structure, unity of command, or clear-cut 
•	 'Kast and Rosenzweig, p. 195. 
2David I. Cleland, "Why Project Management?", in 
Business Horizons, Winter, 1964, p. 83.
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authority and responsibility relationships. 1
 While these 
problems have not precluded the widespread use of matrix 
management, they have caused concern for some and have 
required that people adjust to this split authority 
situations and to expect a changing organizational 
environment.
The Characteristics of Technical 
Professionals 
Dominant characteristics 
Identification of highly consistent characteristics 
of productive scientists has emerged from the research 
of Roe, Barron, Sanders, Knapp, Cattell,and others. The 
methodologies employed by these researchers were highly 
varied and included clinical interviews, projective 
techniques, empirically developed biographical inventories, 
and factor-based tests. 2 The following are the traits of 
productive scientists found in study after study: 
1. A high degree of autonomy, self-
sufficiency, and self-direction. 
2. A preference for mental manipulations 
involving things rather than people: a 
somewhat distant or detached attitude 
in interpersonal relations, and a preference 
for intellectually challenging situations 
rather than socially challenging ones. 
'Kast and Rosenzweig, pp. 197-98. 
21I Reflections of the Conference Participants and 
the Editors," in Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition 
and Development,ed. by Calvin W. Taylor and Frank Barron 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), pp. 385-86.
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3. High ego strength and emotional stability. 
4. A liking for method, precision, and exactness. 
5. A preference for such defense mechanisms as 
repression and isolation in dealing with affect 
and instinctual energies. 
6. A high degree of personal dominance but a 
dislike of personality-toned controversy. 
7. A high degree of control of impulse, amounting 
almost to over control: relatively little 
talkativeness, gregariousness, and impulsiveness. 
8. A liking for abstract thinking, with considerable 
tolerance of cognitive ambiguity. 
9. Marked independence of judgment, rejection of 
group pressures toward conformity in thinking. 
10. Superior general intelligence. 
11. An early, very broad interest in intellectual 
activities. 
12. A drive toward comprehensiveness and elegance 
in explanation. 
13. A special interest in the kind of "wagering" 
which involves pitting oneself against 
uncertain circumstances in which one's own 
effort can be the deciding £ actor.1 
Beveridge believes that the two attributes which 
best describe the research worker are a love of science 
and an insatiable curiosity. 2 These attributes allow the 
researcher to comply with the general essence of research 
which requires that a clear object be in view, while at 
the same time maintaining an alertness for unexpected 
'Ibid. 
1111am B. Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investi-
gation (New York; Random House, Inc., 1950), p. 186.
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opportunjties. Blood summarizes by indicating that several 
personality characteristics have been identified for crea-
tive people in all fields. First and foremost, they are 
dedicated to their work. They possess a strong commitment 
to their goals and are highly self-confident in pursuing 
their objectives. Second, they tend to be independent and 
nonconformist, at least intellectually. They generally seek 
their own goals.. and pursue them in their own way. These 
people, in sum, are intensively dedicated and self-reliant 
individuals.1 
A detrimental characteristic 
An undesirable characteristic, frequently identified 
in the literature as being associated with creative tech-. 
nical professionals, was their inability to communicate. 
Technical professionals, according to Sanders, have an 
average or perhaps below average ability to communicate in 
all areas except their own technical speciality. The 
special terminology, technical dialects, and abbreviated 
references often confuse technical specialists who enter 
other technical fields. Precise terminology which promotes 
communications within similar specialities leads to gross 
inefficiency or near chaos with other groups,. 
..especially 
1Jerome W. Blood, ed., Optimum Use of Engineering 
Talent (New York: American ManagementAssociation, 19611, 
p. 168.	 .
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nontechnical people.' Technical people cannot rephrase 
words so others can understand, as those in other profes- 
sions can. 2
Technical Professionals and
the Organization 
Potentials for conflict 
Management literature indicates that many reasons 
exist for conflicts between individuals and organizations. 
Technical professionals, because of their characteristics 
(favorable and unfavorable) and motivation, compound the 
problem. A number of writers identify the following as 
the most significant potentials for conflict: 
1. The language barrier 
2.. The decision-making credibility gap 
3. .. The recognition paradox 
4. The need for management controls 
5. The loya1tyo:professionals 
The language barrier 
This first potential for conflict is integrally 
related to the detrimental characteristic previously 
described. The problem is essentially created by new tech-
nical languages developed because of specialization. The 
result is a communications barrier between technical 
1Royden C. Sanders, Jr. "Interface Problems Between 
Scientists and Others in Technically Oriented Companies," 
in The Management of Scientists, ed. by Karl Hill (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964), p. 80.	 . 
2Val Cronstedt, Engineering Management Administration 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 4.
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professionals and management. Cronstedt Summarizes the 
problem by recognizing that higher level management is 
often embarrassed when it realizes that it is not fully 
equipped to understand the language of its technical profes-
sionals. The resulting sense of inferiority which develops 
brings on defense mechanisms, which naturally creates a 
certain enjoyment for the professionals as they watch 
their superiors squirm.1 
This problem can lead to a lasting barrier between 
these groups. Undoubtedly, many instances have occurred in 
which a breakdown in communication has resulted in mutual 
distrust. Levin and Kirkpatrick describe what is perhaps 
a typical but undesirable situation created when a scien-
tist is unable to communicate an innovative idea to manage-
ment. Since management generally has better communications 
with consultants, the most likely situation is that it will 
turn to established consulting firms to get done the 
research recommended by the scientist. 2 Going outside the 
firm does little to develop mutual trust and breaks down 
the language barrier. 
Communication, then, is a major management problem 
in professional organizations, because lack of it creates 
1Cronstedt, p. 5. 
2Richard I. Levin and C. A. Kirkpatrick, Quantita-
tive Approaches to Management (New York: McGraw-H111 Book 
Company, 1965), p 9.
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barriers at interfaces between groups. The barriers 
created usually produce more inefficiency, wasted effort, 
and embarrassment than any other organizational failure.1 
It appears that the seriousness of the communication 
problems is directly related to organization size. 
The decision-making credibility gap 
The second problem is related to the language 
barrier described above, because technical professionals 
frequently feel that management does not understand their 
difficulties. This leads to deeper seated problems and 
accusations that company management is making decisions 
which conflict with technical facts. Conversely, manage-
ment often feels that its decisions are probably not under-
stood because of the inept method with which the technical 
mind usually meets a management or business situation.2 
According to Overton, if a professional organization 
is to be viewed as a system which depends on a decision-
making flow from producing technical professionals to 
higher levels of management and vice versa, then it must 
be realized that this interface action is of paramount 
importance. 3 Without credibility between these diverse 
groups, conflict and distrust can be the only result. 
1Sanders, p. 80.	 2Cronstedt, p. 5. 
3Lewis N. Overton, Jr., "R&D Management: Turning 
Scientists into Managers," Personnel, )VI (May-June, 1969), 
56-57.
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The recognition paradox 
The recognition paradox results because, in seeking 
isolation from supervision, technical professionals build 
up a barrier which prevents personal and professional 
recognition by management) Even though technical profes-
sionals seek recognition from colleagues and external 
profession sources, the recognition of supervisors has been 
found to be important. 
In a study of a major R&D laboratory, it was found 
that the technical professional relied principally on the 
supervisors rather than the organization to provide needed 
recogiition. Those involved stresed that they wanted more 
feedback that included not only appropriate recognition, 
but also suggestions for talent enlargement. Little faith 
was placed on so-called "dual ladders of advancement" and 
other "gimmicks" designed to provide opportunity for 
financial and organizational advancement. 2 Approval and 
recognition of professionals by the scientific community 
is often a critical motivational factor, but "official" 
recognition-from a professional's supervisor is also 
important. 3 While this need for recognition is not qnique 
to technical professionals, it is an important conflict 
consideration. 
1 lbid., p. 59.	 2lbid., p. 60°. 
3Blood, p. 176.
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The need for management 
controls
The underlying source of this difficulty is that 
technical professionals have personal motivations and 
goals that make it very difficult for them to understand 
and accept management controls. Conversely, management 
controls become necessary to integrate complicated projects 
or programs to keep each part in phase with the other 
parts. 1 This is especially true as the professional organi-
zation gets larger or becomes multidisciplined. Care must 
be taken, however, since control inevitably means that 
administration procedures become formalized with red tape 
and bureaucracy creeping in, and this is the danger to 
creativity. Sanders indicates that the line has been drawn. 
Technical professionals need freedom to be creative, and 
management needs controls for continuity of action and 
results. 2 The problem becomes one of scientists and 
engineers defending their role as professionals against 
the need to conform to supervision and control. 
Obviously a balance is needed to ensure that the 
personal goals of technical professionals and the goals 
of the organization are satisfied. Kaplan feels that the 
needs of each seem to be incompatible, but that since each 
group needs the other, some reconciliation must be found.3 
1	 2 Sanders, pp. 87-88.	 Ibid., p. 103. 
3Norman Kaplan, "Organization: Will It Choke or 
Promote the Growth of Science," in The Management of Scien-
tists, ed. by Karl Hill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 
103-04.
74 
Without the organization, its management, and its support-
ing function, R&D to any significant extent would not be 
possible. Likewise, without creative technical profes-
sionals, professional organizations would serve no useful 
purpose. 
The loyalty of professionals 
The last problem relates to the loyalty that scien-
tists have for their profession, rather than their organi-
zation. Their training and the professional ethics they 
practice provide ties which management frequently does not 
understand. Often conflicts result when short range 
organizational goals are not compatible with the methods 
or professional ethics of scientists and engineers. 
Determinants for organizational 
success
It is said that when Diogenes, the philosopher, 
was asked by Alexander the Great if there was anything he 
could do to help him, that Diogenes replied, "Only stand 
out of my light."	 It is easy to get the impression that 
technologists feel the same way about organizations.2 
A review of pertinent literature indicates that 
there are a multitude of factors which are important to 
the success of professional organizational activity. Four 
1Quoted in the Annual Report (New York: Carnegie 
Corporation, 1962), p. 9. 
2Kaplan, p. 103.
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significant factors are selected because of the frequency 
with which they appear. They are 	 (1) that an organiza-
tional environment which stimulates creativity is essential, 
(2) that flexible organizational policies must exist, (3) 
that managers are trained technical professionals, and (4) 
that staff functions are mandatory within the organization 
to support R&D. Although, each of these factors is related, 
they are treated separately. 
Organizational environment 
It should be obvious that an environment for 
creativity, the first factor meniioned, is absolutely 
essential to any professional organization. Blood indi-
cates that creativity depends on an organizational envi-
ronment which provides an opportunity for recognition and 
investigation of pertinent problem areas, and reinforce-
ment to encourage and sustain the creative effort. 1 The 
organizational climate needed must provide for some isola-
tion and nonconformity. 
Rudsepp reiterates this requirement by indicating 
that
When ready to think creatively, the creative scien-
tist or engineer will, if possible, isolate himself 
from the encumbrances of his environment in order to 
put himself in a receptive, leisurely mood. This 
enables him to freely entertain thought and ideas 
1Blood, p. 170.
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that are directly or even remotely and tenuously 
connected with the problem he is tackling.1 
This psychological distance from associates and the working 
environment has proved successful in .
 the past, and for that 
reason, is desired. Allowance for these considerations, 
according to Siepert, is the direct responsibility of 
management, and is accomplished by various administrative 
actions which bear on the environment rather than on the 
man himself.2 
Flexible policies
	 . 
The second important factor necessary for R&D 
success, closely related to the first, is that of flexible 
organizational policies. Raudsepp writes that the best 
climate for research cannot be one in which undue pressure 
for organizational conformity exists. This conformity 
tends to inhibit creative thinking and any originality by 
making the individual uncomfortable. 3
 With regard to the 
reaction of technical professionals to management actions, 
Siepert points out that these people have the following 
relevant attributes: curiosity, self-reliance, extreme 
capacity for concentration, reluctance to conform to any 
'Eugene Raudsepp, Managing Creative Scientists and 
Engineers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964'
	 39-40. 
2Albert F. Siepert, "Creating the Management Climate 
for Effective Research in Government Laboratories," in Hill, 
p.89.
3Raudsepp, p. 108.
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constituted authority, and determination to operate with 
shared rather than delegtèd authority.1 
To accommodate these attributes', Raudsepp state 
that'organizations-must relax their systems of controls, 
pr 6 cedures, and opi±àtionstoensure that 'organizational 
forces for conformity are reduced. Organizational policy 
must be flexible 'enough to' provide" the 'individuals 'more 
freedom and autonomy 'while maintaining necessary organiza- 
tional goals. 2 While this balance may be difficult to 
maintain at times, it should be a goal sought by the 
professional organization. 
'Trained technical managers 
'The responsib'ilIties"of managers of technical 
'_professiànals involved 'in R&D 'are identified by'the 
literature of various'writers as  
1. ' 'roviding'an interface 
2. , Providing management control 
3. Ensuring results 
Managers traditiónally'serve as an interface between 
upper management ándémployees. Blood feels that managers 
pI'ay''an extremely important role in organizations, but even 
more-so when'they supervise professional activities. It 
is only through these men that upper management can approach 
and deal with cre,ative'techn,ical professionals 3 and vice 
12 Siepert, p. 88.'	 '	 Raudsepp, p. 110. 
3Blooci, p. 176.
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versa. Since the manager serves in an interface capacity, 
effective communication is the primary means of implement-
ing this function. As a communicator representing upper 
management, the manager's job is to penetrate language 
barriers, to span decision-making credibility gaps, and 
frequently to interpret management directives and policies 
for those who work for them. 
A second function the manager serves is to provide 
effective control. It is through this single individual, 
working in both technical and interpersonal areas, that 
program objectives can be satisfied and organization con- 
trol can be maintained.' Control in an R&D environment 
is a somewhat different challenge because of the individuals 
involved. Managers must consider the often extreme varia-
tions in abilities, personalities, and interests of their 
people. 2
 The direction as well as control of the individ-
uals becomes a delicate and personal thing, and only after 
a certain time passes can the manager determine if a loose 
or relatively tight rein should be maintained.3 
The manager's third responsibility is to ensure 
that all results are achieved. Without some output, even 
basic research is worthless to an organization.. These 
results may be in the form of failures because, strangely 
enough, failures in R&D organizations have their merit. 
1 Overton, p. 56.	 2 Blood, p. 177. 
3. Siepert, p. 88.
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Bradley believes that the requirement for results is that 
the intelligent, communicating manager establish goals 
so that resources can be effectively committed. Priority 
among "right things" both in timing and commitment must be 
weighed against achievable results.' 1 The establishment of 
what are the "right things" is the difficilt part of ensur-
ing results. This necessitates that the manager distinguish 
good creative approaches from conventional or poor ones, 2
 so 
that unproductive projects be stopped. It also requires 
that resources be allocated in proper proportions. The 
ability to ensure that results are achieved is the challenge 
to management. 
Etzioni believes that strain,is created in profes-
sional organizations by nontechnical administrators. The 
dysfunctional situation created is that the hierarchy of 
lay authority is in inverse relation to the hierarchy of 
goals and means of technical professionals. The result 
frequently is the subversion of goals. He goes on to say 
that the manager maintains a strategic position doing 
much to neutralize conflicting pressures and mobilizes 
those factors which support primary goals.3 
By choosing a manager from the ranks, many organi-
zational problems are eliminated. Overton indicates that 
'W. E. Bradley, "The Job of the Modern Research 
Manager," in Research Management, XI (May, 1968), 167-75. 
2	 3 Kaplan, p. 79.	 Etzioni, pp. 84-85.
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the managers who possess technical knowledge and are able 
to make decisions regarding the group's work are acceptable 
to the group. 1 Siepert states that there is no substitute 
for having managers who have contributed in the past and 
who have developed a reputation with their peers. 2
 These 
managers are expected by upper management and the people 
who work for them to be perceptive, quick to pick up new 
Ideas, and alway.s alert to developments in technology. 
However, even though certain technical proficiency norms 
are expected of them, it is necessary that they be competent 
in administrative skills as well. 
The ideal manager of technical professionals is 
not easy to find for several obvious reasons. They must 
be technically capable, must possess some administrative 
ability or a capacity to develop it, and must understand 
human nature. Sanders identifies specific qualities 
sought in these managers (and technical professionals as 
well) as being 
1. Technical and administrative ability and judgment 
2. Scientific and personal integrity, 
3. Balanced skepticism 
4. Persistence	 3 5. Courage of convictions 
Trained technical managers are difficult to find 
but are needed to serve as an interface, provide management 
control, and ensure results. They do much to eliminate 
1Overton, p. 61.	 2Kàplan, p. 91. 
3Sanders, p. 82..
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language/communication problems when accepted by the group, 
and provide necessary reinforcement. 
Staff support 
The last necessary factor is that of staff support. 
It should be realized that in any particular organization, 
the R&D function can be either a line orstafffunction 
depending on what the product or service of the organization 
is. When R&D is a line function (as it will be with the 
Space Base), a supporting staff is needed to ensure produc-
tive output from technical professionals. 
Cronstedt elaborates on the need for supporting 
staffs by indicating that technical professionals are 
spenders who need others to find funds and programs. so  
they can continue their work, designers and draftsmen to 
provide their services, and shops to build prototypes. 
The structure of the professional, organization then can be 
envisioned as being similar to a classical military line 
and staff organization. He indicates that soldiers tight 
the battles as a line function, and an administrative group 
serving as a staff provides these people with everything 
they need to perform their tasks) 
Supporting staffs usually consist of technicians 
who reduce the diversion of professional talents to non-
professional activities. These trained and valuable 
1Cronstedt, pp. 26-27.
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individuals do much to relieve technical professionals 
of the tasks which do not require their special abilities. 
There are many necessary steps in the performance of R&D 
activities which are essentially routine and require a 
relatively low order of skill, and can be performed by 
high school graduates with a science major, or those who 
have had a year or two of junior college. 
Relevant Data from 
tkMlicableAnal 
An elemental question important to this study was 
how appropriate to Space Base are the multitude of social 
systems and environmental situations involving isolation, 
confinement, and situational danger, and what can be 
learned from the most applicable analogs with regard to 
Space Base organizational structure selection? To answer 
the first part of this question, a methodology developed by 
Sells was used to determine which social systems are appli-
cable analogs to Space Base. 
Appendix C contains the analyses and rationale for 
the determination of appropriate Space Base analogs used 
in this study. Those analogs found to be most similar, by 
descending order follow: 
1. NASA Space Station 
2. Various oceanographic research ships 
3. National Science Foundation (NSF)/Navy 
United States Antarctic Research station 
4. Various earthbound R&D laboratories 
5. Grumman Ben Franklin research submarine 
6. Navy/Dept. of Interior/NASA/General Electric 
Tektite II laboratory
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7. NASA/McDonnell Douglas Ninety-Day Space 
Station simulation 
8. Nuclear submarines 
9. Navy Sealab II 
10. NASA Skylab 
The salient aspects of these analogs are briefly described 
in Appendix D. 
Those situations found in the analysis to be least 
similar and, therefore, excluded for further study were 
1. Various exploration parties and expeditions 
2. Remote aircraft control and warning (AC&W) 
stations 
3. Industrial work groups 
4. Routine transoceanic aircraft flights 
5. Wartime bomber crews 
6. NASA Apollo spacecraft 
7. Off-shore/remote drilling rigs 
8. Professional athletic teams 
9. Shipwrecks and disaster situations 
10. Prisoner of war groups 
11. Prison societies 
12. Mental hospital wards 
To answer the second part of the elemental question, 
which was concerned with what can be learned from the most 
applicable analogs, further analysis was required. Table 
4 was developed by the researcher from the results of 
Appendix C, and a review of appropriate literature, visita-
tions, and interviews. These sources of data also served 
as the basis for the brief applicable analog descriptions 
contained in Appendix D. 
Table 4 after Space Base, lists the ten most appli-
cable analogs in descending order of similarity. The 
general and specific variable categories shown are those 
identified previously in this section. Cross-hatched cells
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(more than one-half of the total) indicate those specific 
variables and analogs which were considered by the researcher 
not to warrant further investigation or disc%ission. Space 
Station and Skylab are not included in subsequent discus-
sion because of their hypothetical nature. Emphasis was 
therefore placed on empirical data available for the remain-
ing eight analogs. A key to all entries was included to aid 
in understanding.
Objectives and Plans 
Multiple R&A activities 
As Table 4 indicates, almost all of the analogs 
listed were found to be similar to Space Base with respect 
to multiple R&A activities. The only exceptions were 
nuclear submarines and Sealab II. Little was found in the 
data of the similar analogs which was helpful in drawing 
conclusions for use in Space Base organizational structural 
considerations. Since multiple R&A activities were an 
objective and an integral part of all plans, a concerted 
effort was made to ensure that desired results were 
achieved. 
Assigned priorities 
One method of achieving desired results in a number 
of analog situations was to assign priorities to all R&A 
activities. Either prior to the mission or by direction of 
responsible individuals during the early phase of activities,
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priorities were assigned. This action was observed to assist 
in resolving Conflicts over the allocation of resources. 
These priorities thus served as a guideline to the decision-
making process. 
Crew size 
From Table 4 it is seen that analysis of crew size 
for the applicable analogs offers little help in obtaining 
useful data. There were no instances where the size of 
the analog crew matched the 50-100 population of Space Base 
consistently. Three analogs did, however, have crew sizes 
which on occasion matched the desired population require-
ments. After careful analysis, however, it was found that 
no significant generalizations could be drawn which would 
be important to this study. 
Capability of Personnel 
Crew composition 
As Table 4 indicates, the five highest ranking 
analogs are similar to Space Base with respect to heteroge-
neous crew composition. In the case of these analogs, a 
variety of crew members was needed because of the unique 
skills they possess to satisfy mission requirements. The 
heterogeneous crews were thus needed to accomplish multi-
faceted objectives and plans. In a few of the cases, both 
male and female technologists are routinely utilized. These 
situations are oceanographic research ships and earthbound
R&D labs. 
Both male and female scientists serve as chief 
scientists on research ships of the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. In addition, 
scientific crews are usually composed of mixed members. 
Female members of these teams are selected, like male 
members on the basis of best qualifications. The effec-
tiveness of female leaders and team members has been found 
to be a function of the particular skills, ability, and 
motivation of the particular individuals involved--just 
like any other leadership or task situation. While some 
interpersonal problems have been reported on oceanographic 
research missions involving mixed crews, crew dress, 
manners, and language have consistently been found to 
1 improve.
S^x does not seem to be a factor which differentiates 
'I 
one grop of technical professionals from another in earth-
bound R&D labs either. An interesting comparative investi-
gation was made of professional women and men at work in a 
large, defense-based, R&D organization. The results pointed 
overwhelmingly to the underlying similarities between the 
two groups within an organizational culture which provided 
essentially equal opportunities. Differences arose primarily 
from the residential immobility of the married professional 
'John Schilling, Public Information Officer, Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institution, telephone interview, 
September 22, 1972.
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women, and'other minor differences were attributed to 
occupational group or marital status rather than to sex.' 
Diverse backgrounds 
The composition of members involved in continuing 
Antarctic activities consists primarily of civilian scien-
tists, and Navy officers and enlistedmén.' The ratfoof 
scientists to military personnel varies fom station to 
station, but, in general, the smaller the'station,the 
more equally divided is the ratio. Usually, Antarctic 
groups are composed of a wide variety of scientific and 
occupational specialities. Scientists are selected to 
provide various scientific skills needed to'satIsfy 
station objectives. 
Gunderson notes that in the' Antarctic a large 
diversity of occupations and social and educational back-
grounds exists. As a result, he feels that psychological 
differences tend to be associated with these social back-"
 
ground differences. Truly, the wide range of cultural, 
background, and personality characteristics are' 'evidén€ 
between scientists and Navy cooks. The:
 author concluded 
that in these small and closed groups, adverse effects 
upon communications,, teamwork,. and accomplishment can 
'Evelyn Glatt, "Professional Men and Wômn at. Work: 
A Comparative Study in a Researeh'
 and Development" (unpub... 
lished Ph.D. thesis, Case Institute of Technology, 1966).
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result.
Perhaps the classic example of diverse backgrounds 
was that of the crew of the Ben Franklin, which consisted 
of six technologists who were needed to ensure mission 
success. The key individual of the group was Jacques 
Piccard. According to Phillips, the forty-one-year-old 
Piccard had established himself as a deep-sea explorer in 
1960 0 when he and a Navy Lieutenant set a new depth record 
of 35,800 feetbeneath the surface of the Pacific Ocean in 
the bathyscaphe Trieste. In addition, he had made 115 sea 
dives. 2 The captain of the ship was Donald Kazimir, a 
former U.S. Navy submariner, employed by the Grumman Aero-
space Corporation. Even though Kazimir was the youngest 
member of the crew at thirty, Piccard indicated that he 
"has solid experience with the sea."3 
The principal aide to Piccard and Captain. Kazimir 
was Erwin Aebersold, another Swiss. As a trained pilot,. 
experienced in instrument flying, it was natural that 
he served as the pilot of Ben Franklin. Aebersold had 
worked with Piccard for seven years previously and was, 
considered to be "a precision-minded technologist." The. 
E. K. Gunderson, "Mental Health Problems in 
Antarcitica," Archieves of Environmental Health, XVII 
(October, 1968), 561. 
2McCand].ish . Phillips, "Deep-Sea Explorer: 
Jacques Ernest Jean Piccard," The New York Tiines,:August 
20 1 , 1969, p. 24C. 
3Jacques Piccard, "Piccard Drifts with Gulf Stream," 
The New-York Times, August 20, 1969, p. 24C.
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remainder of the crew consisted of a life engineer and two 
oceanographers. The life engineer, Chester May, was 
employed by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, and was 
responsible for gathering data which might be useful for 
future space activities. One of the oceanographers was 
Frank Busby, a civilian normally employed by the U.S. 
Naval Oceanographic Office. Piccard indicated that Busby 
" knows perhaps more about research submersibles than any 
other living man." The other oceanographer was Kenneth 
Haigh, an exchange scientist from the British Royal Navy 
assigned to the U.S. Navy. Haigh was a specialist in echo 
soundings. 
Principal investigator 
participation 
While it was seen that a number of analog crews 
had diverse backgrounds required by the nature of the 
mission, another consideration was that participation by 
principal investigators (P.1.) was on occasion necessary. 
In the case of the Antarctic, according to Gropper and 
Patterson, the National Science Foundation considers it 
a distinct advantage to have the P.I. participate in at 
least one Antarctic mission. The main advantage of this 
participation was considered to be that the P.I. will have 
a much more accurate picture of field conditions, thus 
enabling him to be more realistic in his demands of field 
1lbid.
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teams. After this participation, a P.I. may choose to 
have a co-investigator conduct later field activities. 
Regardless, the P.I.'s primary experience will be of 
value. 1 
Varying crew size 
The crew size of activity teams for efficient and 
effective operations has been found to vary for different 
analogs because of objectives and plans and other consid-
erations. Gropper and Patterson report that typical 
Antarctic research project teams are usually composed of 
four scientists including the P.I. 2 In addition, von 
Tiésenhausen reports that experience in numerous (R&D) 
organizations and with a great variety of teams, indicates 
that coherence requires an optimum group size of between 
seven and twelve individuals.3 
Another viewpoint was expressed by the teaming 
structure of Martin Marietta's corporate research labora-
tory called the Research Institute for Advanced Studies 
(RIAS). This laboratory, staffed by approximately 100 
people, 	 found that interdisciplinary program and
research teams which consist of from seven to fourteen 
'B. A. Gropper and N. P. Patterson, Trip Report-
U.S. Antarctic Research Program, National Science Founda-
tion (Washington, D. C.: Bellcomm, 1971), p. 3. 	 - 
2 lbid., p. 2. 
3NASA, Fifty-Man Space Base Population Organization, 
p. 3.
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members optimize results..' A general conclusion 
reached from these findings was that an optimum number of 
team members does not exist, but that ranges from four to 
fourteen members have been found to be successful on 
numerous occasions for a variety of R&D activities. 
Crew selection and training
 
A number of analogs, like Space Base, plan or 
place only moderate emphasis on crew selection and train-
ing. Table 4 indicates that this condition exists for 
oceanographic research ships, the Antarctic, and the Ben 
Franklin situations. In each of these cases, crew selection 
was not based on as stringent physiological or psychological 
testing as was required in several of the others. Extensive 
training was not mandatory or accomplished during the 
analog missions either. Generalizations applicable to 
Space Base use are, therefore, difficult to assess. 
Dual selection 
While the ninety-day Space Station simulation con-
ducted by the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company was 
not identified as having close similarity to Space Base 
with respect to crew selection and training, it did offer 
one useful conclusion. A recommendation made was that a 
dual approach to crew member selection should be made based 
1Dr. David L. Goldheim, Manager for Marketing, 
Martin Marietta Corporation, Research Institute for 
Advanced Studies, private interview, August 16 1 1972.
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on the programmatic criteria of suitability for the program 
in terms of skills and educational level, as well as 
acceptable physical health and identification of existing 
health problems.' 
Crew selection 
As with the previous consideration, Sealab II 
was not found to possess close similarity with Space Base 
in relation to crew selection and training. One criterion 
did, however, develop from the empirical studies of 
Helmreich and Radloff. The researchers concluded that the 
most effective social organization for a confined environ-
ment was one where crew members are selected based on 
unique skills and knowledge which they communicate to 
others who are motivated to learn and who have their own 
skills to share. The interaction by these individuals who 
serve as teachers and learners, tends to maximize rewards 
and increase interpersonal understanding in closed 
environments. 
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Finalort: Definition Study for an Extended Manned 
Test of a Regenerative Life Support Sy stem (Huntington 
Beach, Calif.: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, 
1971), p. 115. 
2Robert Helmreich and Roland Radloff, Environmental 
Stress and the Maintenance of Self-Esteem (Austin, Tex.: 
University of Texas, 1969) quoted in Robert HelmreiCh, The 
Tektite II Human Behavior Program (Austin, Tex.: University 
of Texas, 1911), p. 22.
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Environment 
Mission duration 
The Space Base mission has previously been defined 
as being continuous for a useful life of ten years. Based 
on this consideration, as Table 4 indicates, only earth-
bound R&D labs had any similarity at all. This similarity, 
however, did not correlate well because R&D labs located 
on earth have continuous operations usually on a one or 
two work-shift-per-day basis. Conversely, Space Base must 
operate on an around-the-clock work/living basis with 
varying mission duration for most of the crew members. 
Because of probable frequent visits by the Space 
Shuttle, the likelihood of individuals having to stay 
longer than six months will be small. For many, one-month 
tours of duty, especially for transient P.I.'s and technolo-
gists will be the case. No applicable analog, therefore, 
was found useful in providing data which would be useful 
for Space Base organizational structure considerations. 
Environmental factors 
As Table 4 indicates, eight of ten analogs were 
identified as having environmental factors associated with 
them which were similar to Space Base. The only situations 
which did not were oceanographic research ships and earth-
bound R&D labs. Since it would require extensive discus-
S 
sions to elaborate on all similar analogs for all the
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environmental factors involved, only data from a relatively 
few are included in this discussion. In addition, only 
data for the specific area of rewards versus costs are 
presented. 
Rewards versus costs 
Radloff and Helmreich in their Sealab II investi-
gations hypothesized that there must be a more-than-pro-
portional relationship between rewards and costs (risks, 
financial and personal loss, etc.); i.e., reward must exceed 
cost as an incentive which makes people volunteer for work 
in hostile environments. Various balances between reward 
and costs are shown in Figure 2.1 The model was intended 
to represent approximate locations and relative interrela-
tionships. As can be seen, in general, the farther to the 
left and above the diagonal line, the more desirable the 
situation is for the individual or group. Correspondingly, 
the less desirable outcomes are located farther to the 
right and below the diagonal line. 
In considering the environments for the cases pze- 
sented where similarity to Space Base was found, an obviis 
question was why are scientists, engineers, and others 
motivated to participate in such activities? Certainly 
these environments are abnormal compared to those of more 
conventional R&D laboratories. The danger to life is real, 
1Roland Radloff and Robert Helmreich, Groups Under 
Stress: Psychologica1 Research in Sealab II (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 19685, p. 123.
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and the personal inconveniences are significant. Yet, 
with minor exceptions there were no indications that 
volunteers were lacking. In fact, a number of qualified 
backup group members were usually available. 
Studies by Mullin on Antarctic activities mdi-
cate that there are various reasons for a man to volunteer 
for isolated' duty in a unisexual environment. He feels, 
however, that "for a few men it was obvious that separation 
from home, wife, children, and family responsibility meant 
for them the subtraction of an element of stress in their 
1 personal adjustment." 	 This then was their reward, but 
what are other reasons? 
Gunderson found in his studies that high levels of 
expressed motivation prior to arrival in Antarctica were 
negatively correlated with emotional adjustment for the 
military personnel. Importantly, the author found that 
this did not hold true for the civilian scientists. 
Gunderson reasons that the Navy men with their favorable 
and perhaps unrealistic expectations of rewards, were most 
likely to be disappointed by the experience. Another 
reason hypothesized was that the Navy men expected certain 
immediate rewards, such as approval of associates and 
supervisors, favorable results of promotional exams, or 
orders to the next duty station. The scientists on the 
ic. S. Mullin, Jr., "Some Psychological Aspects of 
Isolated Antarctic Living," American Journal of Psychiat ry , 
CXVII (October, 1960), 323-25.
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other hand expected their professional rewards and satis-
factions at some distant time period.' 
It can be reasoned that Space Base R&? activities 
and support operations are closer to the hazardous demand-
ing job area than any other, as are Space Station, 
Antarctic stations, and nuclear submarines. The Ben 
Franklin, Tektite II, and Skylab activities are similar 
to the highest risk and reward circle which includes Sealab 
II. Oceanographic research ships and earthbound R&D labs 
would be considered normal work situations, while the 
ninety-day Space Station simulation falls within the 
low-cost and reward studies circle. Undoubtedly, time is 
a critical variable which causes uppermost relationships 
to shift downward and to the left. With the passage of 
time, the rewards decrease at a faster rate than do costs. 
For example, a second Ben Franklin voyage along the Gulf 
Stream probably would not provide as much recognition for 
the crew as did the first. 
This model, as well as the-discussionwhich follow-
d, was an atempt-to..answer theqüestion-of why people 
volunteer for activities which have high risks. The 
answer was simply that various rewards are either high, or 
are perceived to be high by the individual, and outweigh 
the costs. 
1Gunderson, p. 564.
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Autonomy of operations 
A few analogs were found, like Space Base, to have 
autonomous operations in the conduct of their activities. 
They were oceanographic research ships, Antarctic 
stations, and nuclear submarines. The main reasons for 
this autonomy was found to be the nature of the mission 
and the operational environment. A review of research 
and writings did not produce any significant generalizations 
which were felt by the writer to warrant further considera-
tion for Space Base analysis. 
Authority 
Authority and responsthilit 
Table 4 shows that the six highest ranking analogs 
have moderate authority and responsibility relationships to 
Space Base. Those environments found to be similar were' 
Space Station, oceanographic research ships, Antarctic 
stations, earthbound R&D labs, the Ben Franklin, and 
Tektite II. Since authority and responsibility within 
earthbound R&D labs have already been discussed 
previously in this section -#' only the other analogs: 
are considered. 
In the literature describing the four remote cases, 
there were no major incidents of technologists refusing to 
take direction or orders. This is not surprising for the 
underwater activities because of their unique: and
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nonroutine nature. One might, however, expect some diffi
-
culty in the. Antarctic for various reasons. A reason might 
be the attitudes of the scientists with regard to their 
belief of higher status. After all, the facilities exist 
so they may do their experiments and collect data. Another 
might be the relative routineofactivities-
Perhaps the most significant reason for a lack of 
problems in the Antarctic was that the majority of those 
in residency are military personnel. Also, the records of 
many of the scientists indicated a short career or exposure 
to military life. Discipline learned in the military may 
have seen a relevant factor. Another possibility is that 
in most areas (especially the underwater activities), the 
organizational hierarchy was fairly short. Still another 
reason may be that the missions were fairly short for the 
underwater activities )
-up to sixty days. l Even with the one 
year Antarctic activity, there was a realization that the 
end was already in sight, and that others had "played to 
rules of the game" before.
	 - 
Personal freedom 
In several of the analog situations noted, it was 
found that benefits were derived when crew members had 
personal freedom to vary procedures and manner of task 
accomplishment on their own initiative. Work in these 
isolated situations had been found to be the most meaningful 
of the social roles. and is therefore important. Giving
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individuals the freedom to vary work accomplishment	
ci 
helps to promote morale, to prevent boredom,'and'to' foster 
efficient performance. 
For example, work was found , to be an essential 
part of Antarctic station life. Gunderson's studies show 
that "emotional responses to the Antarctic environment 
can be largely attributed to changes in self esteem and 
group status, which in turn are related to the perceived 
importance of one's job." The scores of scientists on a 
scale indicating feelings of "usefulness" remained 
unchanged over the Antarctic winter. The scores for the 
Navy men showed a significant reduction. There was also a 
direct correlation found between a reduced feeling of 
usefulness of Navy men and emotional symptomatology near 
the end of winter) 
Performance and emotional health' are then , a direct 
function of work itself. Rohrer finds that work soon 
became the most meaningful of the social roles, and that 
an individual who is able to occupy himself working is 
better able to adjust to isolation. It is understandable 
why some men seek additional work functions to occupy their 
time, and an example given was the physician who also 
served as the housing officer. The value attached to work 
roles was somewhat -. different , from what one might think, 
1Gunderson, p. 564.
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and Rohrer found that the cook often has a higher status 
within the group than the scientists do. Another high-
ranking position is held by the radio operator who main-
tains the only link to the outside world.' Each man has 
work responsibilities to perform and these activities are 
not only essential to the survival of the group,but to 
the well-being of the individual as well. 
Communications, coordination, 
and intation 
Very little similarity to Space Base was found 
when considering communications, coordination, and integra-
tion. Only earthbound R&A. labs, which have already been 
discussed in relation to this specific variable, were 
found to be analogous. There were, however, several 
aspects of this variable which were considered important 
enough to discuss briefly. 
Line of communications 
In each of the analogs, either explicitly or 
implicitly, it was realized that lines of communications 
between all groups were needed for critical and safety-
associated announcements. For obvious reasons, these 
communication channels were needed to ensure uniform and 
efficient response to dangerous situations. A number of 
methods were utilized, such as audio and visual alarms, 
1 John U. Rohrer, "Human Adjustment to Antarctic 
Isolation," U.S. Office of Naval Research Reviews, June, 
1959.
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emergency procedures, and periodic training. All of these 
methods, however, require that a line of communications and 
hierarchical relationship exists between crew members and 
an individual with authority and responsibility to direct 
necessary action through other lines of communications. 
The line organization of a nuclear submarine can be con-
sidered a prime example of how hierarchical relationships 
provide for the necessary line of communications. 
Bidirectional communications 
While not specifically identified as a similar 
analog with respect to this specific variable, ninety-day 
Space Station simulation data indicated another need for 
bidirectional communications. A conclusion stated in the 
final report was that it was important that bidirectional 
communications between managers and crew members existed. 
The reason given was that crew members prefer to be informed 
as to the purpose and rationale of all tasks. During the 
simulation, it was found that arduous and unpleasant tasks 
were performed by crew members with no complaints when 
they were fully aware of and thus involved in what was 
being attempted and why.1 
Two-way audio and video 
Studies have indicated that two-way communications 
1NSA, Final	 Study foran Extended 
Manned Test of a Regenerative Life Support System, p. 276.
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diminish the sense of isolation between space/underwater 
and ground personnel. In addition, their communication 
systems aid coordination and integration. For example, 
Antarctic studies by Lewis indicate that while men miss 
being with their families, the use of the station's 
radio and telephone system to talk to their families was 
very helpful to morale.1 
Helmreich reports that it appears that a two-way 
video link played an important role in maintaining good 
relations between Aquanauts and surface personnel during 
Tektite II activities. It was concluded that this video 
link reduced the feeling of isolation and overt hostility 
between the two groups, as had been the case with the 
similar environment of Sealab 11.2 
Summary 
This section consisted of a review of research 
and writings important to organizational structural 
determination for a Space Base; This review, an important 
part of the study methodology, involved four areas of 
investigation. The first was concerned with Space Base 
related studies. The second discussed and identified 
general and specific variables'which can be used to select 
1Richard S. Lewis, A Continent for Science (New 
York: The Viking Press, 195), p. 278. 
2Helmreich, p. 37.
105 
an organizational structure and categorize data. The 
third discussed professional organizations and technical 
professionals. Finally, data were identified and discussed 
by general and specific variables for a number of applicable 
analogs.
A survey of Space Base related studies accomplished 
by six NASA and contractor study groups/individuals was 
presented. While none of these studies had as its sole 
purpose Space Base organizational structural identification, 
a number provided some useful inputs to this study. The 
first study, a NASA Statement of Work for follow-on con-
tractor Space Base investigation, identified three organi-
zatiónal functions, namely, operations, maintenance, and 
experimental operations. Two contractor study teams. 
working independently concluded that these functions 
could be placed in two organizational groups, .with the 
maintenance function either located in one group or shared 
between the groups. Studies performed by two NASA employees 
from different centers identified a basic line organization 
as a Space Base organizational structural model. Then they 
went on to investigate other areas of interest. Finally, 
a relevant Grumman Space Station study, and another by 
Sells were discussed and modified for use for Space Base 
analysis. 
Variables important for the design of organizational 
structure, both general and specific, were identified. It
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was determined that while a totally acceptable set of 
general variables does not exist, the categories of objec-
tives and plans, capability of personnel, environment, and 
authority would suffice for the present study. Nine 
specific variables were discussed and included with the 
general variables to serve as a set important for the design 
of Space Base organizational structure, and as a classifi-
cation scheme for subsequent data gathering and analysis. 
These variables were multidisciplinary R&A. activities; 
crew size; crew composition; crew selection and training; 
mission duration; environmental factors; autonomy of opera-
tions; authority and responsibility; and communications, 
coordination, and integration. 
The discussion of professional organizations and 
technologists was included to identify data relevant for 
subsequent considerations. Professional organizations were 
identified as those where the primary objective was to 
produce, apply, preserve, or communicate knowledge--like 
Space Base. Characteristics of these organizations were 
described in terms of goals, situational factors, authority 
relationships, and structure. Organic-adaptive project 
(matrix) structures were described. The somewhat unique 
characteristics of technical professionals were listed, 
with scientists and engineers being described as intensively 
dedicated and self-reliant individuals who frequently are 
unable to communicate with others. The individuals and
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their relationship to the organization were described in 
terms of a number of potentials for conflict and detriments 
for organizational success. 
The final portion of this section was concerned with 
data relevant to Space Base organizational structural selec-
tion obtained from the most applicable analogs. These 
appropriate and significant data were included and dis-
cussed using the variable categories previously identified. 
In most cases, a review of literature, visitations, and 
interviews provided useful data from which specific con-
siderations were included. More than one-half of the time, 
however, only limited or no data at all were considered by 
the researcher to be relevant. These collected data, as 
well as Space Base program requirements and assumptions, 
were necessary to accomplish the conduct of the study.
III. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY 
This chapter, primarily concerned with the-'second 
phase of the study methodology, indicates how useful 
study data were rationally obtained. These data were 
necessary for the subsequent identification of an optimum 
hypothetical Space Base.organizational structure from a 
large number of possibilities. The general technique 
used was for the researcher to develop organizational 
structural evaluation criteria, develop organizational 
structural models, and reduce these possibilities to a 
much smaller feasible set. In addition, evaluation 
scores and instructions were identified for use by members 
of two pilot evaluation teams and members of a carefully 
selected primary evaluation "panel ofexperts" to score 
each model quantitatively against how well the criteria 
were satisfied. 
Development of Evaluation Criteria 
The technique used to develop evaluation criteria 
(and rationale for each) was eclectic in nature and used 
the pertinent sources of data discussed in sections I and 
II. Three significant areas investigated were (1) Space 
Base program requirements and assumptions; (2) management 
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concepts and practices--as they relate to organizational 
structural variables, professional organizations, and 
technical professionals; 6nd..(3) applicable analog data. 
Table 5 contains a list of criteria identified 
from these areas. These criteria were placed in the 
general and specific structural variable categories 
previously identified in Table 1. The source of each, by 
significant area of investigation as well as rationale 
used, are included. In total, forty-six criteria were 
identified: Space Base program requirements--sixteen; 
management concepts and practices--nineteen, and analog 
data--eleven. 
'Development of Organizational 
Structural Models 
A multitude of organizational structural models 
which could be used in Space Base exists. Classical and 
modern structural variations were discussed in section II 
and included the mechanistic (bureaucratic) and matrix 
forms. Many combinations and varieties are also possible. 
This section of the study discusses-some of these varia-
tions---and develops a number of models--some of which are 
used for further analysis. 
The Grumman "Level-of-Authority" Model 
Because of the organizational structural possibili-
ties, a rationale was needed for development and identifi-
cation purposes. This rationale was provided by the
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TABLE 5 
CRITERIA WITH SOURCES AND RATIONALE 
FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL 
MODEL EVALUATION 
Criteria 
Objectives and Plans 
1. Multidisciplinary R&A 
Activities 
1.1 Variety of R&A: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow a variety of 
R&A activities to be 
accomplished concurrently. 
1.2 Undefined activities: 
The organizational 
structure shall have the 
flexibility to support 
R&A activities and inter-
planetary missions which 
are not defined in detail 
at present. 
1.3 Assigned priori: The 
organizational structure 
shall accommodate R&A 
activities and inter-
planetary missions with 
assigned priorities. 
1.4 Situational requirements: 
The organizational struc-
ture must provide for con-
flicting professional 
organizational situational 
requirements.
Source/Rationale 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: Space Base 
objectives of R&A, public 
and private sector support, 
space explorations, and 
orbital operations require 
a variety of concurrent 
activities for mission 
success. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: The proba-
bility of long range Space 
Base program success will 
be increased if organiza-
tional structure is flexible 
enough to accommodate change. 
plicable analog data: 
Priority assignments assist 
in resolving scheduling con-
flicts, and serve as a 
guideline to the decision-
making process. 
Management concepts and 
practices: The organization 
structure for an internalized 
multiprofession, public profes-
sional organization such as 
the Space Base must provide 
for nonuniform events and 
innovation, and at the same 
time use certain traditional 
bureaucratic mechanisms for 
routine activities.
111 
TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria 
Objectives and Plans 
2. Crew Size 
2.1 Large crew: The organi-
zational structure will 
accommodate a Space Base 
crew consisting of 50-100 
members. 
2.2 Crew growth: The organi-
zational structure shall 
accommodate a crew which 
will vary in size of from 
50 initially to 100 as 
the program matures. 
2.3 Many technologists: The 
organizational structure 
must allow support opera-
tions personnel to satisfy 
the needs of a large 
population of R&I technolo-
gists who use but do not 
operate the Space Base. 
Capability of Personnel 
3. Crew Composition
Source/Rationale 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: The Space 
Base wifle manned by a 
large number of 
technologists. 
Program re( uirem e ntsand 
assumptions: Space Base 
maximum crew size will vary 
during the life of the pro-
gram. In the initial build-
up phase, only 50 crew 
members will participate. 
Later, as the Space Base is 
physically expanded, the 
crew will be increased to a 
maximum of 100 members. 
Program reqirements and 
assumptions: Support opera- 
ti5ns personnel will func-
tion to assist in every way 
possible to ensu±e that the 
various needs of R&A tech-
nologists are effectively, 
efficiently, and safely 
satisfied. Functions per-
formed include subsystem 
operations, flight control 
and orientation, data manage-
ment, medical services, 
maintenance, logistics and 
resupply, food handling, and 
housekeeping. 
3.1 Mixed crew: The organi- 	 Program requirements and 
zational structure shall 	 assumptions: Crew members 
accommodate male and 	 will be selected solely on 
female crew members. 	 qualifications.
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria	 Source/Rationale 
Capability of Personnel 
3.2 Multination crew: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow international, 
as well as domestic, 
technologists to work pro-
ductively. 
3.3 Diverse backgrounds: The 
organizational structure 
shall accommodate tech-
nologists of diverse occu-
pations and social and 
educational backgrounds. 
3.4 Task leader: The organi-
zational structure shall 
accommodate a task leader 
assigned and responsible 
for each major R& 
activity. 
3.5 P.I. participation: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow for partici-
pation by principal R&A 
investigators on occasion. 
3.6 Varying crew size: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow for R&A 
activity teams consisting 
of from four to fourteen 
technologists.
Program requirements and 
assumptions: The Space 
Base will provide a focal 
point for productive inter-
national cooperation and 
joint ventures. 
Applicable analog data: 
Psychological differences 
are associated with groups 
with diverse backgrounds, 
on occasion causing adverse. 
effects upon communications, 
teamwork, and accomplishment. 
Management concepts and 
practices: The likelihood 
of timely and efficient task 
accomplishment is increased 
if an individual is identified 
as being responsible for its 
success. 
Aoolicable analoa data: 
OccasIonal partici-
pation by principal investi-
gators gives them a much more 
accurate picture of field 
conditions, and enables them 
to be more realistic in their 
demands on field personnel. 
ADolicable analoq data: 
Efficient and effective R&A 
team size has been found to 
vary between four to fourteen 
individuals including the 
team leader, participating 
technologists, and the 
principal R&A investigator.
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria 
Capability of Personnel 
4. Crew Selection and Training 
4.1 Minimum astronaut train-
ing: The organizational 
structure will accommodate 
crew members with a minimum 
of astronaut-type training 
and physical conditioning. 
4.2 Dual selection: 'The 
organizational structure 
shall allow for a dual 
approach to crew member 
selection, i.e., con-
sideration will be given 
to education/skills and 
general health. 
4.3 Crew selection: The 
organizational structure 
shall accommodate crew 
members who are selected 
partially based on their 
unique skills and knowl-
edge and who are motivated 
to learn.
Source/Rationale 
Program reqirements and 
assumptions: The widest 
range of skilled technologists 
shall participate in Space 
Base activities. ' This will 
require that personnelwho 
lack flight training, exten-
sive testing, and exposure 
to the space environment will 
be utilized. The present 
physical/medical requirements 
for astronauts ' should apply 
only to those personnel 
required for extra/intra-
vehicular activities. 
Applicable ana1data: Two 
general criteria should be 
used to select crew members. 
The first is based on the 
programmatic criteria of 
suitability for the program 
in terms of skills, cross 
skills, and educational 
levels. The second relates 
to acceptable physical 
health and the identification 
of existing health problems. 
Applicable analog data: The 
most effective social organi-
zation for a confined environ-
ment is one in which crew 
members have unique skills and 
knowledge which they communi-
cate to others who are motivated 
to learn and who have skills to 
share. The interaction by 
individuals who serve as teach-
ers and learners tends to maxi-
mize rewards and increase inter-' 
personal understanding in a 
closed environment.
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria
Capability of Personnel 
4.4 Training and 
indoctrination: The 
organizational structure 
shall accommodate the 
training and indoctrina-
tion of long and short 
duration crew members. 
Environment 
5. Mission Duration 
5.1 Ten-year life: The 
organizational structure 
shall be flexible enough 
to allow maximum return 
from a highly worthwhile 
R&A program over a full 
ten year period. 
5.2 Varying tours: The 
organizational structure 
shall have the flexi-
bility to accommodate crew 
members who remain in the 
Space Base for varying 
tours of duty.
Source/Rationale 
Prom requirements and 
assumptions: Some in-orbit 
training and indoctrination 
will be required because of 
the possibility that some 
R&A personnel may participate 
in Space Base R&A activities 
for extended periods. 
Indoctrination of new crew 
members will be a recurring 
requirement. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: This require-
ment allows for the effective 
accomplishment of a program 
which may continuously change 
and require updating to meet 
changing budgets, technologies, 
and national/international 
interests. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: The organiza-
tional structure must not be 
sensitive to a specific 
mission duration since R&A 
technologists and support 
operations personnel will 
participate in Space Base duty 
for varying (yet unspecified) 
lengths of time. In addition, 
the organizational structure 
must be flexible enough to 
permit increases in stay time 
as the program matures and 
extended manned operations 
are better understood.
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria 
Environment 
5.3 Multishift work: The 
organizational structure 
must be flexible enough 
to accommodate multishift 
RSA activities and support 
operations. 
5.4 placement: The 
organizational structure 
shall have the flexi-
• bility to allow for 
periodic replacement and 
reassignment of some crew 
members before certain 
long-run R&A activities 
and continuous support 
activities are completed. 
6. Environmental Factors 
6.1 Rewards vs. costs: The 
•	 organizational structure 
shall serve to ensure that 
• -• there is a more-than-pro-
portional relationship 
between rewards and costs. 
6.2 Cohesive group. The 
organizational structure 
shall create a cohesive
Source/Rationale 
Program requirements and 
assumptions:. Multishift 
R&A activities and operations 
are needed to maximize pro-
gram results and to insure 
the safety and well being of 
the Space Base crew. Many 
R&A activities will require 
either continuous coverage 
or must be accomplished 
during "nonstandard" hours 
for various technical 
reasons. In addition, many 
maintenance, repair, and 
housekeeping functions must 
be accomplished when they 
will not conflict with R& 
activities. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: Success of the 
Space Base program will depend 
on the ability of the in-orbit 
organization to adjust to 
personnel changes due to crew 
member replacement or reassign-
ment to higher priority work. 
Some task rotation keeps crew 
members fully occupied, and 
provides backup capability in 
the event of illness. 
Applicable analog data: 
Studies indicate that personnel 
reward must exceed cost as an 
incentive which makes people 
volunteer for work in hostile 
environments. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Group unit 
connotes unity of purpose
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TABLE 5..--Continued. 
Criteria 
Environment 
organization and cohesive-
ness within groups. 
6.3Work schedule: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow for work 
schedules that bring 
various groups together.
Source/Rationale 
and promotes effective 
performance. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Work schedules 
which allow for varied 
individual and group contact 
reduce the formation of 
informal subgroups and fac-
tions and increase overall 
unity and cohesiveness. 
6.4 Professional satisfaction: Management concepts and 
The organizational struc- practices: The probability 
tue shall allow technical of retaining trained individuals 
professional crew members
	 is increased if the achievement 
to satisfy profe ssional'
	 of professional goals is 
needs and goals.
	 emphasized. This also reduces 
training costs and improves 
morale. 
6.5 Human capabilities: The
	 Management concepts and 
organizational structure
	 practices: The maximum 
shall allow for the
	 contribution to organizational 
maximum use of cross skills activities is achieved by 
and the full range of
	 people whose capabilities are 
human capabilities,	 fully used. 
6.6 Full employment: The 
organizational structure 
shall provide for full 
employment of crew 
members (except during 
off-duty hours). 
6.7 Various construction: Ti organizationa1truc-
ture shall be appropriate 
for either a modularly 
constructed or centralized 
Space Base design.
Management concepts and 
practices: Full employment 
is a goal of efficient organi-
zational activities, which 
require the completion of 
scheduled and operational 
tasks with the human 
resources available. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: Since Space Base 
design has'been finalized, 
the organizational structure 
identified should be compatible 
with either the modular or 
centralized designs.
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TABLE 5,--Continued. 
Criteria 
Environment 
7. Autonomy of Operations 
7.1 Autonomous operations: 
Me organizational struc-
ture shall allow autonomous 
Space Base operation. 
7.2 Planning and scheduling: 
The organizational struc-
ture shall allow, to the 
maximum extent possible, 
in-orbit mission planning 
activity/support opera-
tion priority definition, 
and work scheduling. 
7.3 Nonduy_work: The 
orgaiiizational struc-
ture shall have the 
flexibility of allowing 
certain technical profes-
sionals to work on R&A, 
activities during "non-
duty" hours. 
Authority 
8. Authority and 
Responsibility
Source/Rationale 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: Cost effec-
tiveness dictates that 
operation of the ten year 
life Space Base be as 
independent from earth 
control/support as possible. 
Program requirements and 
assumptions: The cr ew of 
the Space Base needs a 
capability for mission plan-
ning, priority definition, 
and activity scheduling; with 
consideration given to work/ 
rest-cycle variations, equip-
ment sharing, number of crew-
men available for duty, crew 
skill proficiency, scheduling 
conflicts, and requirements 
for team tasks. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Creative technical 
professionals frequently do 
not know what an eight-hour 
workday means, and preoccupa-
tion with problem solutions 
is often incessant and end-
less. They are frequently 
characterized by their love 
of science and an insatiable 
curiosity. 
8.1 General definition: The	 Management concepts and 
or^anizational structure 	 practices: Studies indicate 
shall allow for	 that determination of who
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria 
Authority 
general authority and 
responsibility definition. 
8.2 Various managers: The 
organizational structure 
shall accommodate trained 
technical managers at 
various Space Base hierar-
chical levels. 
8.3 Unity of command: The 
organizational structure 
will use the unity of 
command principle when 
possible. 
8.4 Span of control: The 
organizational structure 
shall provide for moderate 
and workable spans of 
control. 
8.5 Work flexibility: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow for flexi-
bility in crew member 
work activity definition.
Source/Rationale 
does what, when, and how will 
help to prevent Conflicts. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Trained technical 
management of all phases of 
the activities of technical 
professionals is essential to 
organizational success. These 
managers provide an interface 
between technologists and 
higher management, and ensure 
management control is 
accomplished. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Coordination of 
work efforts and the utiliza-
tion of resources can be best 
achieved by a single authority. 
The decision-making process 
may involve many people, but 
final authority must be vested 
in a single individual. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Good management 
practice dictates that spans 
of control shall be neither 
too narrow or too wide. 
Generally, a span too narrow 
does not fully employ managers, 
and a span too wide overextends 
their control and direction 
depending on the work environ-
ment and types of personnel 
involved. 
Management concepts and 
practices: A well defined 
series of tasks results in 
specific assignment of personnel 
to accomplish them. This re-
duces the systems' ability to
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria 
Authority 
8.6 Personal freedom: The 
organizational structure 
shall permit personnel 
to vary procedures and 
manner of task accomplish-
ment on their own 
initiative. 
9. Communications, Coordi-
nation, and Integration 
9.1 Group decision making: 
The organizational struc-
ture shall allow group 
decision making where 
practical. 
9.2 Quality and speed: The 
organizational structure 
shall have provision for 
quality and speed in 
decision making.
Source/Rationale 
shift its resources to 
accomplish other lesser defined 
tasks, and ultimately leads 
to a highly specialized crew. 
Therefore, the degree of 
specialization is inversely 
related to flexibility of 
crew assignment. 
pplicab1e analog data: Work, 
in isolated situations, has 
been found to be the most 
meaningful of the social 
roles,, and is therefore 
important. Giving individuals 
the freedom to vary work 
accomplishments helps to pro-
mote morale, prevent boredom, 
and foster efficient 
performance. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Group decision 
making serves as an aid to 
communications, coordination, 
and integration. Group 
decisions ensure that all 
relevant inputs are made and 
properly evaluated. This 
action also promotes morale. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Managers need an 
organizational structure which 
assists them in rendering 
sound decisions. This requires 
good information inputs, and 
an analytical process that 
yields unambiguous unbiased 
judgments. These decisions 
must not only be appropriate 
to the situation, but must be
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TABLE 5.--Continued. 
Criteria	 Source/Rationale 
Authority
arrived at and acted on 
within time constraints. 
9.3 Line of communications:	 Applicable analog data::. 
The organizational struc-
 Open lines of communications 
ture shall allow for lines will ensure uniform, 'efficient 
of communication between	 response to dangerous 
groups for all critical 	 situations 
and safety-associated tasks. 
9.4 Bidirectional communica-
tions The organizational 
structure shall provide 
bidirectional communica-
tions between directors/ 
managers and crew members. 
9.5 Technical professional 
communications: The 
organizational structure 
shall allow and encourage 
communications between 
technical professionals 
and managers. 
9.6 Two-way audio and video.: 
T1e organizational struc-
ture shall be compatible 
with the use of two-way 
audio and video 
communications.
Applicable analog data: 
Crew members prefer to be 
informed as to the purpose 
and rationale of all tasks. 
Arduous and unpleasant. tasks 
are performed by drew, members 
with no. complaints when they 
are fully aware of. and thus 
involved in what is being 
attempted and why. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Since technical 
professionals are generally 
not considered to possess the 
ability to. communicate, the 
organizational structure must 
allow this difficulty to be 
overcome by ensuring that 
adequatecommunication 
channels exist. In this way, 
accomplishments and support 
requirements-will-be made. 
known, and needed recognition 
and support, can be provided. 
Applicable 'analog data: 
Studies made indicate that 
two-way.. communications 
diminishes the sense of 
isolation-between space/ 
underwater and ground 
personnel. In addition, 
these communication systems 
aid coordination and 
integration.
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Criteria 
Authority 
9.7 Minimum interfaces: The 
iganizationa1 structure 
shall include a minimum 
•	 number of communication 
•	 interfaces to achieve 
objectives effectively 
and efficiently. 
9.8 Feedback: The organiza-
tional, structure shall 
allow for accurate and 
timely feedback of R&? 
activity progress. 
9.9 Creative climate: The 
S organizational structure 
shall create a climate 
for creativity for those 
technical professionals 
involved in R&A activities.
Sour ce/Rationale 
Management concepts and 
practices: Communication 
theory indicates that the, 
number of steps, or communi-
cation links, in terms of 
people that are required for 
information to get from the 
originator to the person who 
is ultimately responsible for 
the action should be as few 
as possible. 
Management concepts and 
practices: Managers use 
lines of communication to 
allocate resources and make 
decisions. Accurate and 
timely information is needed 
for quality management 
decisions. 
Management concepts and 
practices: An organizational 
environment which stimulates 
creativity through communi-
cation, coordination and 
integration is essential to 
technical professionals. 
methodology used in the Grumman Space Station study 
previously identified. The technique was based on an 
organizational pyramid model which 'considered four distinct 
hierarchical 'levels of authority shown in Figure 3. 
These levels are command, discipline, function, and
122 
task.'
Fig. 3.--The Grumman "level of authority" organi-
zational pyramid model. 
As the model shows, the command level is located 
at the apex of the pyramid. Major authority and responsi-
bility for all Space Station operations and activities is 
here, and a manager or commander was assigned. At the next 
level, the discipline level, two major disciplines for the 
Space Station existed. These disciplines were comprised 
of related functions and were called the scientific and 
operations disciplines with a manager assigned to each. 
The function level, the next lowest, represented the level 
at which a number of related tasks were logically grouped. 
Included as Space Station functions were experiments, 
maintenance, and repair. At this level, an individual was 
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Crew 
Operations Study of Command Structure, by Samuel C. Campbell, 
Perry L. Gardner, and Robert H. Schaifer (Bethpage, New York: 
Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 1971), p. D-2.
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identified as having authority and responsibility for the 
accomplishment of each functional group.1 
The task level, located at the base of the pyramid, 
contained all tasks that must be performed by the Space 
Station crew during the mission. Typical required tasks 
would be calibration for an experiment, star sighting 
for navigation purposes, and housekeeping.. No individual 
authority or responsibilities for task. accomplishment were 
implied at this level--just that all tasks be inclixled.2 
The writer feels that while the Grumman organizational 
pyramid was developed for Space Station considerations, it 
was equally applicable and useful for Space Base analysis' 
as will be seen in the discussion which follows. 
Some Hypothetical Space Base 
Organizational Structural 
Models 
Figures 4 and 5 show the correlation between the 
Grumman level-of-authority model and two Space Base• 
hypothetical organizational structures. The structures 
proposed are classical and matrix in nature, and each serves 
as parent models from which others are developed. As the 
classical structural model portion of Figure 4 shows, 
personnel are assigned to each authority level. Space 
Base, R&A, and Support Operations Directors are located 
at the command and discipline levels, respectively. 
1 Ibid.	 2Ibjd
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Functional managers for research, applications, operations 
medical operation, and maintenance/logistics are identified 
at the function level. The task level is staffed with the 
remaining technologists who comprise the Space Base crew. 
This model is very similar to the functional Space Base 
organizational structures suggested by von Tiesenhausen1 
and Gundersen. 
The matrix structural model portion of Figure 5 
also shows assignment of personnel to various levels. 
Major titles are identical, except that the R&A Director 
has a varying number of project managers assigned to him 
instead of functional R&A, Managers. The number of project 
managers and projects is a function of mission objectives 
and planned manning levels, with variability indicated by 
a broken line. The lines with arrows on this matrix model 
are included to indicate horizontal project and vertical 
functional authority and responsibility. These charac-
teristics are typical of matrix organizations and were 
discussed in section Ii. 
The organizational titles shown in Figures 4 and 5 
have been selected to serve as the basis for all subsequent 
study discussion. Close examination reveals that discipline, 
functional, and project titles shown are a preliminary 
pp. 3-5. 
1NASA, Fifty-Man Space Base Population Organization,
    
2NASA, Earth-Orbiting Space Base Crew Skills Assess-
ment, p. 53.
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attempt by the researcher to establish several Space Base 
organizational structural possibilities. Personnel 
assignments are based on program requirements identified 
and assumptions made in Section I. 
Organizational Structural Model 
Combinations Based on Authority
Assignments 
The technique used by Grumman to generate organi-
zational structural model variations was to vary the level 
and number of authority assignments. For example, total 
authority was assigned to personnel at the highest level, 
or it was shared between members of lower levels, such as 
the discipline and task levels. 1 This same technique was 
used in the present study for Space Base analysis. 
Statistically there are thirty different combinations in 
which these assignments could be made. 2 Figures 6 through 
1NASA, Crew Operations Study of Command Structure, 
p. D-3.
2The general formula for determining possible 
combinations is: 
C	 n 
n r = rUn-r)! Where n is the number of items in the 
population and r is the number of items 
considered from the population. 
Total combinations ='4 l 4 2 4 3 4 
4
C C c c ) (No. of repetitions)* 
= (4 + 6 + 4 + 1) (2) = (15) (2) = 30 
*both classical and matrix models are considered. 
See Robert Mason, Statistical Techniques in Business and 
Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), 
pp. 319-20.
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11 indicate these combinations. 
Figures 6 through 8 contain organizational struc-
tural models which are classical in nature; i.e., they 
are variations of line-functional structures. Figures 9 
through 11 are organic and are based on variations to 
the more modern matrix organizational structural model. 
Model numbers one (Figure 6) and sixteen (Figure 9) repre-
sent the classical and matrix models shown in Figures 5 
and 6, respectively. 
These figures illustrate a multitude of considera-
tions important to this study's analysis. The "level-of-
authority" model column represents variations of Figure 3. 
In each of the figures, authority responsibility was 
either shared between levels or located at a single level. 
Authority location within the "level-of-authority" model 
is shown cross-hatched. It should be observed that as 
authority was assigned to lower levels, higher and inter-
mediate unassigned levels were eliminated because they no 
longer served any purpose. 
Numbers were assigned to each model in the model 
number column for accounting purposes, and the arrows 
containing the model numbers indicate that each "level-of-
authority" model has a resulting organizational structural 
model. These models are variations of the hypothetical 
Space Base organizational structure portion of Figures 4 
and 5, without titles. The cross-hatched areas represent
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Level of	 Model 
Authority Model	 Name/Ninrtber 
A
Dis c.	
E> Function 
11 k i
Traditional 
A-
A 
A Ah
Organizational 
Structural Model 
a
Mission Director located on earth. 
Pig. 6.--Classical models with authority shared between 
four/three levels.
 /Task\ 
00- I	 or M M M 
'-4 
0  1 000,01,
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Level of
	 Model	 Organizational Authority Model	 Name/Number-
	 Structural Model 
)/P, n^- Dual Command 
Funct ion  
ol /	 Tk	 \
44
a
Mission Director located on earth. 
Fig. 7.--Classical models with authority shared between 
two levels.
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Level of
	
Model
	
Organizational 
Authority Model
	
Name/Number	 Structural 1'iodel 
A. 
__TI /•	 Task
Round Table 
Function
Task
E: >
a
1ission Director located on earth. 
Fig. 8.--Classical models with authority located 
at a single level.
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Level of 
Authority Model
Model	 Organizational 
Name/Number	 Structural Model 
AI 
Total Matrix 
E> 
W4A 
Function 
waI C. 
Qnd
A.
a
Mission Director located on earth.. 
ig. 9. --Matrix models with authority shared between 
four/jree levels.
lelo
Level of	 Model
	 133	
Organizational 
Authority Model Name/Number
	 Structural Model 
p	 VIO 
V0 VIA 
a
Mission Director located on earth. 
Fig. 10.--Matrix models with authority shared at two levels. 
A 1 2 
4Task
U
/ t\ 1:)
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Level of	 Model	 Organizational 
Authority Model	 Narne/Nunber	 Structural Model 
44.	 E55thLJ 
Vol	
100 
Task
OVO^T,000 
a
Mission Director on earth. 
Fig. 11.---Matrix models with authority located 
at a single level.
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the location of either single level or shared multilevel 
authority assignments. Like the "level-of-authority" 
models, as authority assignments are moved downward, higher -
and intermediate unassigned structural levels were 
eliminated. 
As noted in the figures, when a combination 
resulted in authority being shared at the same level, an 
earth-based Mission Director was identified. This assigned 
authority and responsibility were felt to be necessary in 
the event that those in authority reached a decision 
impass. No attempt was made to violate the program 
requirement of autonomous activities since the only 
purpose of the Mission Director was to serve as a final. 
arbiter for unresolved, onboard problems. Fourteen models 
fit this situation. 
Twenty-two of the thirty organizational structural 
models are shown crossed. The remaining eight are identi-
fied by a model name assigned by the researcher. The 
rationale for the identification of these models in this 
manner is presented in the next section. 
Selection of a Feasible
Set of Models 
Screening Criteria 
Because of the large number (thirty) of models 
generated using this technique, it was necessary to reduce 
the number to a more practical size for analysis. The
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reduction method used by the Grumman study team was to 
establish a set of criteria which could be used to screen 
out those models with limited value. The criteria used 
were practicality, differences, decision making, and 
program requirements) The criterion of practicality 
eliminated models which lacked realism or were not feasible. 
Primary examples were those models where an excessively 
wide span of control resulted. The criterion of differences 
ensured that sufficient variation existed, so that each 
model could be independently evaluated against others. 
The criterion of decision making was used to ensure 
that a clear cut, decision making capability existed. 
This criterion was not used to eliminate models which were 
not conventional, but only those which did not result in 
an eventual, final "ultimate" authority. Also considered 
under this criterion were those models which made communi-
cations, coordination, and integration between all Space 
Base personnel impossible. The final criterion was con-
cerned with how well program requirements were satisfied 
by the specific model considered. Those models which would 
not accommodate the requirements identified in section 1 
and associated with mission accomplishment were eliminated. 
For the purposes of this study, Space Base assumptions 
identified in sectionl were also included in this criterion. 
'Ibid., pp. D-5-D-7.
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Organizational Structural 
Model Selection 
Table 6 indicates the results of a screening by 
the researcher of the models contained in Figures 6 
through 11. As the table indicates, twenty-two models were 
eliminated using the criterion of practicality primarily 
because of span of control problems. Several models 
generated (such as six, twelve, and thirteen) required 
that the total 50-100 member population of the Space Base 
be managed by one-to-three individuals with formal authority 
and responsibility assignments. In many cases, there was 
no span of control because authority was assigned in such 
a way that there were no superior/subordinate relation-
ships. Examples were models one, three, four, and five. 
These spans of control in the Space Base situation were 
not considered practicable by the researcher. 
The criterion of differences eliminated seven 
models, all of which were also rejected by the first 
criterion. The main reason that these models were 
eliminated was : that they were identical in most respects 
to others considered. Several identical models were 
created in Figures 9 through 11, when matrix organizational 
structural models were formed. Examples were four and 
nineteen, six and twenty-one, and ten and twenty-five. 
The criterion of decision making eliminated six-
teen models because they did not provide a clear cut 
decision making capability. In the cases where models
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TABLE 6 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL MODEL
SCREENING RESULTS 
Model 
Number
Screening	 Criteria
Accept-
able Practicality Differences
Decision 
Making
Program 
Requirements 
1 X  X
Yes—2 
3  X
 Yes 
4 X  X 
5 X 
6 X 
7 
8 X  X
Yes 
_l0 x  x x
 Yes 
_ll x  x x 
_12 X 
13 X 
_14 
_15 x  x x
 Yes 
16 X  x 
17 
18  x
 Yes 
19 X  X 
20 X  X 
21 X X 
22 
23 X  X
 Yes 24 
25 X X X X
 Yes 
26 X X X X 
27 X X 
28 X X-
29 
30 X X x x 
Total 22 7 16 6 8
were rejected, an eventual final "ultimate" authority did not 
exist. Models lacking this authority were those where 
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authority was shared at all remaining levels simultaneously,
 
or was assigned at the lowest level only. Under these 
circumstances there would be no leadership or decisive 
action, and the most likely result would be chaos. 
Examples were models one, three, four and five. 
The last criterion was used to reject six models 
which did not satisfy general Space Base program require-
ments and assumptions. Models rejected were those which 
could not possibly accommodate a 50-100 member crew of 
technologists involved in multidisciplinary R&A activities 
in space for extended periods of time. Included were 
models ten, eleven, and fifteen. 
Models were not considered acceptable if they were 
rejected by one or more screening criteria. As a result 
of this screening process by the researcher, only eight of 
the original thirty models remained for further analysis. 
These remaining models are shown in Figure 12 (classical 
models) and Figure 13 (matrix models), along with names 
assigned to each and major features. These features are a 
summary of the descriptions presented next. 
Descriptions of Feasible Models 
The eight models identified in Figures 12 and 13 
were important to the study because they served as a 
feasible set of Space Base models for later analysis and 
evaluation. These models were called traditional, dual 
command, line, round table, total matrix, dual matrix,
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Organizational Structura1 Model Model Name and Major Features 
Traditional 
ETiii1
'Four-level model 
•Space Base Director, R&A 
and Support Operations 
Directors, functional 
managers, and 
technologists 
•Traditional line organiza-
tion with delegated authority 
and responsibility 
Dual Command 
'Three-level model 
'R&& and Support Operations 
DirectOrs, functional 
managers, and technologists 
*Each Director with authority 
and responsibility for respec-. 
tive areas 
'Mission Director resolves 
impasses 
Line 
'Three-level model 
*Space Base Director, func-
tional managers, and 
technologists 
•A simple line organization 
with delegated authority and 
responsibility	 - 
Round Table 
a *Two-level model 
L
	
	
,Functional managers and
technologists 
*Decision committee of func-
tional managers with rotating 
•	 chairmanship	 ,- 
a	
'Mission Director resolves 
Mission Director	 impasses • • 
located on earth 
Fig. 12.--Classical organizational structural models 
to be evaluated and their major features. 	 -•
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Organizational Structural Mode); Model Name and Major Features 
aM.S.	 Director 
located on earth
Total Matrix 
'Four-level, model 
*Space Base Director, R&A 
and Support Operations 
Directors, project/func-
tional managers, and 
.technologists 
• Proj ect/functional authority 
and responsibility 
• Technologists assigned to 
projects as needed 
Dual Matrix 
'Three-level model 
•R&A and Support Operations 
Directors, project/func-
tional managers, and 
technologists 
*Pr oject/functional authority 
d an responsibility 
'Technologists assigned to 
projects as needed 
Standard Matrix 
*Three-level model*_.
 
'Space Base -Director,...pro-
ject/functional managers, 
and technologists 
'Project/functional authOrity 
and responsibility 
*Technologists assigned to 
projects as needed 
Shared Matrix 
'Two-level model 
'Project/functional managers 
and technologists 
'Decision committee of pro-
ject and functional managers 
with rotating chairmanship 
'Technologists assigned to 
projects as needed 
'Mission Director resolves 
impasses 
Fig. 13.--Matrix organizational structural models to 
be evaluated and their major features.
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standard matrix, and shared matrix. Each has different 
characteristics and complexities,and for that reason, a 
description of each was needed to ensure that evaluation: 
team members had the same general understanding. The 
following descriptions identify the nature and scope of 
the eight remaining models. 
Traditional 
This four-tiered model consists of three management 
and one task levels. The three are the Space Base Director 
level, the R&A. and Support Operations Directors level, and 
the level of the functional managers. The task level is 
comprised of groups of technologists assigned to various 
functions. The Space Base Director has ultimate authority 
and responsibility for overall in-orbit Space Base activi-
ties, operations, and crew safety required for goal 
accomplishment. The Director makes all significant 
operational decisions and resolves conflicts between lower 
level directors. 
The R&A and Support Operations Directors have 
delegated authority and responsibility within their respec-
tive areas. Part of this responsibility is to resolve 
conflicts between the functional managers who report 
directly to them. The various functional managers have 
delegated authority and responsibility to ensure that 
resources under their control are effectively and efficiently 
utilized. The groups of technologists assigned to the
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various functions are responsible for Space Base task 
accomplishment only within their assigned work areas and 
capabilities. 
Dual command 
This model is a three-level structure consisting 
of two management and one task levels. The R&A and 
Support Operations Directors occupy the highest level, the 
various functional managers are next, and finally, groups 
of technologists are assigned to various functions at the 
lowest level. In this simple but somewhat unique struc-
ture, the R&A and Support Operations Directors share 
overall in-orbit Space Base authority and responsibility. 
The R&A Director is responsible for all R&? activities, 
while the Support Operations Director provides for all 
Space Base operations and for the comprehensive support 
required for R&A. activities. The latter is solely 
responsible for personnel safety and welfare. In the event 
of an impasse between these directors on issues of common 
interest, an earth-based Mission Director serves as the 
final arbiter. 
The various functional managers have delegated 
authority and responsibility to ensure that resources 
under their control are effectively and efficiently 
utilized. The groups of technologists assigned to the 
various functions are responsible for Space Base task 
accomplishment only within their assigned work areas and
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capabilities. 
Line
This three-tiered model consists of two management 
and one task levels. They are the Space Base Directors 
level, the level of the various functional managers; and 
the technologist task level. In this simplified line 
organization, the Space Base Director has total authority 
and responsibility for in-orbit Space Base activities, 
operations, and crew safety. The resolution of conflicts 
between the functional managers occurs at this level. 
The functional managers have delegated authority 
for the activities within their functional responsibility. 
These managers ensure that resources under their control 
are effectively and efficiently used. The groups of 
technologists assigned to the various functions are 
responsible for Space Base task accomplishment only 
within their assigned functional areas and capabilities. 
Round table 
This is a two-level model consisting of one 
management and one task levels. These levels are the 
level of the various functional managers, and the 
technologist task level. Overall in-orbit Space Base 
authority and responsibility is vested in a "decision 
committee" comprised of the functional managers. Pro 
tern chairmanship of the committee is in accordance with
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a prearranged sequence and plan. Each functional manager 
serves for an equal period of time on a rotating basis. 
All significant decisions relating to R&A and 
support operations functions are made by consensus action 
of the decision committee. If significant disagreement 
results, the earth-based Mission Director acts as final 
arbiter. The functional managers, serving in a dual role, 
possess delegated authority and responsibility within their 
respective areas to ensure that resources under their con-
trol are effectively and efficiently used. Groups of 
technologists assigned to the various functions are respon-
sible for Space Base task accomplishment only within their 
assigned functional areas and capabilities. 
Total matrix 
This four-tiered model consists of three' management 
and one task levels. The three are the Space Base Director 
level, the R&? and Support Operations Directors lèvél, and 
the level of project and functional managers. The task 
level is comprised of groups of technologists assigned to 
various projects and functions. The Space Base Director 
has ultimate authority and responsibility for overall in-
orbit Space Base activities, operations, and crew safety 
required for goal accomplishment. The Director makes all 
significant operational decisions and resolves conflicts 
between lower-level directors. 
The R&A. and Support Operations Directors have
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delegated authority and responsibility for goal accomplish-
ment within their respective areas. Part of this responsi-
bility is to resolve conflicts between the project/functional 
managers who report directly to them. These project/func-
tional managers have delegated authority and responsibility 
to ensure that resources under their control are effectively 
and efficiently utilized. The authority and responsibility 
of the project managers are horizontal in nature, while 
those of the functional managers are vertical. Technologists 
are assigned to various projects on an as-needed basis 
through mutual consent of the managers involved ,
 or by the 
assignment from earth because of special skill needs. 
Dual matrix 
This model is a three-level structure consisting of 
two management and one task levels. The R&A and Support 
Operations Directors occupy the highest level, the various 
project/functional managers are next, and finally, groups 
of technologists are assigned at the lowest level. In this 
simple but somewhat unique structure, the R&A and Support 
Operations Directors share overall in-orbit Space Base 
authority and responsibility. The R&P. Director is responsi-
ble for 'all R&A. project activities, while the Support Opera-
tions Director provides for all Space Base operations and 
for the comprehensive support required for the R&A projects. 
The latter is solely responsible for personnel safety and 
welfare. In the event of an impasse between these directors
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on issues of common interest, an earth-based Mission Director 
serves as the final arbiter. 
The various project/functional managers have delegated 
authority and responsibility to ensure that resources under 
their control are effectively and efficiently utilized. 
This delegated authority and responsibility for the project 
managers is horizontal in nature, while that of the func-
tional managers is vertical. Technologists are assigned to 
various projects on an as-needed basis through mutual con-
sent of the managers involved, or by the direct assignment 
from earth because of special skill needs. 
Standard matrix 
This three-tiered model consists of two management 
levels and one task level. They are the Space Base Director 
level, the level of the various projects/functional managers, 
and the technologists task level. The Space Base Director 
has total authority and responsibility for in-orbit Space 
Base activities, operations, and crew safety. The resolution 
of conflicts between the project and functional managers 
occurs at this level. 
The project and functional managers have delegated 
authority for the activities within their responsibility. 
They are primarily responsible for ensuring that resources 
under their control are effectively and efficiently used. 
The authority and responsibility of the project managers 
are horizontal in nature, while those of the functional
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managers are vertical. The groups of crew member technolo-. 
gists are assigned to the various projects on an as-needed 
basis through mutual consent of.the managers involved, or 
by the direct assignment from earth because of special skill 
needs. 
Shared matrix 
This is a two-level model consisting of one manage-
ment and one task levels. These levels are the level of 
the various project and functional managers and the 
technologists task level. Overall in-orbit Space Base 
authority and responsibility is vested in a "decision 
committee" comprised of the project and functional managers. 
Pro tem chairmanship of the committee is in accordance with 
a prearranged sequence and plan. Each project and func-
tional manager serves for an equal period of time on a 
rotating basis. 
All significant decisions relating to project and 
functional activities are made by consensus action of the 
decision committee. If significant disagreement results, 
the earth-based Mission Director acts as arbiter. The 
project ,
 and functional managers, serving in a dual role, 
possess-delegated authority and responsibility within their 
respective areas to ensure that resources under their con-
trol are effectively and efficiently utilized. The authority 
and responsibility of the project manager are horizontal in 
nature while those of the functional managers are vertical.
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Technologists are assigned to the various projects on an 
as-needed basis through mutual consent of the managers 
involved or by the direct assignment from earth because of 
special skill needs. 
The Evaluation Process 
The development of forty-six criteria which could 
serve as standards on which judgments could be made and 
the narrowing of feasible organizational structural models 
to eight, using the rationale discussed previously 
in this section, required a method to evaluate 
these models against the criteria. The remaining portion of 
this section describes that method. 
Evaluation Team Membership 
Two pilot and one final evaluation, using five man 
teams, were accomplished to obtain data for this study. 
Pilot and primary evaluators were selected based on the 
requirement that each was knowledgeable in one or more of 
the areas of investigation previously identified and dis-
cussed, namely: (1) program requirements and assumptions, 
(2) management concepts and practices, and (3) applicable 
analog data. To provide a wide but knowledgeable range 
of views, a diversified team was selected. While it would 
have been possible for the researcher to make this evalua-
tion, it was felt that better results could be achieved if 
a knowledgeable team performed this task. The researcher,
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however, did serve as a member of all teams. 
Separate and independent pilot teams (except for 
the researcher) were composed of knowledgeable John F. 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida, NASA employees of various 
disciplines. 
The primary evaluation team was composed of three 
NASA, one contractor, and one academic representative. 
The NASA personnel were from two NASA Centers - the John 
F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, and the Marshall Space 
Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama. The contractor 
member was from the Grumman Corporation, Bethpage, New 
York, and was the manager for the Grumman Space Station 
study extensively referenced. The academic representative 
was the department head of the general business department 
at East Texas University's School of Business and was a 
former NASA employee. The areas of specialized capabilities 
and interests, related experience, employer and location, 
and formal education of each evaluation team member are 
included in Table 7.
Evaluation Scores 
Evaluation scores developed by the researcher, as 
shown in Table 8, provided a means for members of the pilot
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and primary evaluation teams to quantify their 'feelins 
by scoring each model on its criteria satisfying ability.' 
Interval scale values with a range from four to zero' weie 
used. A significant advantage in using these scales was' 
that arithmetic calculations can be made. Descriptions 
for these five score's represent an all-inclusive range 
from criterion "completely satisfied" to "not at all 
satisfied." These descriptions and scores were found 
during two pilot runs to be adequate to identify all 
possibilities of satisfaction of criterion by the' models 
considered. It was felt by the researcher, and later 
verified by various evaluators, that scores beyond a range
-
from four to zero would'be in excess of the perceptual 
ability of evaluators to distinguish' criteria satisfactiOn. 
TABLE 8 
EVALUATION SCORES 
• Descriptions of Criterion
	 Scores 
Satisfaction 
Completely satisfied
	 4 
Substantially satisfied
	 '	 3 
Partially satisfied
	 2 
Poorly satisfied	 '	 ' '
	 1 
Not at all satisfied	 0 
Evaluation Activities

and Instructions 
The purpose of the pilot activities was to test 
and refine the evaluation technique. In each of these runs,
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a group session lasting approximately one-and-one-half hours 
was used to review, explain, and answer questions concerning 
instructions and evaluation material provided. These group 
sessions ensured that each team member had a common under-
àtanding of the models, the criteria, and what was expected 
of them during the evaluation activities. Several minor 
difficulties identified during the first run were corrected 
and factored into the instructions and evaluation material 
used for the second run. Corrections included several 
criteria which were deleted or revised, and rearrangement 
of models to aid in understanding. Pilot team results were 
obtained in early September 1972. 
The results of these pilot evaluations provided 
encouragement to mail' revised final evaluator instructions 
and evaluation material to the primary evaluation team 
members in late September1972. appendix E iidentifies 
these instructions and material, and includes supplement 
material which was not included elsewhere in this study. 
Conference and individualtelephone calls followed to 
ensure that a common baseline of understanding existed. 
Results were received from the primary evaluators during 
October 1972. These data were used by the researcher to 
verify 'that the evaluators generally understood the 'nature 
and scope of the models and the criteria. If a reasonable 
doubt existed, as indicated by significant variation in 
• scores when compared to the consensus of other evaluator/
/
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scores, the evaluator was contacted and clarification was 
provided if needed. In several cases, revisions to scores 
and satisfaction rationale resulted. 
Each evaluator was instructed to work independently 
and proceed as follows: The eight models were to be 
evaluated in turn against the first criterion. An evalua-
tion score from four to zero was to be assigned to each 
model, based on the evaluator's judgment as to how well 
the criterion was satisfied. After each model had been 
scored, the models were to be compared against the second 
criterion and assigned a score. This process was to be 
continued until the eight models were evaluated against 
the forty-six criteria. Each model thus received five 
scores (one from each evaluator) against each criterion. 
When a model did not completely satisfy a criterion (i.e., 
a value of four was not assigned), the evaluator was asked 
to identify reasons on forms provided. 
Surnrn ary 
This chapter indicated how the study was conducted. 
Major consideration was given to
	 (1) the development of 
organizational structural evaluation criteria, (2) 
development of classical and modern organizational structural 
models and their reduction to a much smaller, feasible set 
for evaluation purposes, and (3) a description of the 
evaluation process. 
Forty-six criteria with rationale were developed
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and synthesized from data which were presented in Sections 
I and II. Major sources of these data were found in (1) 
program requirements and assumptions, (2) management con-
cepts and practices, and (3) applicable analog data. The 
specific source of these data and rationale for each were 
provided. Sixteen criteria came from the first source, 
nineteen from the second, and eleven from the third. 
Thirty models were identified by considering various 
combination of authority assigned to various levels of 
classical and modern matrix organizational hierarchical 
pyramids. These levels were identified as 	 command, 
discipline, function/project, and task. The hypothetical 
Space Base organizational structural models served to 
help in the understanding of the variations which were 
considered. After screening, a much smaller feasible set 
of eight models resulted. This screening was accomplished 
by using criteria of practicality, difference, decision-
making, and program requirements and assumptions. The 
eight models were described and major features identified. 
These models were called traditional, dual command, 
line, round table, total matrix, dual matrix, standard 
matrix, and shared matrix. The first four were classical 
in nature while the last four were modern matrix variations. 
Last, the evaluation process was described. It 
included an identification of pilot and primary evaluation 
team members, evaluation scores, and evaluation activities
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and instructions. A primary evaluation team consisted of 
five knowledgeable NASA, contractor, and academic members. 
These evaluators, after pilot runs by two other teams, 
independently scored the eight models by determining how 
well they felt each model satisfied each of the forty-six 
criteria. To do this, a four to zero interval scale scoring 
system was used independently by each of the evaluators. 
Data derived from this process served as the basis for 
section nT-_Presentation and Analysis of Data.
IV. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The purposein conducting this study was to identify 
an optimum hypothetical organizational structure which would 
assure the-orderly, effective, and efficient management of 
a mixed Space Base crew in pursuit of mission goals.. Conduct 
of this study-and the resulting data obtained helped to 
realize this purpose. Findings which result from the evalua-
tion team data and subsequent analyses were used by the 
researcher to identify the most feasible organizational 
structure model from a group of eight models which were 
considered. These findings and analyses constitute the 
final phase of the study methodology. 
Findings and Preliminary Analysis 
The raw score data presented in Table 9 are the 
tabulated evaluation team relative scorings of the eight 
models. The scores of the five evaluators (A thru E) were 
totaled for each model and criterion and re'--res-nt each 
model's score (T). The column totals for 	 model are 
obtained by summing the evaluator totals (T) for each 
criterion. From these column totals, a ranking of models 
was obtained. When ranked, the descending order was 	 (1) 
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total matrix, (2) standard matrix, (3) traditional, (4) 
dual matrix, (5)'line, (6) dual command, (7) shared matrix, 
and (8) round table. 
Up to this point all criteria have been equally 
weighted. -It should be obvious that those criteria which 
fall into the program requirements and assumptions category 
are generally of more importance to NASA than are those of 
management concepts and practices and applicable analog 
data. Even the assumptions identified by the researcher 
will probably be program requirements in time. Space Base 
program requirements and assumptions criteria were, there-
fore, considered mandatory and assigned a weighting factor 
of one and were called level I criteria. A second cate-
gory of criteria for weighting purposes was management con-
cepts and practices and applicable analog data. These 
criteria were assigned a weighting factor of one-half, and 
were identified as level II criteria. Table 9 indicates 
which criteria are contained in each category. 
Tables 10 and 11 are tabulations of scores 
abstracted from Table 9 for level I and II criteria, 
respectively. Revised model column totals and ranks by 
criteria level are shown. A tabulation of weighted level 
I and II criteria scores, as well as ranks, are included 
at the end of Table 11. Because of the wide variation in 
model column scores, it was decided by the researcher to 
consider only the four highest ranking models for subsequent
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analysis. The main reason was that a major discontinuity 
in scores consistently occurred, between the fourth and 
fifth ranked models. Elimination of additional models 
within the top four models was considered by the researcher 
to be premature, since the reasons for variations between 
scores and ranks were not evident. The highest ranked 
classical and matrix models as well as two other matrix 
models are, therefore, assessed. 
Tables 10 and 11 also include a range of scores 
column;f or the four finalist candidate models. Values are 
seen to range from nine to zero, and only a relatively few 
of the criteria show high ranges. These criteria were 
considered to be discriminating, since they vary signif i-
cantly between the candidate models. They were important 
to this study because they were used in the final analysis 
to select the best model. 
Table 12 lists ten discriminating level I and II 
criteria. The five level I criteria were identified because 
of the break in range of scores between six or greater and 
four or less. A different rationale for selecting level II 
discriminating criteria was used, however. After careful 
consideration by the researcher, it was realized that 
because of previous weighting factor considerations, level 
II criteria could and should only have a limited influence 
on final selection of a recommended model. For that 
reason, only the five level II criteria with ranges of
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scores of seven or higher were considered. They were 
intended to serve either to validate or refute the conclu-
sions of the level 1 analysis. 
Final Analysis 
The final and most important portion of this study 
methodology consists of a two-part analysis to select a 
preferred optimum model from the finalist models. The 
first part was concerned with how well these models scored 
and ranked in relation to each other, and was quantitative 
in nature. The second part, a qualitative analysis, con-
sisted of evaluation and reassessment of differences 
between the finalist models with respect to how well the 
ten level I and II discriminating criteria identified in 
Table 12 were satisfied. 
This two-part analysis provided a rationale for 
the selection of the total matrix model as the preferred 
Space Base organizational structural model. The quantita-
tive and qualitative superiority of the model is assessed 
in the discussion and tables which follow. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Table 13 is important because it indicates varia-
tion (if any) in ranking. Significantly, the total matrix 
model consistently maintained the highest rank throughout 
various criteria analyses. This was also true during the
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two pilot evaluations when all criteria were considered) 
The other highest ranking models showed rank variation, 
while the lowest four did not. It is difficult to determine 
from Table 13 why the traditional, dual matrix, and 
standard matrix varied in rank. It can only be observed 
that changes did occur. Considering all forty-six criteria, 
it is seen that the traditional model had the most rank 
variation., .due primarily to the effect of the thirty level 
II criteria. Only small changes were observed between the 
traditional and standard matrix models when only discriminat-
ing criteria are considered. 
Tables 14 and 15 look at the same data differently, 
and consider how well the total matrix and the next best 
model satisfy criteria on an absolute and percentage basis 
by criteria groupings. Table 14 shows that the total matrix 
model has a higher criteria satisfaction capability than 
does the next best model based on scoring data. When all 
criteria are considered, the total matrix model is seen to 
have percentage satisfaction variation which ranges from a 
high of 97 to a low of 90 per cent. This model also seems 
to satisfy level II markedly better than level I criteria. 
The percentage superiority between the total matrix and the 
next best model is shown to vary between Ii and 4 per cent. 
Only slightly different conclusions are reached when 
1While the primary purpose of the pilot evaluations 
was to improve the evaluation team process, some preliminary 
assessment was made of comparable data .
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discriminating criteria data are analyzed. Total matrix 
percentage satisfaction was high in all cases, but varia-
tion was small ranging from 95 to . 93 per cent. Level II 
criteria are satisfied slightly better than are the level 
I and weighted criteria categories. Percentage superiority 
over the. next best model varies only slightly between 10 
and 8 per cent. While some of the percentage differences 
appear relatively small, especially the 4 per cent difference 
in the all criteria, level II category, it should be realized 
that this analysis is only part of several which indicate 
that in the overall consideration, the total matrix :model 
istheinost feasible Space Baseorganizational structure, 
Table 15 is a slightly different approach.and indi-
cates the number and percentage of criteria which ,the. total 
matrix model satisfied better than, less than, or the-same, 
as the next best model. As indicated, percentage satisfac-
tion varies between 81 and 67 per cent for all. criteria, 
and 80 to. 60 per cent for the discriminating criteria. 
Greater relative satisfaction occurred for the level I 
criteria when considering all criteria, but the converse was 
true when considering discriminating criteria only. 
The analysis of criteria satisfaction indicated in. 
Tables 14 and 15 showed that the.. total matrix model con-
sistently. scored higher than the next best model (and.all 
others). The reasons for this superior performance were' 
not obvious. More insight.into these reasons, however, is.
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provided by the qualitative analysis which follows. 
Qualitative Analysis 
The second part of the final analysis, which con-
firthed the selection of the total matrix model, was con-
cerned with a qualitative assessment of how well the 
finalist'módel àatisfy the' level I and level Ildiscrimi-
nating criteria. The paramount Objective during this 
analysis was t6-select thernodelwhich would permit the 
most effective-and productive R&A. and support operations. 
Produätive objective áccomp1i1ixneñt was, therefore, the 
most impbrtañt standard which was used to judge the dis-
criminàting criteria satisfaction by the finalist models. 
' Also-of importance"during the assessment was what 
was called "reality testing" ir the Grumman study.	 Scoring 
differences noted between' the models were reassessed and 
their impOitance was judged in relation to the conditions 
anticipated for the Space Base. 'Consideration was given 
during'this analysis to such questions as which of the 
discriminating crieriaarèmore important for model 
selection? How real are these differences between Imodels 
when tested against the Space Base? Are the differences 
important?'' If the differences are real and 'important, are 
they as large as or smaller-than the magnitude' of 'their 
scores? And finally', 'how compatible are-the models to the 
'Ibid., pp. G-9-G-10.
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assumed Space Base manning levels included in Appendix E? 
Many of the judgments and assessments made by the 
researcher were supported by information and insights con-
tained in the brief written rationale provided by each 
evaluator when criteria were less than fully satisfied by 
the models. The following discussion of discriminating 
criteria was arranged in the order considered by the 
researcher to be in descending order of importance 'with 
level I criteria discussed first. This order permitted a 
logical development upon which the total matrix model 
recommendation was 'based. Model scores utilized in the 
discussion have been abstracted from Table 12, and criterion 
numbers are provided for reference purposes.:. 
Level I discriminating criteria 
Undefined activities (1.2) 
This criterion required that the organizational 
structure have the flexibility to support R&A activities 
and interplanetary missions which are not defined in detail 
at present. Rationale was that the probability of long 
range Space Base program success will be increased if the 
organizational structure is flexible enough to accommodate 
change. These factors allude to the fact that there are 
many unknowns associated with the program which will become 
a reality in the Space Base era. Included are new technology, 
techniques, hardware, and man's future' needs. 
Evaluators scored the models as follows: total
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matrix--twenty, dual matrix--eighteen, standard matrix--
sixteen, and traditional--fourteen. From these results, it 
was seen that the three project-type models scored highest, 
with the total matrix model receiving a perfect score indicat-
ing complete satisfaction. The reason for the matrix models 
scoring well was clearly that the evaluators considered the 
flexibility of project organizations as being compatible 
with the need for the in-orbit organization to be able to 
adapt to the ever-changing requirements during the ten-year 
operating life of the program. 
Clearly, the total matrix model satisfies these 
criteria better than do the other two matrix models. For 
one thing, as new R&A activities and interplanetary missions 
are identified, the R&A and Operations Support Directors 
can ensure that project and functional authority and 
responsibility are established. While the dual matrix model 
also requires discipline directors, part of their time would 
be devoted to the total operation of the Space Base because 
of their shared dual command responsibilities. The standard 
matrix does not have benefit of these directors, and 
requires that the various project/functional managers 
ensure that change is accommodated perhaps with limited 
results. 
Various construction (6.7) 
This criterion specified that the organizational 
structure shall be appropriate for either a modularly
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constructed or centralized Space Base design. The rationale 
for this criterion was that since Space Base design has not 
been finalized, the structure identified should be compatible 
with either a modular or centralized design. This criterion 
was the only one considered which attempted to assess the 
effect of structural design on organizational structure 
selection. 
The evaluator scores varied widely for this criterion. 
They were total matrix--twenty, standard matrix--eighteen, 
traditional--sixteen, and dual matrix--fourteen. This scoring 
indicated that models without a Mission Director located on 
earth scored highest. It was, however, evidence from evaluator 
comments that matrix models, because of their smaller project 
team sizes, were more compatible to modular laboratories 
such as the one shown in Appendix A. For that reason, the 
traditional model did not score as well as the total and 
standard matrix models. The evaluators dislike for the dual 
matix model, however, apparently outweighed its project 
orientation advantages. Regardless, the total matrix model, 
with its perfect criterion satisfaction, was considered 
superior to the other models and was judged to be totally 
compatible with either a modular or centralized Space Base 
design. 
Autonomous operations (7.1) 
This criterion emphasized the ability of the organi-
zation structure to allow for autonomous Space Base R&A
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activities and support operations. The rationale was that 
cost effectiveness dictates that the operation of the ten-
year life Space Base should be as independent from earth 
control and support as possible. 
Evaluator scores were total matrix--eighteen, 
traditional--seventeen; standard matrix­--seventeen;- and dual 
matrix--nine. It should be noted that this criterion had 'a 
higher score range than did any of the forty-six criteria 
listed in Tables 10 and 11. The 'reason for this difference, 
as indicated by the evaluators, was that the three top models 
did not require a Mission Director on earth as did the 'dual 
matrix model. The requirement for authority 'a 'nd respoiisi-
bility external to the Space Base was considered to be  
serious limitation, 'since conflict resolution from 'e'a±th can 
only result in lack of confidence by crew members in leader-
ship and the dual command arrangement. 
The three highest scoring-models utilize the S'pace' 
Base Director to serve as a single authority to ensure as 
autonomous activities and operations as possible frOm earth. 
The reason these models did not score higher, however, was 
that there is a limitation to how autonomous and self-
sufficient the Space Base can remain. The-Space Shuttle is 
still mandatory to sustain life and support all activities ­, 
and operations because of its crew rotation, resupply, and 
rescue capability. 	 - 
The total matrix model scored slightly higher in -
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satisfying this criterion. The reasons given by the evaluators 
were that projects allow for more autonomy in R&Aactjvjtjes 
than do the traditional R&A arrangement, and the discipline 
directors assist in ensuring autonomy when compared to their 
absence in the standard matrix model. In reality, this 
criterion was not as helpful in discriminating between the 
highest scoring models because all three models would 
adequately provide for an autonomous Space Base except for 
necessary Space Shuttle support. 
Planning and scheduling (7.2) 
This criterion was related to autonomy of operations. 
It required that the structure shall allow, to the maximum. 
extent possible, in-orbit mission planning activities and 
support operation priority definition and work scheduling. 
The rationale used was that the crew of the Space Base needs 
a capability for mission planning, priority definition and 
activity scheduling. Consideration must also be given to 
work/rest-cycle variations, equipment sharing, number of 
crewmen available for duty, crew skill proficiency, 
scheduling conflicts, and requirements for team tasks. 
Evaluation scores for the model were total matrix--
nineteen, traditional--nineteen, standard matrix--seventeen, 
and dual matrix--thirteen. From these scores and evaluator 
rationale, it was evident that those models which do not 
require an earthbound Mission Director scored highest. 
The reason was obvious since in-orbit capability for planning
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and scheduling would be overshadowed by the Mission Director. 
The reason for. equal superiority between the total matrix 
and traditional models was not as obvious. Both models, 
however, do have a three-level hierarchy with authority and 
responsibility for planning and scheduling. 
The real difference between these models was within 
the R&A area, where planning and scheduling are either 
accomplished by the Project Managers or the R&A Managers. 
In the first case, fewer crew members are involved for each 
project manager to be concerned with, but multiple projects 
require more coordination by the R&A Director. In the 
second case, the R&A Managers have a more difficult task to 
be concerned with because of much larger teams, but the R&A 
Director has a'reduced coordination responsibility. Thus, 
the total matrix model does not have a clearcut advantage 
over the traditional model. Both, however, almost totally 
satisfy the criterion. 
Training and 
indoctrination (4.4) 
The criterion was identified to ensure that the 
training and indoctrination of long and short duration 
crew members could be accommodated. The rationale used was 
based on the belief that some in-orbit training and indoctri-
nation will be required within the Space Base because of the 
possibility that some personnel may be involved in R&A 
activities for extended periods. Indoctrination was
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considered to be a. recurring requirement. 
The models scored as follows: traditional--nineteen, 
total matrix--sixteen, dual matrix--fourteen, and standard 
matrix--thirteen. The traditional model was clearly superior 
to all other models in satisfaction of this criterion. The 
main reason identified by the evaluators was that because of 
the semipermaflency of the R&A crew teams, there would be less 
turnover and training/indoctrination requirements. The Oppo-
site was, of course,true with the matrix organizations, since 
they frequently must accommodate new project teams. 
While the. total matrix model was outscored by the 
traditional model, it was the highest scoring of the matrix 
models. The problem here was that other criteria require 
viable and adaptable provisions which inherently require 
some transiency, - in R&A, crew members. In addition, full 
and cross, utilization of support personnel requires that on 
occasion, some training will be needed. Matrix models satisfy 
these requirements best end, in reality, should be considered 
to be more, important to overall Space Base activities and 
operations than the training/indoctrination difficulties 
created. , What was signigicant, however, was that the 
hierarchical, authority and responsibility relationships 
which exist for.the total matrix model can accommodate the 
training/indoctrination needs of transient and more permanent 
crew members better than the other matrix models.
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Level _II discriminating _criteria 
Task leader (3.4) 
This criterion established the need for a task 
leader assigned and responsible for each major R&A activity. 
Rationale was provided from a management concepts and 
practices source, which indicated that the likelihood of 
timely and efficient task accomplishment was increased if 
an individual was identified as being responsible for its 
success.
Evaluator scores for the models were total matrix--
twenty, dual matrix--nineteen, standard matrix--seventeen, 
and traditional--thirteen. The top scoring matrix models 
have an inherent advantage in satisfying this criterion 
because of the requirement that task leaders (project 
managers) be identified for each project. Each of these 
R&I project managers directs the activities of a relatively 
small number of technologists (approximately six) regardless 
of Space Base crew size, as the Appendix E assumed manning 
levels for the matrix models shows. Conversely, the tra-
ditional model has no task leaders identified per Se. 
The R&A managers only partially serve as task 
leaders when R&A crew sizes are small. (i .e.; approximately 
nine team members) . As was seen from the assumed manning 
leve'lsf or classical organizational structural models 
located in Appendix E, this was true when total Space Base 
crew size is 50. When Space Base growth reaches 100,
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however, the assumed size of the R&A groups is 23. These 
groups were not intended to have any task leaders below the 
R&A manager level because only a four-tier level of 
authority model was utilized for this study. The traditional 
model, therefore, cannot satisfy this criterion as well as 
the matrix models, and specifically the total matrix model 
which received a perfect score. 
Varying crew size (3.6) 
This criterion, closely related to the task leader 
criterion, indicated that structure shall allow for R&P 
activity teams consisting of four to fourteen technologists. 
Rationale, from applicable analog data, considered that 
efficient and effective R&I4 team size has been found to 
vary between four to fourteen individuals including the team 
leader, participating technologists, and the principal R&A 
investigator. 
Criterion evaluation scores ranged widely as follows: 
total matrix--twenty, standard matrix--twenty, dual matrix--
nineteen, and traditional--twelve. The closely grouped 
matrix models obviously scored highly, and the traditional, 
model did not. The reason simply was that only the matrix 
models provided for R&A teams of the desired size. Average 
team size of six technologists was shown in the assumed 
manning levels for matrix organizational structural models 
for a Space Base crew size of 50 to 100. The traditional 
model, conversely, falls outside the desired team size when
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total Space Base size is 100. The assumed team size of 
nine for Space Base size of fifty is, however, within the 
desired range. 
Evaluators collectively were unable to distinguish 
between the total and standard-matrix models, giving each a 
perfect score. Only a small reduction in score was noted 
for the dual matrix model. Clearly, when the assumed 
manning levels were used, the matrix models satisfied the 
criterion. The classical, traditional model did not do so 
for a 100 crew member Space Base population. 
Unity of command (8.3) 
This criterion states that the structure selected 
will utilize the unity of command principle when possible. 
Rationale from management concepts and practices indicates 
that coordination of work efforts and the utilization of 
resources can be achieved best by a single authority. 
In addition, the decision-making process may involve many 
people, but final authority must be vested in a single 
individual. 
The four candidate models scored as follows: 
traditional--twenty, total matrix--nineteen, standard matrix 
--eighteen, and dual matrix--twelve. While a wide range of 
scores existed for this criterion, the top three indicated 
a high satisfaction level. The top scoring-model completely 
satisfied this criterion because of its classical nature 
i.e.,every individual withinthe organization has only a
184 
single superior, from the technologists at the task level 
to the R&A, and Support Operations Directors). 
The other two high scoring models are of the matrix 
type and inherently violate the unity of command principle. 
Violation occurs when technologists who are normally part 
of the support operations crew are assigned to a project 
because of skill capability or lack of full employment. 
Loyalties then become divided between functional and pro-' 
ject managers. In the case 'of the low scoring dual matrix 
model, no provision was provided for'total in-orbit 
unity of command. Not only do the functional technologiats 
have split command loyalties, but so do the R& alid Support 
Operations Directors: sharing command authority and respôn-
sibility except in the case of conflict which requires 
resolution by the Mission Director. 
The strength of the total matrix model was indicated 
by the fact that in spite of its inherent design which 
violates the unity of command principle, it scored well; 
The evaluation team members thus felt that the model 
could be used by management without serious unity of 
command problems. 
Quality and speed (9.2) 
This criterion was intended to ensure that the. 
structure selected had provision for quality, and speed 
in decision making. Rationale from management concepts and 
practices dictated that managers need a structure which
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assists them in rendering sound decisions. This requires 
good information inputs, and an analytical process that 
yields unambiguous, unbiased judgments. In addition, these 
decisions must be appropriate to the situation and arrived 
at and acted on within time constraints. 
Model scoring was as follows: traditional--nine-. 
teen, total matrix--eighteen, standard matrix--seventeen, 
and dual matrix--twelve. From these scores, it was seen. 
that three models substantially satisfied the criterion 
about equally well, but the dual matrix model did not. 
The, reason the latter was unable to score well was that 
the evaluators considered that the requirement for a 
Mission Director on earth would restrict speed and perhaps 
quality of decision making when impasses were reached. 
While the total matrix model was not the highest 
scoring model, it did score well considering that the 
project teams are more numerous than are the R&A functional 
groups of the traditional model. What the total matrix 
model lacks in speed because of width is compensated for 
by the upward flow of quality information by knowledgeable 
project managers,-hopefully resulting in better decisions, 
by directors.  
It was interesting to note that the inherent 
shorter' lines of communication of the three-level'
 standard 
matrix model were not considered by the evaluators to 
significantly improve quality and speed of communications.
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The reason given was that the R&A and Support Operations 
Directors would do much to improve decision making because 
of their intermediate position serving as a filter, trans-
l.ator and reinforcer of upward and downward communications. 
Line of communications (9.3) 
This criterion specified that the structure shall 
allow for lines of communication between groups for all 
critical and safety-associated tasks. Rationale identified 
in applicable analog data indicated that open lines of 
communications would ensure uniform, efficient response to 
dangerous situations. 
Model scoring was traditional--twenty, total 
matrix--eighteen, dual matrix--fourteen, and standard matrix 
--thirteen. Clearly the traditional model scored best, 
followed closely by the total matrix model. The remaining 
models did not score well. The reason for the superior 
performance of the top model was that it has the most direct 
path and fewest interfaces from the Space Base Director, 
with total safety responsibility, to others within the 
organization who may need timely information. 
The total matrix model has as direct a path, but 
it also has more projects and interfaces for a communicator 
to contend with. The dual matrix has limited lines of 
communications even though the Support Operations Manager 
was assumed to have safety responsibility for the total 
Space Base crew. Like the standard matrix model, expanded
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downward communication interfaces reduce the effectiveness 
and efficiency-of lines of communications. 
Even though the total matrix model scored second to 
the traditional model and the other models did not score 
well, this criterion was not considered by the researcher 
to be as important as the other discriminating criteria. - 
The primary reason was that the speed and effectiveness 
of critical safety communications will be improved by . newer 
udio and visual systems. Even with. today's warning equip-
ment, emergency procedures, and periodic training require-
ments, this criterion was not considered by the researcher 
to be as sensitive to organizational structure as the scores 
indicated.
Summary 
This section was concerned with the presentation 
and analysis of data provided by subjective determination 
of how well eight organizational structural models satisfied 
forty-six criteria. Analysis of this data resulted in the 
selection by the researcher of the modern, project-type total 
matrix organizational structural model as the optimum Space 
Base structure. The methodology used for this analysis was 
to tabuiat first the data obtained and conduct a preliminary 
analysis to reduce the eight models considered to a smaller 
set of finalist models. The second step was the performance 
by the researcher of a final in-depth analysis to identify 
the desired model.
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The tabulation of data and preliminary analysis con-
tained in this section accomplished several things. First, 
it allowed the ranking of the eight models by the use of 
model scores provided by the team of five evaluators. This 
resulted in the elimination of the four lowest-ranking 
models, leaving one classical model and three matrix models 
for further assessment. They were the traditional, total 
matrix, dual matrix, and standard matrix models. The divi-
sion of all criteria into two differently weighted categories 
helped in this analysis. Determination of range of scores 
for the four finalist models for all weighted criteria pro-
vided a means of identifying those level I and II criteria 
which significantly discriminated between the models. Ten 
discriminating criteria were identified, five for each 
criteria level. 
A two-part final analysis provided a more detailed.. 
rationale for optimum model determination. The first part 
of this analysis was concerned with how well the four 
finalist models scored and ranked in relation to each. other. 
A ranking correlation of models, and scoring and relative 
analysis of criteria satisfaction for the total matrix 
versus the next best model was accomplished. These results 
indicated that in all cases, the total matrix model con-
sistently ranked first and satisfied various criteria 
groupings better than all other models considered. 
The second part of this final analysis provided
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more insight into the strength of the total matrix model's 
ability to satisfy level I and II discriminating criteria. 
Analysis of the five level I criteria determined that in 
all cases except one, the model selected scored better than 
or equal to the other models for valid reasons. Even in 
the case of the exception, a rationale was provided for 
downgrading the importance of the criterion because of 
other more significant considerations such as more effec-
tive and productive R&A and support operations accomplish-
ments. Analysis of level II discriminating criteria were 
used to validate the level I results. Again, the total 
matrix model was found to satisfy these criteria more con-
sistently, for valid reasons. 
The findings and analysis of this section strongly 
support the conclusion reached by the researcher that the 
total matrix model was the best structure to assure the 
orderly, effective, and efficient management of Space Base 
technologists. The summary and conclusions, with implica-
tions and recommendations resulting from the research con-
ducted, are discussed in the section V.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Study Problem and Methodology 
This study was concerned with the determination of 
an optimum hypothetical organizational structure, for a 
large earth-orbiting multidisciplinary R&A Space Base 
manned by . a mixed crew of 50 to 100 domestic and interna-
tional technologists. The facility would be designed for a 
useful ten-year operating life. Supplied with equipment, 
personnel, and food by a reusable Space Shuttle, Space Base 
would serve to greatly expand advancements in the sciences, 
exploration, public and private services, and foreign 
relations. 
For discussion and analysis purposes, Space Base 
organizational structure was defined to be the established 
pattern or deliberate grouping of relationships among the 
components or parts of a formal organization to achieve 
specific goals. It was characterized by planned division 
of activities ;
 leadership, and communications responsibilities. 
Another salient feature was the presence of a hierarchy of 
authority needed to plan, control, direct, and coordinate 
the concerted efforts of the organization effectively and 
efficiently toward its goals. 
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While the broad purpose of the study was to expand 
the body of knowledge concerned with the role of organiza-
tional structure on human endeavor, the primary question 
answered by the research conducted during this study was 
what is the preferred organizational structure for optimizing 
the mission accomplishments of the various technologists who 
will work and live in a large multidisciplinary earth-orbiting 
Space Base? The answer to this question was reached through 
research and the development of answers to the following 
elemental questions: 
1. What known Space Base program requirements 
are important to organizational structure 
selection and what assumptions must be 
made? 
2. What related studies provide insight into 
Space Base organizational structure selection? 
3. What variables are important to the selection 
of an organizational structure for a Space 
Base? 
4. What type of organizational structure best 
serves the needs of technical prOfessionals? 
5. How appropriate to Space Base are the multi-
tude of social systems and environmental situa-
tions involving isolation, confinement, and 
situational danger; and what can be learned 
from the most applicable analogs with regard to 
Space Base organizational structural selection? 
6. What evaluation criteria should be used to 
select the preferred Space Base organizational 
structure? 
7. What variation to basic classical and modern 
organizational structural models should be con-
sidered for Space Base use and 'why? 
8. What analyses can' be used to assess feasible 
classical and modern organizational structures 
and select the preferred one?
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The research accomplished during the study was a 
modified operational replication of a NASA-funded Grumman 
Corporation analysis which identified a preferred organiza-
tional-structure for a twelve-man Space Station. Data 
collection and analysis activities, like those. of the Grumman 
study, had the following phases: (1) data. research, (2) 
development of organizational structural evaluation criteria 
and a set of feasible models, and (3) evaluation of feasible 
models and selection of the optimum one. 
The first phase, concerned with data research, 
relied heavily on data obtained from review of primary and 
secondary literature, visitations and examinations of cer-
tain Space Base analogs where appropriate and practical, and 
interviews with knowledgeable persons. Specific topics 
investigated using these sources of data were (1) program 
requirements and assumptions, (2) related studies, (3) 
general and specific organizational structural variables, 
(4) the nature of professional organizations and technical 
professionals, and (5) applicable analogs. The purpose of 
reviewing these topics was to obtain data which were useful 
for subsequent phases of the methodology. 
The second phase used first-phase data to develop 
evaluation criteria and a feasible set of organizational 
models. Criteria with rationale were identified from 
program requirements and assumptions, management concepts 
and practices, and applicable analog data. These criteria
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were then grouped into a number of general and specific 
categories for organizational purposes. 
A four-level Grumman "level-of-authority" model was 
used to generate a variety of organizational structural 
models from parent classical line-functional and modern 
matrix models. These levels were called command, discipline, 
function/project, and task. From the parent models, others 
were developed by varying the level and number of authority 
assignments. The resulting models were then screened by 
the researcher to determine if they were reasonable and 
practical, possessed sufficient difference from the other 
models, provided for decision making, and satisfied program 
requirements and assumptions. 
The third and final phase used the data and analyses 
of the first two phases and provided a means for evaluating 
the set of models and selecting the preferred one. This was 
accomplished partially by an evaluation team considered to 
be a panel of experts who individually scored the criterion-
satisfying ability of each model using a five-point scoring 
system. This technique allowed each evaluator to quantify 
subjective judgments. After two pilot teams confirmed the 
feasibility of this type of evaluation analysis, a final 
five-man evaluation team scored the models. This team 
consisted of the researcher and - two other NASA employees, 
the manager of the Grumman study, and a member of the academic 
community.
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Remaining analysis for this phase of the methodology 
was accomplished by the researcher. This independent analysis, 
using final evaluation team data, consisted of quantitative 
and qualitative segments. Quantitative analysis determined 
how well the evaluated models scored and ranked in relation 
to each other, while qualitative analysis determined how well 
certain discriminating criteria were satisfied by the models. 
These criteria discriminated because of their wide variation 
of summed evaluator scores between models. This final quan-
titative and qualitative analysis resulted in an answer to 
the primary study question. 
Summary of Findings
 
The primary question 
The essential finding of the research conducted dur-
ing this study was that the hypothetical organizational 
structure which optimizes the mission accomplishment of Space 
Base technologists was the total matrix model. This struc-
ture was found to possess the greatest capability for orderly, 
efficient, and effective management of the crew through its 
adaptability of anticipated objectives, R&A activities, and 
support operations. More specifically, this model was 
selected for two fundamental reasons. The first was that it 
consistently scored and ranked highest in relation to the 
other candidate models evaluated during the study. Second, 
analysis showed that, overall, the model satisfied the
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discriminating criteria best. 
The four-level hierarchical total matrix model 
requires staffing by a Space Base Director and Deputy at the 
command level, and R&A and Support Operations Directors at 
the discipline level. In addition, various Project and 
Operations, Medical Operations, and Maintenance/Logistics 
Managers are needed at the project/functional level, as are 
project/functional groups of technologists at the task level. 
The' elemental questions 
The first elemental question was concerned with the 
identification of established Space Base program require-
ments and the development of assumptions which were needed 
to make the study possible. A review of literature identified 
twelve program requirements considered by NASA to be necessary 
to ensure program success: 
1. The Space Base will be operational by 1985. 
2. The Space Base crew is expected to be main-
tained between 50 to 100 technologists of 
various skills. 
3. The Space Shuttle will be used to provide 
Space Base logistics in the form of supplies, 
crew rotation, and exchange of scientific 
instruments and data. 
4. A variety of multidisciplinary R&A activities 
will be accomplished concurrently within the 
Space Base. 
5. International as well as domestic technologists 
will participate as Space Base 'R&A crew members. 
6. The Space Base will support R&A activities and 
interplanetary missions which are not defined 
in detail at present.
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7. The Space Base will be a semipermanent 
f-acuity with a-minimum operational life of 
ten years with resupply. 
8. Female, as well as male, technologists will 
comprise the Space Base crew. 
9. The Space Base will be as autonomous from 
earth control and support as possible. 
10. Support operations personnel will function 
to satisfy the needs of the R&?i technologists 
who use but do not operate the Space Base. 
11. Initial crew size will be 50 members. As the 
Space Base facility grows in size, the crew 
will increase to 100 technologists. 
12. The vast majority of crew members, especially 
those involved with R&A activities, will be 
nonastronaut trained and will have been selected 
using criteria without any overly restrictive 
physical or mental requirements. 
In addition to these program requirements, nine 
assumptions relevant to organizational structural considera-
tions and related to Space Base R&A activities and operations 
were made by the researcher to simplify, clarify, and restrict 
variables:
1. The great majority of Space Base personnel 
will be technical professionals, i.e., scien-
tists and engineers, while a much smaller 
group will be technicians and semiskilled 
personnel. The technicians of the Space Base 
era will, however, be as capable as today's 
technical professionals because of rapid 
advances in the state-of-technology and knowl-
edge requirements. 
2. Some in-orbit training and indoctrination will 
be required because some R&A technologists may 
participate for extended periods and new crew 
member indoctrination will be a recurring 
requirement. 
3. R&A technologists and support operations 
personnel will participate in Space Base duty 
for varying (yet unspecified) lengths of time.
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4. Nonroutine and around-the-clock activities 
and support operations will be accomplished 
within the Space Base when required. This 
will allow R&A. technologists the flexibility 
to perform activities during "nonstandard" 
hours for various technical reasons. Support 
operations personnel, in addition to supporting 
nonroutine activities, will be required to 
operate and maintain the Space Base on an 
around-the-clock basis. 
5. Personnel changes will be made within the Space 
Base as required to replace technologists because 
their work is complete or to reassign them to 
higher priority work. 
6. The Space Base w 
as envisioned by 
components sized 
cargo bay, or it 
design placed in 
the former being
ill either be of a modular design 
the Space Task Group with major 
to fit into the Space Shuttle 
will be a more centralized 
orbit by another vehicle--with 
more likely. 
7. In-orbit Space Base managers will be technically 
trained in either a scientific or engineering 
discipline and will be NASA employees. This 
assumption, therefore, restricts discussion of 
whether nontechnical personnel can manage 
technologists--especially within the Space Base. 
8. Permanent party and transient technologists 
will comprise the Space Base crew at any point 
in its operational life. The permanent members 
will be NASA employees assigned to the program 
on a full time basis. The transient members 
would be international and domestic technologists 
usually involved in one- time- only R&A activities. 
9. Crew members will be approximately divided between 
R&A. and support operations. This ensures that 
adequate supporting personnel are available to 
assist those involved in accomplishing Space Base 
objectives. 
The second elemental question pertained to related 
studies which would provide insight into Space Base organi-
zational structure selection. An extensive and intensive 
review of primary and secondary literature revealed that there 
have been no Space Base studies the sole purpose of which was
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to determine a preferred organizational structure. However, 
there were some related studies which were found to be 
important to the present study. 
In 1969, an in-house NASA study identified basic 
Space Base program objectives and developed a Statement of 
Work for follow-on contractor study efforts. Studies by 
the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company and the North 
American Rockwell Corporation resulted from the NASA State-
ment of Work. While neither contractor studied organiza-
tional structure per se, both indicated that all Space Base 
crew members could be assigned to two organizational groups: 
R&A activities and operations. 
Concurrent with the contractor efforts, independent 
studies by two NASA employees at different NASA centers were 
accomplished. These exploratory studies were conducted by 
von Tiesenhausen of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, and 
Gundersen. at NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center. In the first 
study, von Tiesenhausen, concluded that a mixed military-
type and a scientifically-oriented organization structure, 
was needed for Space Base. The author then established a 
hypothetical line-functional organization and showed how 
requirements and activities of personnel organized in this 
fashiorVaffect Space Base layout. This functional organi-
zationdivided all Space Base personnel into three groups: 
Base Command and Management, Base Operations, and Scientific 
Faculty.
/
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In the second study, Gundersen proposed a military 
line organization similar to that of a nuclear submarine 
to be used for Space Base. Personnel were to be divided into 
two major functional groups: : Operations and Technical Pro-
jects, with a Space Base commander and his deputy considered 
as part of Operations. The author also concluded that cross 
skills were important to crew selection. 
Two other studies were investigated because they were 
important to the study methodology. The first was the Grumman 
Aircraft Engineering Corporation study on Space Station 
command structure. This study served as the model for the 
present studies phased methodology which has previously been 
described. The Grumman study also identified seven specific 
Space Station organizational structural variables. They 
were multidisciplinary scientific operations, crew size, 
Space Station with users on board, mission duration, duty 
cycle, arrangement of space, and Space Station autonomy. 
The second was a study by Sells of a 500-day manned 
space flight to Mars and back. This study provided a tech-' 
nique to determine the appropriateness of a number of social 
systems to the Mars mission system under analysis. Using a 
three-point scale, each of eleven comparison systems was 
scored, using fifty-six system characteristics listed under 
seven descriptive categories. These descriptive categories 
used were objectives and goals, value systems, personnel 
composition, organization, technology, physical environment,
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and temporaral characteristics. Sells' analysis indicated 
that submarines, exploration parties, and bomber crews are 
most similar to the Mars extended-duration space ship, while 
industrial work groups and shipwreck and disaster situations 
are the most dissimilar. 
The third elemental question related to the identifi-
cation of variables important to the selection of Space Base 
organizational structure. After an extensive review of the 
literature relevant to organizational design and selection, 
it was determined by the researcher that four general 
variables identified by Koontz and O'Donnell were most 
appropriate to this study. They were objectives and plans, 
capability of personnel, environment, and authority. 
In addition to these general variables, nine specific 
variables were used. They were multidisciplinary R&A 
activities; crew size; crew composition; crew selection and 
training; mission duration; environmental factors; autonomy 
of operations; authority and responsibility; and communica-
tions, coordination, and integration. Seven of these 
variables were derived (and modified) from those identified 
in the Grumman study. The latter two were added by the 
researcher to broaden the list. 
The fourth elemental question involved the require-
ment to identify the organizational structure which best 
serves the needs of technical professionals. During the 
review of literature relating to professional organizations,
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characteristics of technical professionals, and the rela-
tionships of technical professionals to the organization, 
revealed a variety of data important to this and subsequent 
considerations. These data indicated that professional 
organizations (defined as those where knowledge is produced, 
applied, preserved, or communicated) required more modern, 
flexible, even temporary, organic-adaptive organizational 
structures if objectives were to be optimized. This organi-
zational form contrasts to more classical mechanistic struc-
tures which adequately serve other more routine organizational 
endeavors. 
The fifth elemental question relates to the appro-
priateness of the multitude of social systems and environ-
mental situations to Space Base and what can be learned 
from them. The first part of this question was answered by 
the use of the social system comparison analysis developed 
by Sells, which provided a means of ranking twenty-two 
systems and situations by degree of similarity. Ten 
analogous systems and situations were identified and used 
for the present study. The ten highest ranking analogs of 
Space Base in descending order of similarity were 
1. Space Station 
2. Various oceanographic research ships 
3. Antarctic stations 
4. Earthbound R&D laboratories 
5. Ben Franklin research submarine 
6. Tektite II laboratory 
7. Ninety-Day Space Station simulation 
8. Nuclear submarines 
9. Sealab II 
10. Skylab
202 
After these applicable analogs were identified, 
they were analyzed in depth using data derived from appro-
priate literature, visitations to several analogs, and 
interviews with knowledgeable people. A correlation analysis 
between these analogs and the general and specific variables 
previously described, identified the areas where in-depth 
analysis was justified. Investigation in these areas 
revealed a variety of data invaluable for subsequent analyses. 
The sixth elemental question pertained, to evaluation 
criteria identification and use. A multitude of criteria 
and rationale for their use were identified, and, after care-
ful screening, a total of forty-six-criteria were grouped in 
four general and nine specific variable categories. The 
source of these criteria were Space Base program require-
ments and assumptions--sixteen, management concepts and 
practices--nineteen, and analog data--eleven. A rationale 
for each criterion was also provided from these sources. 
The seventh elemental question concerned the identi-
fication of classical and modern organizational structural 
models for use in Space Base and the rationale. From an 
analysis of program requirements, management concepts and 
practices, and applicable analogs, thirty variations of 
classical and matrix models were identified, using the 
Grumman "level-of-authority" method of model generation. 
These models, reduced to a feasible set of eight by 
the researcher, were equally divided between classical and
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matrix model variations. The eight remaining models were 
judged feasible because they were found to be practical, 
sufficiently different, provided for decision making, and 
satisfied program requirements and assumptions. The models 
were called traditional, dual command, line, round table, 
total matrix, dual matrix, standard matrix, and shared matrix. 
Finally, the eighth elemental question addresses itself 
to the analyses which would provide a rationale for the selec-
tion of an optimum model of those considered. A two-part 
methodology and several techniques were required and used. 
During the first part data were collected from an evaluation 
team. This allowed the eight feasible models to be reduced 
to one classical and three matrix models. Those remaining 
were the traditional, total matrix, dual matrix, and standard 
matrix models. 
Also significant from the evaluation data were the 
identification of discriminating criteria that have values 
which varied significantly between the final four models. 
Five level I criteria associated with Space Base program 
requirements, and five level II criteria of lesser 
importance coming from the other sources were identified. 
They were level--I --undefined activities, training and 
indoctrination, various Space Base construction, autonomous 
operations, and planning and scheduling; and level II--task 
leader accommodation, varying crew size, unity of command, 
quality and speed in decision making, and line of
204' 
communications availability. 
During the secondary portion of this assessment, 
quantitative and qualitative analyses performed by the 
researcher supported the identification of the total matrix 
model as the optimum Space Base model. Quantitative analysis 
showed that in all cases the total matrix model ,cóhsistently 
ranked first when a rank correlation and scoring of total, 
level I, level II, and weighted criteria were performed.' 
Likewise, the total matrix model was determined to be 
superior overall to the other three finalist models during 
an in-depth qualitative analysis which evaluated the extent 
and completeness of discriminating criteria satisfaction. 
Sununaof the Conclusions 
The review of appropriate literature, visitations, 
interviews, evaluation team results, and findings of this 
research permitted the researcher to reach a number of 
conclusions that are listed and briefly discussed in the 
following paragraphs. These conclusions were derived 
primarily from analysis presented in section IV; however, 
the last conclusion resulted from the analysis of applicable 
analogs discussed earlier. 
The total matrix model 
The first conclusion was that the project-type 
organizational structural model called total matrix should 
be used for the Space Base program. This model offers the
Nev 
greatest probability of optimizing. the utilization of 
Space Base resources to satisfy program objectives and plans, 
when compared to a variety of alternate models considered. 
In retrospect, this conclusion was considered by the researcher 
to be: sound, because only an organic-adaptive project organi-
zation has the inherent flexibility of satisfying Space Base 
program needs presently envisioned and those which are still 
undefined at this time. It should be realized, however, that 
while the total matrix model was selected, both the standard 
matrix and traditional models scored and ranked fairly well 
in comparison. The validity and usefulness of these models 
should not be overlooked in future studies and applications. 
Discriminating criteria 
The second conclusion was that while a number of 
criteria relating to Space Base program requirements and 
assumptions, management concepts and practices, and appli-
cable analog data are available, only a relatively few were 
found to be important to the selection of Space Base organi-
zational structure. For example, discriminating criteria 
were found in each criteria category except crew size and 
mission duration. These variables, usually discussed 
extensively in the literature, were not found to discriminate 
for the models identified in this research. 
Several seemingly iihportant and interesting criteria 
for organizational structural selection which also did not 
discriminate were mixed crew ofmales and females,
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multinational crew, technical professional communications, 
and creative climate. The former two criteria have been 
the subject of much speculation and little research, while 
the latter two have been the subject of extensive research 
and discussion in a variety of literature. The conclusion 
was not intended to belittle the importance of-,these-criteria 
to overall organizational structural activities. It did 
mean, however, that when the highest ranked models identi-
fied in this study were analyzed, these criteria were not 
found to be important in selecting one model over the other 
(i.e,, they were not discriminating). 
Applicable analogs 
The third conclusion was that while a multitude of 
environmental situations involving isolation, confinement, 
and situational danger exists, only a limited amount of data 
relevant to Space Base organizational structure can be ob-
tained. Certain social system similarities were found and 
several organizational structural criteria were identified 
from the more similar analogs. However, analysis of data 
showed that relevancy to Space Base was found lacking. 
This led to an ultimate conclusion that Space Base as 
envisioned would be an environment somewhat unique in itself. 
Implications of the Study 
A number of implications are advanced and presented 
as a result of this research study. Hopefully, this
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discussion will be of value to practitioners and theoreticians 
who are concerned with organizational structure design and 
selection for complex organizations, as well as to those who 
will be involved in Space Base program management. Important 
to this latter group will be the need for orderly, effective, 
and efficient Space Base R&A activities and support operations. 
Implications for Space Base
Program Management 
The study was justified primarily because of the need 
to reduce high program costs, to maintain a productive crew, 
and to accommodate a mixed crew of technologists in an unusual 
environment. As a result of this study, it was determined 
that an organic-adaptive total matrix model would best serve 
these needs. The rationale provided was that this model, 
overall, satisfied level I and level II discriminating 
criteria and all criteria considered better than the other 
models.
In general, it was seen that the total matrix model 
was optimum because it provided for R&A activities which 
are undefined at present, either a modularly constructed 
or centralized Space Base design, autonomous operations from 
earth except for Shuttle visits, in-orbit planning and 
scheduling, and effective training and indoctrination of 
crew members. In addition, this model accommodated task 
leaders, had flexibility for varying crew size, provided 
for the unity of command principle, encouraged quality and
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speed of decision-making, and ensured a line of communications 
in the event of emergency. 
As with any study of this nature, it is necessary to 
discuss implications for those practitioners concerned with 
Space Base program management--program planners, the Program 
Manager, in-orbit Space Base Directors, as well as the 
remainder of the crew. Important considerations for these 
personnel because of the selection of the total matrix are 
facility design crew selection training plans, crew 
scheduling, motivation, and morale. - 
Facility design 
Facility design must have provisions for crew 
accommodation, commonly used facilities, and work areas 
required to support the mission. While the total matrix 
model does not possess unique features requiring special 
designs, considerations must be made for living and working 
matters, work team audio and visual communications, equip-
ment layout, and health and recreational equipment, among 
other things. Certain special needs for female and inter-
national crew members and occasional VIPs who may be 
visitors must also be considered. 
Crew selection 
The identification of a four-level model consisting 
of three management and one task level dictates general 
crew selection requirements. For example, selection of the
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various level managers will require different selection 
criteria than those required for the technologist task 
members. Selection criteria will be based on general and 
specific administrative and technical skills required. 
The Space Base Director' and the R&A Director should 
be selected on the basisof related baOkground and 'experience 
in managing large, multidisciplinary activities. -The Support 
Operations Director should have an operations background. 
Project and functional managers who may have- 'a lesser scope 
of responsibility must be 'people who can work cooperatively 
with each other and others without excess detrimental 
competition. Technologists should be selected based on 
specialized skills, cross skills, knowledge, and experience. 
They should be people who are motivated to learn from others. 
The sources of these personnel will be from NASA, and domes-
tic/international universities, and industries. 
Training plans
 
While itisplanned that all crew members will have 
a minimum of astronaut-type training and physical condition-
ing, certain training will be required after crew members''- 
have been selected. Three general types of 'training will be 
needed to ensure mission success. They are specialized, 
familiarization, and team training. 
Specialized training would prepare skilled techni-
cians to use equipment peculiar to Space Base and necessary 
for performing their specialized tasks. This training
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would be necessary even though the individuals were highly 
trained and experienced in a discipline. Familiarization 
training would be required by all personnel prior to their 
first mission assignment. Included in this category would 
be communications, safety, and emergency procedures, and 
facility familiarization. Finally, team training would 
focus on the activities and tasks that require group inter-
action and cooperation. This training would promote the 
development of cohesive work units and flexibility of group 
assignment by encouraging group members to learn and appre-
ciate the skills of other members. 
The literature on group performance is rich with 
conclusion on the efficiency of this latter type of training. 
When groups train as teams, cohesiveness results,-.-even 'zhen 
they are operating under less than ideal working conditions. 
Cohesive groups are usually less vulnerable to reduction in 
performance over long periods of time. Even more important, 
these groups have been found to act and react more favorably 
during critical and emergency conditions. 
Crew scheduling 
Certain aspects of crew scheduling must be evaluated 
by program planners as a function of organizational struc-
ture selection. Crew scheduling can be considered as con-
sisting of two primary areas: tour of duty and duty cycle. 
Both areas are important to program management. 
An assumption made during this study was that crew
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members will remain in the Space Base for varying tours of 
duty. This likely situation will result in the condition 
where certain crew members and task teams will be returned 
to earth when their activities are complete. New task 
members joining established task groups and the formation 
of entirely new groups are, therefore, a reality. As a 
result, task groups and individuals must be rotated without 
causing a restructuring of communication links or channels 
of influence. Members and teams must fit into the existing 
structure working under a task leader without disruption. 
The total matrix model is, however, well suited to this type 
of transient activity. 
Duty cycles for members and teams will be determined 
largely by the nature of tasks which must be performed. 
Frequently, work will be accomplished by R&A members on a 
variety of shifts throughout a period depending on the nature 
of the experiments and observations to be made. On-board 
planning and scheduling, thus, becomes more acute, as does 
the need for communications, coordination, and integration. 
In addition, varying maintenance repair and housekeeping 
functions by Support Operations personnel must be accomplished 
when they will not conflict with R&A activities. 
Crew motivation and morale 
A significant factor affecting crew motivation and 
morale and relating to organizational structure is the degree 
of crew participation and involvement in the decision-making
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process. This consideration appears repeatedly in manage-
ment literature. While the total matrix model is dependent 
at all levels and designed for participation in the decision 
making process, leadership style is also important. An 
authoritarian leader, except in emergency situations, will 
do. much to stifle the creative environment needed. Con-
versely, a participative leadership style over extended 
periods of time will develop a superior level of perfor-
mance and achievement using the total matrix model. 
Another function affecting crew motivation and morale 
is the degree to which the reality of the Space Base environ-
ment, in terms of duty assumptions and responsibilities, 
matched each crew member's expectations. Important to this 
consideration are crew training activities which. would 
define, in general terms, what would be expected of each 
member so that little misinformation existed. If this under-
standing at least approximates reality, crew members at 
all levels will not be confronted with unanticipated situa-
tions and expectations. Deterioration of morale would not 
result from inaccurate or incomplete representation of their 
roles. ....- 	 . 
.;In the past, NASA has not selected organizational 
structure first and then considered facility design, crew 
selection, training, scheduling, and motivation and morale 
for its manned space programs. While there are several 
reasons for the approach taken, the main one was that only a
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few astronauts (one-to-three) were usually required. Those 
concerned with Space Base program management need to be 
conscious of this difference and the implications-of the 
selection of an in-orbit matrix structure. They also need 
to.be
 aware of the requirements and advantages of this model 
over the more conventional line-functional structures used 
in the past. 
Implications for Those Concerned With 
Management Theory 
The primary purpose of this investigation was to 
identify the optimum organizational structure for a crew 
of technical professionals involved in multidisciplinary 
activities in an unusual environment. It was found that-an 
organic-adaptive type of project organization will best fit 
Space.
 Base program objectives, type of personnel involved, 
and situational conditions. Important to management
	 - 
theoreticians obviously would be the method and rationale 
which were used to develop and answer the primary study 
question. Consequently, in a theoretical sense, the 
methodology was important, if not more important, than the 
answer derived because of its possibilities. For that 
reason, both the implications of the methodology, and the 
selection of a matrix structure are discussed. 
The ,methodology 
A significant study implication is that the methodology 
used is not confined to Space Base 4nalysis only. By its very
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nature, it is applicable to all management studies involving 
organizational structure design and selection. The methodology 
is therefore valuable to government, corporation, and academic 
planners, since it is not sensitive to any particular set of 
organizational objectives and plans, capability of personnel, 
environment, or authority needs. 
Initial or periodic organizational structure assess-
ment to determine a superior model is possible. Initially, 
a preferred model can be identified using the study meth-
odology. Once functioning, the organizational structure can 
be modified to satisfy changing needS. As new criteria and 
model variations are identified, a team or several teams of 
experts can be used to evaluate criteria satisfaction by the 
operating model and other candidates. Overall ranking and 
range of scores analyses to detiine if a new criterion 
discriminates will provide valuable insight into the 
suitability of the models. 
More specifically, the Sells technique used early in 
the study, has several obvious advantages to other comparison 
schemes. First, it is a quantitative method by which com-
parison between a number of social systems can be made. 
Not only can these systems be ranked, but a similarity 
analysis can be made by system description categories, 
namely, objectives and goals, value systems, personnel 
composition, organization, technology, physical environment, 
and temporal characteristics. Second, a large variety of
215 
systems can be assessed simultaneously. As a result, a 
variety of organizational types (e.g., profit, nonprofit, 
diversified, and centralized) can be scored and ranked as 
part of the same analysis. 
The Grumman methodology, as modified by the present 
study, also has universal applications. This three-phase 
approach. allows any analyst to identify the, optimum struc-
ture of those considered based on the best information 
available. As new criteria, models, and teams are identi-
fied, revised data can be used to update, modify slightly, 
or totally change results. 
Data research, development of organizational struc-
tural evaluation criteria and a set of feasible models, 
and evaluation of feasible models and selection of the one 
which is optimum are a relatively simple sequence. As with 
any other technique. of this nature, the quality of results 
achieved is a function of the quality of the input data, 
effort expended, and competency of the evaluation personnel. 
In spite of the simplicity of the three phases involved 
and the synergistic results, each phase has certain 
implications that should be indicated. 
.Data research, the first phase, used reviews of 
literature, visitations,and examination of certain analogs, 
and interviews as sources of data. Most management studies 
would not use all three of these sources in such a concurrent 
and complementary fashion. The reason is simply that it is
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usually difficult to integrate the variety of data obtained. 
In addition, without the Sells technique, it would be diffi-
cult to properly determine which potential analogs to 
investigate. Even after this analysis, if applicable analogs 
are found not to exist, valuable information has been obtained. 
Development of evaluation criteria and a set of 
feasible models, the second phase, evolves from data 
research. These developments are the result of the integra-
tion of data obtained. The taxonomy used and the collation 
of these data do much to limit and direct these developments. 
Since this phase requires criteria which could be used for 
evaluation and possible organizational structural model 
identification, care must be taken to ensure that only the 
most applicable are used. Otherwise the evaluation becomes 
too cumbersome and results in wasted effort. 
Evaluation of feasible models and selection of a 
final model, the third phase, can be accomplished by an 
individual or many, depending on resource availability and 
quality of results desired. This phase of activities is 
particularly suited to the iterative Delphi technique which 
has been found useful for consensus forecasting. Using 
Delphi for consensus evaluation would not only be a new 
application of the technique, but it would enhance the 
evaluation process by providing added confidence in the 
results achieved. Computerized scoring and quantitative 
analysis of results obtained would be an obvious advantage
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if the evaluation group were large or recurring results were 
needed.
An important consideration, however, is that while 
all criteria used in the evaluation process are important 
and can be weighted accordingly, the attention of the final 
evaluators should be focused on the discriminating criteria 
as well. The identification of these criteria separate the 
wheat from the chaff and allow in-depth analysis of criteria 
which discriminate between models. Incremental analysis of 
these criteria provides a great deal of insight into the 
strengths and weaknesses of models under analysis. 
In summary, the flexibility and usefulness of the 
methodology (including the Sells technique) has a number 
of advantages over other evaluation techniques. Usually, 
other schemes are based on the intuition of a few, or con-
sideration of only a limited number of important variables 
required to insure proper organizational structural selec-
tion. This methodolágy has no such weaknesses. 
The selection of a matrix 
structure 
The resultant selection of a total matrix project 
organization for Space Base has several obvious advantages 
over other models considered. These advantages have already 
been discussed extensively. However, there are several 
supplemental considerations for those concerned with manage-
ment theory.
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The first, as this study points out, is that organic... 
adaptive organizational structures will probably have a 
significant and increasing function in the future. The need 
for mechanistic (bureaucratic) structures, while having cer-
tain application for more routine functions, cannot meet 
the needs and demands of complex organizations of the future. 
The second is that the needs of creative technologists, with 
respect to professional organizations, situational factors, 
authority relationships, and potentials of conflict, must 
be continually evaluated and studied. Research on research 
will have increased importance in the future. 
The rate of growth of technology due to advancements 
made by technical professionals in professional organizations 
has been ever increasing. However, many organizations have 
become even more complex as seemingly insurmountable problems 
are identified and solved. As demonstrated by the Apollo 
program. and other large undertakings, multidisciplinary 
approaches are needed to find these solutions. Once solu-
tions are found, members of the teams formed are reassigned 
to use their skills and talents for other applications. 
This trend will probably continue in the future because of 
the productivity of this approach--Results will be obtained 
which would be impossible using the classical organizational 
structures and traditional personnel assignments. 
Limitations of the StHqy
 
Research studies are not without limitations, and
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this one is no exception. Several limitations are recognized 
and are identified below. Basically, they can be classified 
into three general categories: evaluator limitations, 
instrument limitations, and analysis limitations. 
Evaluator limitations 
This limitation refers to the general unwillingness 
and/or inability of an evaluator to accurately respond in 
scoring social systems or models. In this case, both the 
researcher and other members of the evaluation team are 
affected, since evaluation activities occurred using the 
Sells technique and the Grumman methodology. In reality, 
the only problem encountered in the present study might have 
been the difficulty for evaluators to accurately assess their 
personal perceptions of the systems or models being con-
sidered. The tedious and time consuming requirements of 
these evaluations do not help. 
It was found by the researcher during the Sells 
evaluation that on occasion there was some difficulty in 
accurately assessing personal perceptions. For that reason, 
the total evaluation was repeated three times, each time 
updating prior results. A similar technique was used by 
several of the evaluators during the model versus criteria 
comparisons. Several evaluators reported that they had a 
much stronger feeling of confidence in their scoring 
responses after the second or third iteration. To further 
increase this confidence, after data were received, the
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researcher asked each evaluator to review his scoring of 
models for a particular criterion if results were signifi-
cantly different from the consensus. 
As a result of these procedural steps, reasonable 
assurance exists that evaluators were able to accurately 
quantify their personal perceptions. While an inherent 
evaluator limitation in this kind of research may exist, 
a lot was done to reduce or totally alleviate the problem 
procedurally. 
Instrument limitations 
This limitation refers to deficiencies in the 
evaluation material and instructions used in this research. 
Several possible limitations are recognized 
1. The data gathered were not adequate to provide 
answers to the primary and elemental questions. 
2. The evaluators may not have understood the 
instructions asked, the evaluation material, 
or what was expected of them. 
3. The evaluators may not have followed the 
instructions. 
4. The labeling of organizational structural 
models may have biased the evaluators. 
The first limitation cited above was not a problem 
because the data obtained did answer the elemental questions 
which provided an answer to the primary study question. The 
second limitation also did not materialize because of
221 
conference and individual telephone calls which followed 
the mailed evaluation packages. Even though two pilot 
evaluations were conducted, there was some evidence that 
several evaluators did not fully understand a few of the 
criteria and distinctions between some of the models. 
Minimum effort was required to correct this problem, however, 
and usually a single contact was all that was required. 
The third limitation was concerned with evaluators 
not following instructions. There is little evidence to 
believe that this occurred, since each evaluator was 
instructed to score model variations for the first criterion, 
then proceed to the second, and so on. Results received 
and conversations with the evaluators indicate that this 
procedure was closely followed without difficulty. In addi-
tion, since one of the evaluators developed the Grumman 
evaluation scheme used, it is doubtful-that difficult\ was 
experienced in understanding or following instructions on 
his part.
j 
The fourth limitation, related to possible model 
labeling bias, was not considered to be a serious problem by 
the researcher. The reason was that names were assigned to 
the eight feasible models based on their predominant features. 
These model features were carefully described to each 
evaluator. However, since no attempt was made in this study 
to measure variations in evaluation scores due to labeling 
bias, it is suggested that descriptive names not be used in
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future replications of this evaluation process. Numbers 
or letters assigned to each model-would be a recommended 
substitute. 
Analysis limitations 
This limitation is concerned with those aspects of 
the study methodology which involves the analysis of data 
accomplished in section IV. Since several types of 
analyses identified and verified the selection of a single 
model as being optimum, limitation of any one analysis 
technique was not considered significant and would not 
invalidate the primary study conclusion. In addition, 
scoring and ranking techniques used in the present study 
are widely used, primarily because of their simplicity and 
ease of understanding. 
Two possible analysis limitations during the final 
quantitative and qualitative portion of section IV were 
overcome by the rationale provided. The first was that dur-
ing quantitative analysis comparing percentage superiority 
of the total matrix model and the next best model, in some 
cases, only small superiority was indicated--perhaps due to 
chance variation. The occurrence of these small differences 
was not considered to be important because what must be 
realized was that the next best model was being contrasted. 
If comparisons were made to each of the individual models, 
percentage superiority of the total matrix model would be 
considerably higher.
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The second possible limitation was that too much 
subjectiveness would be introduced into the qualitative 
portion of the analysis. Care was exercised, however, 
because rationale for analysis was provided by written 
evaluator comments when models did.not fully satisfy the 
criteria. Also, in proper perspective, it should be realized 
that the qualitative analysis was intended to be supportive 
and somewhat redundant to the quantitative analysis. 
Although the above evaluator, instrument, and analysis 
limitations were noted, it was not felt that any were so 
severe as to reduce the validity or usefulness of the study 
results. . These limitations are not unique to this study 
since they occur in most behavioral science research studies. 
Importantly, more significant limitations were eliminated by 
the study design used, and as a result many potential errors 
which could have materialized did not. 
Other Areas for Research 
.This study has resulted in findings, conclusions, 
and implications. The researcher, therefore, feels that it 
is appropriate to identify a number of areas which would be 
useful for further analysis of this subject. This research 
is suggested because of the large financial investment Space 
Base will require, the program's potential significance, 
and, hopefully, the part that,
 this study will play in Space 
Base planning and organizational considerations.
ra
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First, an exact replication of the model evaluation 
process should be accomplished by teams of different mixes 
and sizes. Further replication should also include the 
results of additional studies of evaluation criteria, 
organizational structural models, and weighting factors. 
These criteria and models should be investigated for addi-
tions, deletions, or modifications. Even the Space Base 
program requirements which resulted in level I criteria 
should be reevaluated for validity and usefulness now that 
a period of time has elapsed since their inception. A 
computer software program would be useful for data analysis 
purposes, if team size increases. This replication would 
serve to validate the model selected, even though the total 
matrix model was identified as the preferred model from data 
obtained from pilot and primary evaluation team results. 
These teams should include heterogeneous members of diverse 
backgrounds and interests including those from scientific, 
industrial, military, and academic organizations. 
Second, the top two organizational structural models 
should be tested in situ in the most analogous environments 
possible. That is, test the total matrix and traditional 
models in either oceanographic research ship or antarctic 
situations. Testing in these environments, in conjunction 
with worthwhile R&A activities and support operations, would 
allow removal of large-sized heterogeneous crews from their 
natural and customary social and work environments, and
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would provide confinement and stress conditions. This 
testing would serve to validate fundamental premises 
regarding large groups involved in and supporting R&Za. 
activities and small groups involved in project/function 
assignments, the organizational structural findings 
drawn, and recommendations made in this study. 
Third, the selection of the total matrix organiza-
tional structural model suggests that other program elements 
such as Space Base design, crew selection, training, 
scheduling, and motivation and morale will be affected. 
Other related studies should be begun at an early date to 
investigate the effects of the selected structure on these 
considerations. A fully successful Space Base program will 
be dependent on the compatibility of these follow-on con-
siderations to the total matrix model. 
Finally, the methodology should be tested in a wide 
variety of environments where optimum results are at a 
premium. These environments should include the gamut from 
large to small, highly skilled to unskilled, diversified to 
centralized, and profit to nonprofit organizations. If 
after several years of testing and structuring of a variety 
of groups the methodology is validated, a valuable contri-
bution will have been made to general organization theory 
and practice.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN THE STUDY
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN THE STUDY 
The nature of this subject requires thatcertain 
terms used should be defined to aid in understanding. The 
definitions provided are intended to be traditional in 
nature, although some may not be. The termsincludedin: 
this Appendix are defined by the researcher in the following 
way:
Analog.--an-environment or facility which has similar, 
appropriate, and related characteristics to the situation 
being evaluated. 
ications.--the direct use of a space facility to 
conduct periodic and continuous earth and space survey, study, 
service, and development activities. 
pied_Research.--investigation which is directed 
toward practical or commercial application of scientific 
knowledge. 
Author.--the right connected with a position or 
rank to make a decision in fulfillment of a responsibility 
and to act, command, or require action by others. 
Basic Research.--original- investigation , or inquiry 
which is directed toward increasing the knowledge of science 
rather than practical application. 
Confinement.--physical and temporal limitation on 
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the activities and translational motions of an individual or 
group, occasioned by enclosure within a restrictive barrier, 
and sometimes associated with elements of perceptual and 
social isolation. 
Criterion.--a standard on which a judgment or 
decision-may be based. 
Delegation.--the granting or conferring of both

responsibility and authority from one organization to another. 
Development.--systematic use of scientific knowledge 
directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, 
systems, or methods including design and origination of proto-. 
types and processes. 
Discipline.--a branch of learning or field of study. 
Discriminating Criteria .--udgment standards which 
have evaluation scores which vary significantly between 
tested organizational structural models. 
Effectiveness.--the degree to which an individual or 
group of individuals realize goals and objectives. 
Efficiency.--a measure of the amount of resources used 
to produce a unit of output. 
Engineer.--a college-trained person having expert 
knowledge in the design, operation, or production of either 
mechanical, electrical, chemical, aeronautical, or similar 
discipline mechanisms and processes. 
Formal Organization.--a system of coordinated activi-
ties of a group of people working cooperatively toward a
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common goal under authority and leadership. 
Hierarchy.--the vertical division of authority and 
responsibility and the assignment of duties to organizational 
units.
Homeostasis.--a stable state or balance. 
Informal Organization.--those aspects of an organiza-
tional system which are not formally planned, but arise spon-
taneously from activities of participants. 
Interface.--a region common to two or more elements, 
systems, projects, or programs and characterized by mutual 
physical, functional, environmental, operations, and/or 
procedural properties. 
Integration.--the process of achieving unit of effort 
among the various subsystems in the accomplishment of the 
organization's task. 
Isolation.--separation from the whole and set apart. 
Laboratory.--a facility or area equipped for scien-
tific experimentation, research, development, or testing. 
Manager.--an individual engaged in decision-making, 
that affects technical professionals and others, the one 
who implements these decisions through command. 
Mission.--the purpose for which the organization 
exists; it is the sum of all the more detailed goal formula-
tions--the objectives. 
Multidiscplina.--participating in work activity of 
two or more technical professionals trained in various
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disciplines. 
Organic-Adaptive Organizational Structure.--a 
temporary organizational system of diverse specialists 
solving problems, linked together by coordination and task 
evaluation. 
Organizational Structure.--the established pattern 
or deliberate grouping of relationships among the components 
or parts of a formal organization to achieve specific goals; 
characterized by planned division of activities, leadership, 
and communications responsibilities, and the presence of a 
hierarchy of authority needed to control, direct, and coordi-
nate the concerted efforts of the organization towards its 
goal.
Power.--the ability to secure desired behavior from 
individuals or to affect a situation in a predetermined 
manner.
Principal Investigator (P.I.).--a member of the scien-
tific, academic, or medical community responsible for a 
research or applications activity. 
Process.--a series of actions that leads to the 
accomplishment of objectives; e.g., management processes 
include planning, organizing, controlling, directing and 
coordinating. 
Program.--a related series of undertakings which con-
tinue over a period of time (normally years) and which are 
designed to accomplish a broad scientific or technical goal.
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Project.--an undertaking with a scheduled beginning 
and end, such as the operation ofanew launch vehicle (and 
associated ground support equipment) 'during its R&D phase. 
Project Manager.--an individual' responsibile for the 
planning,'organizing, directing and controlling of aprojèt. 
Research.--investigation or inquiry which is either of 
the basic or applied variety.  
Research' and Applicatioiis (R&A)Facili.--an in-orbit 
operatiOnal Skylab, Spacè Station, r Space Base. 
Responsibility.--the obligation of an individual to 
perform the duties assigned to him to the best of his 
abilities. In another sense, a responsibility may be regarded 
as a duty. 
Scientist.--a college-trained person having expert 
knowledge in either chemistry, mathematics, physics, 
astronomy, psychology, or similar disciplines or areas of study. 
Situational Stress.--the set of environmental circum-
stances which tend to disturb homeostasis or internal 
stability. 
Span of Control.--the number of subordinates reporting 
to a superior. 
Stress.--the set of circumstances which tend to dis-
turb homeostasis, or internal stability. 
Structure.--see organizational structure. 
Synergistic.--cooperative action such that the total 
effect is greater than the sum of the parts taken separately.
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Technical Professional.--a scientist or engineer 
who is experienced and working in the same or related field 
as his, discipline of study.. 
Technician.--anoncollege-.trained person having 
slcills..in one or more. areas of scientific or engineering 
areas of study. 
'Technologist.--a scientist, engineer, or technician. 
Work Unit.--a task which contributes to the-accomplish-
ment of functions, and which a single individual is required 
to perform ...
SPACE BASE ANALOG EVALUATION 
A study of this nature requires, as part of the 
analytical process, consideration of appropriate analogous 
situations. The basic problem then was to determine what 
situations are most similar to the Space Base environment 
under consideration. The methodology which makes this 
comparison possible is contained in this appendix. 
Sells has developed a comparison method for 
evaluating the appropriateness of eleven well-known social 
systems to a subject system.' The systems considered all 
had elements of isolation, confinement, situational danger 
and substantial information in the literature associated 
with them. These variables and data availability make 
each identified system important for consideration 
purposes. The objective of the Sells study was to develop 
a ranking for eleven systems, and to determine categorical 
areas of similarity and difference. The subject system was 
a hypothetical 500-day mission to Mars and return by a crew 
S. B. Sells, "A Model for the Social System for the 
Mu].timan Extended Duration Space Ship," Aerospace Medicine, 
)OOCVII (November, 1966), 1105-135; and S. B. Sells, "General 
Theoretical Problems Related to Organizational Taxonomy: A 
Model Solution and Its Assumptions," Paper presented to the 
Symposium on People, Groups, and Organizations: An Effective 
Integration of Knowledge, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
September 30, 1966.
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of six.
The following list contains the eleven system 
patterns identified by Sells  and eleven additional systems 
identified by the writer. Two of the additional systems 
identified are for programs which have not been accomplished 
yet, but will be prior to the initiation' of an operational 
Space Base. The two futuristic systems identified, and also 
discussed in other parts of this study, are the Skylab and 
Space Station programs. The comparative systems used for 
this analysis are: 
1. Apollo spacecraft
 
2. Nuclear submarines 
3. Ben Franklin research submarine 	 s 
4. Tektite II laboratory 
5. Sealab II  
6. Oceanographic research ships 
7. Antarctic stations  
8. Exploration parties and expeditions 
9. Transoceanic aircraft flights 
10. Prison societies 
11. Mental hospital wards 
12. Off-Shore/Remote - drilling rigs 
13. Bomber Crews 
14. Remote AC&W stations 
15. Professional athletic teams 
16. Industrial work groups 
17. Shipwrecks and disaster situations 
18. Prisoner of war groups 
19. Earthbound R&D labs 
20. Ninety-day Space Station simulation 
21. Skylab  
22. Space Station 
Table 1 is a comparison of social system profiles for 
the identified twenty-two system patterns with that of Space 
'Sells, "A Model for the Social System," p. 1130. 
2 Ibid., p. 1134.
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Base. Sells has developed a standard set of system structure 
characteristics that can be applied generally as a means of 
ordering various microsocieties according to their similarity 
to each other. The set consists of seven categories and 
fifty-eight elements (slightly modified by the writer). 
These elements can be ordered on a continuum conducive to 
comparative analysis. 1 The numbered comparison systems are 
those identified above. 
The twenty-two comparison systems have been sequen-
tially evaluated against each system element. The numbers 
shown indicate the relative degree of similarity between the 
comparison systems and the Space Base system. A three point 
scale - two (highly similar), one (moderately similar), and. 
zero (dissimilar or unrelated) - developed by Sells 2 was used. 
The comparative relative values shown, representing a 
separate decision in each case, were made by the writer 
based on extensive studies of the known characteristics of 
the comparison systems. A maximum similarity score for the 
fifty-eight elements would be 116 (2 x 58), with scores 
ranging from 116 to 0. 
Table 2 is a tabulation of the similarity scores for 
each comparison system. The systems are then ranked starting 
with the highest scoring system (Space Station), and ending 
with the lowest (mental hospital wards). 
1lbid., pp. 1132-134.	 2lbid., p. 1134.
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON SYSTEMS SIMILARITY RANK AND SCORE 
Comparison Systems	 Similarity Similarity 
Rank	 Score 
22.	 Space Station 1 S 
6.	 Oceanographic research 
ships 2 99 
7.	 Antarctic stations 3 93 
19.	 Earthbound R&D labs 4 78 
3.	 Ben Franklin research 
submarine 5 77 
4.	 Tektite II lab 6 76 
20.	 Ninety-dày Space Station 
simulation 7 74 
2.	 Nuclear submarines 8 72 
5.	 Sealab II 9 71 
21.	 Skylab 10 70 
8.	 Exploration parties and 
expeditions 11 64 
14.	 Remote AC&W stations 12 62 
16.	 Industrial work groups 13 61 
9.	 Transoceanic aircraft 
flights 14 59 
13.	 Bomber crews 15 58 
1.	 Apollo program. 16 55 
12.	 Off-Shore/remote drilling 
rigs 17 53 
15.	 Professional athletic 
teams 18 43 
17.	 Shipwrecks and disaster 
situations 19 29 
18.	 Prisoner of war groups 20 23 
10.	 Prison societies 21 16 
11.	 Mental hospital wards 22 15
247 
Several conclusions have been drawn by the writer 
based on the analysis of the ranking provided in Table 2. 
The first is that the first three systems are the most 
analogous to Space Base, and the last four rank least 
analogous. In both cases definite break points are shown 
in the similarity scores. The second conclusion is that 
because of the discernible break between the scores of the 
tenth (Skylab) and the eleventh (Exploration parties and 
expeditions) systems, that the first ten comparison systems 
should be considered the most analogous and relevant 
systems for purposes of this study. 
Table 3 is an analysis of system similarities by 
descriptive categories. This method of comparative analysis, 
also developed by Sells, 1
 uses numbers to indicate similarity 
on the following bases: two for matching over 70 per cent 
of the items in each category from Table 1,' one for match-
ing 31 to 70 per cent, and zero for matching less than 3Q 
per cent. 
The table is interesting because of the similarities 
and dissimilarities shown. In this analysis it is seen 
that there is close ,
 similarity to Space Base by the four top 
ranking.systems. The notable exception is in the physical 
environment category for earthbound R&D Labs, and this result 
is not totally unexpected. The bottom four categories 
indicate the extent of dissimilarity which exists between 
1lbid., p. 1135.
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these systems and Space Base in almost all categories. 
Only a few scattered, moderate. similarities exist. 
It is important and necessary to indicate that some 
limitations of this comparative analysis exist. First, 
weights are not assigned, nor is relative importance given 
to the,
 particular elements of system structure characteris-
tics shown in Table 1. Second, the list of elements may
. not 
be mutually exclusive or all inclusive. Lastly, this 
comparison was made by a knowledgeable individual (the 
researcher in this study) and not by a group of knowlede-
able individuals. 
While these limitations at first seem to be a 
condemnation of the methodology, there are several reasons 
why the method should be considered valid and-necessary for 
this study. First, while it may be desirable to--weigh and 
give relative importance to each element, an adequate method 
does not exist to do so. A method might be for a knowledge-
able individual or group to assign subjective weighing 
factors for each element, but here again this method has its 
limitations. In addition, there is probably little reason 
to believe that any one element is important enough to 
warrant a factor which would change the results significantly. 
Second, while the list may not be mutually exclusive 
or all inclusive, it is the best available for this study. 
The methodology was found to be flexible enough to accom-
modate additions or deletions without significant impact.
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Third, the methodology should not be condemned because an 
individual was the only one who assigned point values 
rather than a group. Realistically, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to assemble a group knowledgeable enough 
to individually or collectively make the point assessments 
for the spectrum of system structure characteristics and 
comparison systems considered. 
In conclusion, the methodology and results presented 
in this appendix represent a necessary and accepted way of 
identifying and ranking the appropriateness of a multitude 
of analogous social systems. This analysis will serve as 
an important stepping stone for the total study methodology. 
The identified limitations of the Sells methodology are not 
considered by the researcher to be of sufficient magnitude 
to eliminate its use.
APPLICABLE ANALOG DESCRIPTION 
This appendix provides a brief description of the 
salient aspects of the most applicable analogs identified 
in Appendix C and used in this study. These ten analogs, 
listed in descending order of similarity to Space Base are 
Space Station, oceanographic research ships, Antarctic 
stations, earthbound R&D labs, the Ben Franklin research 
submarine, the Tektite II lab, the ninety-day Space Station 
simulation, nuclear submarines, Sealab II, and Skylab. 
Categories used for this discussion are objectives 
and goals, physical configuration, physical environments, 
personnel composition, organization, and technology. 
These categories are closely correlated to those used in 
the social system analysis of Appendix C, which was 
developed by Sells. In addition, these categories are 
similar to the organizational structural variables identi-
fied in Table 1 of section II. Much of the descriptive 
information of this appendix is summarized in Table 4 of 
that section. Any additional descriptive information of 
these analogs required by the reader, can be found in one 
of the appropriate references contained in the Bibliography. 
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Space Station 
Objectives and Goals 
To provide a centralized and general purpose laboratory 
in earth orbit for the conduct and support of scientific 
and technological experiments, for beneficial applications, 
and for the future development of space exploration capa-
bility for mission lasting three months in duration and 
longer
Physical Configuration 
Either a modular design compatible with the Space 
Shuttle cargo bay (fourteen-foot diameter), or a more 
centralized design (thirty-three-foot diameter) launched by 
a modified Saturn vehicle 
Physical Environment 
• Circular earth orbit 242 miles high 
• Semiconfinement and isolation 
• Zero and/or partial gravity 
• Autonomous operations planned 
Personnel Composition 
• Crew of six to twenty technologists 
*One-sixth of crew involved in administrations and 
operations 
.Male/female/international members 
*Moderate crew selection and mission training 
Organization 
*Undefined and still in study stage 
•Traditional line organizations recommended in several 
studies 
*Moderate communications, coordination, and integration 
will be required
Technology 
'Equipment automation where possible 
• State-of-the-technology R&? activities 
• Scientific principles involved
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Oceanographic Research Ships

Objectives and Goals 
*To conduct scientific studies and explorations of 
various durations of the oceans and seas in all their 
aspects, including the sediments and rocks beneath the 
seas; the interaction of sea and atmosphere; the behavior 
of the living content of the seas and sea floors; the 
chemical composition of the water; and the formation and 
interaction of beaches, shores, and estuaries 
Physical Configuration 
• Includes both conventional and special-purpose research 
ships and specialized research vehicles, such as deep 
submersibles 
*Includes vessels of varying sizes, shapes, and operational 
limitations
Physical Environment 
'Varies widely depending on oceanographic vessel con-
figuration and mission objectives 
•Semjconfjnement and isolation 
A wide variety of geographical conditions 
*Autonomous operations 
Personnel Composition 
'Crew size and skills vary widely 
'Crew functions usually split between scientific 
activities and support operations 
• Traditionally have an all male crew, but female and 
international crew members participating more 
. Moderate crew selection and training 
Organization 
S Traditionally used Naval line (functional) organizations 
• Now use more modern project structures for scientific 
activities with scientific responsibility for accomplishment 
resting with science leader and safety responsibilities
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belonging to the Captain 
•Little communications, coordination, and integration is 
usually needed because of the specialization of each mission 
Technology 
• Some equipment automation. 
• Scientific principles involved 
• state-of-technology vari.es widely 
Antarctic Stations . 
Objectives and Goals 
ITo conduct a wide variety of scientific studies and 
explorations involving a number of, research disciplines such 
as geology, physics, biology, medicine, glaciology 
oceanography, astronomy, geophysics, paleontology, and ,... 
psychology 
*Studies conducted year-round 
Physical Configuration 
*Varies between large, well-equipped facilities to a 
small cluster of portable vans  
*Many physical comforts and recreational facilities pro-
vided to personnel
 
Physical 'Environment 
*Antarctica considered the most hostile environment on 
earth inhabited by man 
• Temperatures recorded as 'low as -126°F
 
•Austral winter (March through October) covers continent 
in complete and continuous darkness, while perpetual sunlight 
occurs during the summer
	 . 
'Semiconfinemeñt and isolation"
 
•Total autonomy and isolation in winter
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Personnel Composition 
• Crew size Varies at different stations between '8 and 340 
people during "wintering in" period 
*Crew functions usually split between scientific activi-
ties and support operations 
'Civilian scientists and Navy 'officers and enlisted men 
staff stations 
sWomen excluded until recently 
*Moderate crew selection and training 
Organization 
'Traditionally use Naval line (functional) organizational 
structure 
.Navy officer is commander 
'Various scientific leaders identified 
*Little communications, coordination, and integration is 
usually needed
Technology 
'Some equipment automated 
'Scientific principles involved 
'State-of-technology varies wiciely 
Earthbound R&D Labs 
Objectives and Goals 
'To conduct a wide variety of R&D activities in the 
private and public sectors involving a number of disciplines 
such as physics, chemistry, biology, botany, and engineering 
Physical Configuration 
'Facilities vary widely with respect to size and location 
.Usually located near universities or other desirable areas 
Physical Environments 
'Usually attempt to develop an atmosphere of creativity
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*Technologist's  equipment/funding needs normally 
accommodated' 
'Few if any physical hazards 
•Moderate autonomy of operations 
Personnel Composition 
*Various staffing levels depending on funds and size of 
organization 
'Fairly heterogeneous manning for administration, R&D 
activities, and support operations 
'IMale and female organization members 
* Little physiological or psychological testing or training 
for a specific activity required 
* Generally high education/skill levels 
Organization 
S Organizational structure varies depending on organization 
size and activities 
*Matrix structure frequently used 
'Moderate communications, coordination, and integration is 
usually needed
Technology 
*Advanced and stae-of-the-technology equipment required 
• Scientific principles used extensively 
Ben Franklin
Objectives and Goals 
'To explore the Gulfstream from Florida to Nova Scotia 
using visual observations, bottom photography, and biological 
and acoustical surveys 
'To provide data for NASA's man-in-space programs on crew 
reactions, the man-machine interface, habitability, and the 
effects of complete biological isolation during a long-term 
mission lasting thirty days.
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Physical Configuration 
•A 147-ton displacement research submersible 
*Length forty-eight feet, extreme beam twenty feet, and 
height twenty-one feet 
S Four-knot maximum submerged speed 
• Powered by four electric motors 
• Marine observation through twenty-nine portholes 
Physical Environment 
• Semiconfinement and isolation 
*Outside water temperature of 44.6°F 
• Strong eddy currents within the Gulfstream 
.Some support provided by surface ships 
*Moderate autonomy of operations 
Personnel Composition 
•A six-man crew 
*Various scientific, engineerinq, and technician skills 
utilized 
*Captain was a former Navy submariner 
•Moderate crew selection and training 
Organization 
Top-sided Mission Director had overall mission 
responsibility 
*Small-scale on-board matrix organization 
*Captain responsible for activities and operations within 
the submersible 
*On-board Mission Scientific Leader identified 
*Little communications, coordination, and integration was 
needed
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Technology 
• Some equipment automated 
• State-of-the-technology equipment utilized 
• Scientific principles involved 
Tektite II
Objectives and Goals 
*To determine if a small group of men could perform 
scientific tasks for extended time periods under hazardous 
conditions and in a nitrogen saturated environment 
'To perform behavioral studies concurrently in the areas 
of individual and small group dynamics and human performance 
capability for use in NASA's man-in-space programs 
Physical Configuration 
•Two steel cylinders 12.5 feet in diameter and 18 feet 
high mounted vertically on a rectangular box-life base and 
connected by a tunnel 
•An'opén hatch provided access to and from the s.ea 
'Located fifty feet deep in the Great Larneshur Bay off 
St. John's Island in the U.S. Virgin Islands 
Physical Environment 
'Danger from the bends 
•Semiconfinement and isolation 
• Habitat supported from shore 
• Moderate autonomy of operations 
Personnel Composition 
• Ten - five diver teams 
*Each crew consisted of scientists and one habitat 
engineer 
l All_male and all-female crews 
•High education/skill levels 
• Stringent crew selection and training
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Organization 
• Team leaders. selected befOre missions began 
• Traditional line organization with main division between 
scientific and habitat engineering activities 
*Small multishift operating test-staff required during 
missions 
*Little communications, coordination, and integration 
required
Technology 
$ Some equipment automated 
*Advanced breathing and scientific equipment utilized 
• Scientific principles used 
Ninety-Day Space Station Simulation 
Objectives and Goals 
*To provide data in a closed ecology such as that of an 
orbiting:SpaCe.StatiOn for a'periodof ninety days-
-I TO' determine the performance of subsystems under con-
tinuous operating• conditions	 , 
•To demonstrate the ability of the crew to operate and 
maintain the various subsystems 
To evaluate the requirements of the crew formaintenance 
of their physiological and psychological health to efficiently 
perform mission objectives 
Physical Configuration 
•Doubie-walled horizontal cylinder, twelve feet in 
diameter and forty feet in length; 	 .' 
S An airlock located at one end 
*Several small pass-through ports 
ISimulator located at McDonnell Douglas Astronautics 
Company, Huntington Beach, California
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Physical Environment 
• Semiconfinement and isolation I Moderate autonomy of operations 
Personnel Composition 
• One - four man crew 
,Stringent crew selection and training. 
•Physical science graduate students 
,Incentive pay program utilized for the crew 
Organization 
• Quasi-military line organization within simulator 
*one crew member designated Crew Commander 
•Deputy Commander selected by the Commander with approval 
of the Program Manager 
•A relatively small multishift operating test staff and 
program management organization required during the simulation 
.Little communications, coordination, and integration 
required
Technology 
• Some automated equipment used 
*An advanced regenerative life support system used 
Nuclear Submarines 
Objectives and Goals 
'To serve as a strategic deterrent weapons system to 
prevent nuclear war 
*To remain hidden, mobile, and ready to launch any or all 
sixteen nuclear-tipped Polaris or Poseidon missiles against 
an enemy
Physical Configuration 
• Three classes of submarines ranging from 389 to 425 feet 
long, and 5,900 to 7,000 tons, respectively
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*When on operational status, range the oceans of the 
world
Physical Environment 
'Semiconfinement and isolation 
*Operate without communicating 
'Autonomy of operations 
'Some fear of accident present because of earlier nuclear 
submarines losses
Personal Composition 
*Crew size of approximately 125 Navy officers and enlisted 
personnel 
'Varying eduiation/skill levels 
.Stringent crew selection and training 
Organization 
,Traditional Navy line (functional) organizational structure 
•Captain has responsibility and authority for all vessel 
activities 
*Stringent communications, coordination, and integration 
required
Technology 
'Extensive equipment automation 
'Many advanced systems used 
Sealab II
Objectives and Goals 
*To demonstrate that man can live in a hostile ocean 
environment at a depth of 205 feet, and perform useful work 
for extended periods without returning to the surface 
*To increase man's knowledge of this environment for the 
purpose of making the millions of square miles of submerged
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territory of the continental shelves off the coasts of the 
United States accessible for useful purposes 
Physical Configuation 
• A twelve foot diameter and fifty-séven foot long steel 
cylinder 
• Eleven ports used for marine observation 
• An open hatch provided access to and from the habitat 
*Located one mile offshore inthe Pacific Ocean, near the 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla; CaI1orniá 
Physical Environment 
• Three - ten man teams of divers 
• Fifteen day mission duration with two men staying thirty 
days 
•Mixture of male civilian and active duty Navy personnel: 
scientists, divers, and salvage specialists 
• Ages varied from twenty-four to fifty years 
•Education varied from less than ninth grade tóthe graduate 
level 
• Stringent crew selection and training 
Organization 
*Traditional Navy line (functional) organization 
.A relatively small multishift operating test staff 
required during the missions 
*Little--communications, coordination, and integration 
required
Technology 
• Some equipment automation 
• A diversity of technology utilized 
• Some scientific principles involved
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Skylab 
Objectives and Goals 
• Scientific investigations in earth orbit including
astronomical, space physics, and biological experiments 
• Applications in earth-orbit including earth resources 
surveys to gather data for oceanography, water management, 
agriculture, forestry, geology, geography, and ecology 
• Understanding man's capabilities in space for extended 
- periods of time with one mission up to twenty-eight days 
duration and two others up to fifty-six days 	 - 
Physical Configuration 
•House trailer sized Orbital Workshop twenty-two feet in 
diameter and forty-eight feet long 
*other components such as an Airlock Module, Multiple 
Docking Adapter, Apollo Telescope Mount, and solar panels 
Physical Environment 
• Circular earth-orbit 270 nautical miles high 
• Semiconfinement and isolation 
• Zero gravity 
• Limited autonomy of operations 
Personnel Composition 
• Three - astronaut crews of three men 
*At least one crew member will be a scientist-astronaut 
• Stringent crew selection and training 
Organization 
• Military-type line organization with a commander in orbit 
•An extensive mission control and program management 
organization on earth 
*Stringent communications, coordination, and integration 
required.
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Technology 
• Some automated in-orbit equipment 
• State-of-technology R&A activities 
• Scientific principles involved 
*Engineering skills required
APPENDIX E 
EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS AND

EVALUATOR MATERIAL
EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS AND EVALUATION MATERIAL 
Study Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to identify an optimum formal 
organizational structure which would assure the orderly 
and effective management of Space Base crew members and 
their resources.	 - 
Evaluator Instructions and 
Evaluation Material 
1. Each evaluation team member should become familiar with 
the evaluation material included in the package provided. 
a. Artist's concept of centralized and modular earth-
orbiting Space Bases, and a photo of ámodular 
laboratory mockup. 
b. Space Base program requirements and assumptions. 
c. Figs. 4 and 5 (possible organizational structural 
models for a Space Base).	 - 
d. Figs. 12 and 13--Classical and matrix organizational 
structural models to be evaluated and their major 
features. 
e. Descriptions of organizational structural models to 
be evaluated. 
f. Table 5--Criteria with sources and rationale for 
organizational structural model evaluation. 
g. Table 7--Evaluation team membership. 
h. Table 8--Evaluation scores. 
1. Individual relative scoring of organizational 
structural models forms (3). 
j. Classical and matrix assumed manning levels. 
k. Evaluation rationale forms (twenty-three). 
68
269 
2. Each evaluation team member is asked to formulate any 
questions, so that they can be discussed and answered 
when contacted. Unfamiliar words or terms used in the 
material provided should be noted. The purpose of this 
contact is to ensure that all team members have the same 
understanding of the organizational structural models, 
the criteria, and the study methodology. 
On an individual basis, each team member will evaluate 
how well each of the criteria (listed in Table 5) are 
satisfied by the eight organizational structural motels 
being evaluated (Figures 12 and 13). Some criteria are 
self-descriptive, while others require that the surce/ 
rationale column be read for better understanding. Once 
scores (from Table 8). are assigned to the models: being 
evaluated (using the Individual Relative Scoring of 
Organizational Structural Models form), the process is 
repeated for the next criterion. If a model does not 
completely satisfy a criterion, the rater is to briefly 
indicate his reason on the evaluation rationale forms 
provided... These notes will be important should questions 
arise, after preliminary evaluation of the data. If 
questions develop during the individual evaluation period, 
contact James Ragusa at (305)1867-2355. Results should 
be mailed to: James M. Ragusa,. NASA-KSC-DY, Kennedy 
Space Center, Florida 32899. 
Selected study evaluation team member's may be asked to 
meet again after the data is received to critique results 
obtained.	 ,
3 ' 
4.
270 
Space Base Prpam Requirements 
and Assumptions 
Initial operation 1980-2000period 
Minimum life of ten years. 
Autonomous activities and operations when possible 
Modular or centralized configuration 
Shuttle vehicle used for logistics 
Multidisciplinary research and applications (R&A) activities 
Interplanetary mission support 
Crew size of 50 to 100 	 . 
Initially 50 crew members - later 100 
Male and female crew members 
Domestic and international technologists 
Permanent party and transient crew members 
Minimum astronaut-type training and physical conditioning 
NASA Directors and Managers 
Around-the-clock and nonroütine activities and operations
Traditional 
Line 
9%_I 
Dual Command , i
m 
Val 
Round Table
	 VA	
FOAM 
Note: Numbers in the upper part of each box are manning 
levels for a crew size of 100, while the lower numbers are 
for a crew size of 50. 
aMlS.fl Director located on earth 
Assumed manning levels for matrix 
organizational structural models
Dual 
Matrix 
Standard 
Matrix 
Shared 
Matrix 
Total 
Matrix 
Note: Numbers in the upper part of each box are manning 
levels for a crew size of 100, while the lower numbers are 
for a crew size of 50. 
aM SSOfl Director located on earth 
Assumed manning levels for matrix 
organizational structural models
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